Debates on the future role of nuclear weapons by Özer, Özkan
  
 
 
 
DEBATES ON THE FUTURE ROLE OF  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
 
 
The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences 
of 
Bilkent University 
 
By 
ÖZKAN ÖZER 
 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
MASTER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
 
 
 THE DEPARTMENT OF  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
BİLKENT UNIVERSITY 
 
 
ANKARA 
July 2002 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and I have found that it is fully adequate, in scope 
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations. 
 
Asst. Prof. Mustafa Kibaroğlu 
Thesis Supervisor 
 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and I have found that it is fully adequate, in scope 
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations. 
 
Asst. Prof. Nur Bilge Criss 
Examining Committee Member 
 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and I have found that it is fully adequate, in scope 
and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations. 
 
Dr. Walter E. Kretchik 
Examining Committee Member 
 
 
Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences 
 
Prof. Kürşat Aydoğan 
Director 
 iii
ABSTRACT 
DEBATES ON THE FUTURE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
ÖZER, ÖZKAN 
 
M.A. In International Relations 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu 
July 2002, 189 pages 
 Nuclear weapons are the most destructive power of the world, because of 
their inherited and unique potential capability to destroy the humanity in a matter of 
minutes. While some experts have perceived them as the main mechanisms of the 
international stability, peace and security, others have recognized them as the most 
formidable threat to the humanity. Meanwhile, on part of the US, they had been, 
throughout the Cold War, the main equalizer against conventional superiority of the 
Soviet Block and the main instrument of deterring a Soviet nuclear or conventional 
attack against the US and its allies. Hence, nuclear deterrence became the dominant 
concept of the Cold War to escape their actual use. However, the nuclear question of 
“how much is enough to deter enemy,” induced the Soviets and Americans to have 
huge nuclear arsenals, bigger than the nuclear stockpiles of each other. With the 
collapse of Soviet Union, this strategic system has transformed. The threat of nuclear 
war between two superpowers disappeared but new nuclear dangers began to surface 
within the unpredictable framework of the post-Cold War period. Moreover, the 
rational behind possessing huge nuclear stockpiles vanished. Because of these 
imperatives of the post-Cold War era, a number of people including military and 
civilian leaders, and prominent experts or academics in the US began to articulate 
their views on the future role of nuclear weapons in the US security policy. While 
some recommend realizing the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons as 
envisaged in the Article VI under NPT and abandonment of nuclear deterrence, 
others seem to reject making any radical change in the US nuclear strategy. In this 
context, there are many arguments and counter-arguments capturing substantial 
support from different groups and consequently a contemporary debate about the US 
nuclear strategy in the post-Cold War and the ongoing strategic arms reduction 
process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Deterrence, nuclear weapons, ABM, security, START, US, Soviet 
Union, Russia, debate, terrorism, HEU, Plutonium 
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ÖZET 
NÜKLEER SİLAHLARIN GELECEKTEKİ ROLLERİ ÜZERİNE 
TARTIŞMALAR 
ÖZER, ÖZKAN 
 
Uluslararası İlişkiler Yüksek Lisans 
Tez Danışmanı: Asst. Prof. Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu 
Temmuz 2002, 189 Sayfa 
 Nükleer silahlar, kendilerine özgü ve tabiatlarında var olan  insanlığı bir kaç 
dakika içerisinde yok edebilme potansiyelleri nedeniyle, dünyanın en tahrip edici 
gücüdür. Bazı uzmanlar nükleer silahları uluslararası istikrar , barış, ve güvenliğin  
ana mekanizmaları olarak görürken diğerleri onları insanlığa karşı en ürkütücü tehdit 
olarak algılamışlardır. Amerika açısından ise, onlar Soğuk Savaş müddetince Sovyet 
Bloğunun konvansiyonel üstünlüğüne karşı ana dengeleyici unsur ve Amerika ve 
mütttefiklerine karşı yapılabilecek bir Sovyet nükleer ve konvansiyonel saldırısını 
caydırmanın ana enstrumanları olmuştur. Bu nedenle, nükleer silahların gerçek 
anlamda kullanılmasını önlemek için nükleer caydırıcılık soğuk savaşın en önde 
gelen konsepti olmuştur.  Ancak, “düşmanı caydırmak için ne kadar gerekli” sorusu, 
Amerikayı ve Sovyetleri , birbirlerinden daha fazla olacak şekilde büyük nükleer  
mühümmat stoğu edinmeye sevk etmiştir. Sovyetler Birliğinin çökmesiyle bu 
stratejik sistem değişmiştir.  İki süper güç arasındaki nükleer savaş tehditi yok 
olurken, Soğuk Savaş sonrası döneminin  belirsiz yapısı icinde yeni nükleer tehditler 
ortaya çıkmaya başlamıştır. Bunun yanında, büyük nükleer  mühümmat stoğuna 
sahip olma güdüsünün temelindeki rasyonellik ortadan kalkmıştır. Soğuk savaş 
sonrası uluslarası yapının bu zorunluluklarından dolayı, Amerikadaki askeri ve sivil 
liderleri ve tanınmış uzman ve akademisyeleri de içeren birçok insan  Amerikan  
güvenlik politikası içerisinde nükleer silahların gelecekteki rolleri üzerine kendi 
görüşlerini dile getirmeye başlamıştır. Bazıları nükleer silahların yayılmasını önleme 
anlaşmasının 6. maddesinde öngörüldüğü gibi nükleer silahların yok edilme 
amacının gerçeşleştirilmesini ve nükleer caydırıcılığın terkedilmesini ileri sürerken, 
diğerleri Amerikan nükleer stratejisinde herhangi bir köklü değişiklik yapılmasına  
karşı çıkmaktadır. Bu durumda, farklı gruplardan önemli derecede destek gören 
argumanlar ve karşı argumanlar ve bunun sonucunda Amerikan’ın Soğuk Savaş 
sonrasındaki nükleer stratejisi ve devam eden stratejik silah indirim faaliyetleri ile 
ilgili bir tartışma mevcuttur. 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Caydırıcılık, nükleer silahlar, ABM, güvenlik, START, 
Amerika, Sovyetler Birliği, Rusya, tartışma, terrör, HEU,Plutonyum 
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INTRODUCTION: 
Nuclear weapons have always been recognized as the most destructive power 
of the world since their creation. Although they were only two times actually used by 
the United Sates (US) during the Second World War, since then even the threat of 
using them has been put under severe criticisms by many experts around the world. 
However, it did not become possible to prevent their dominance over international 
power politics. In this context, the nuclear question, “how can/should the nuclear 
weapons be used as a military power?” has been at the heart of debate among the US 
military analysts.   
The US as being the first country that tested and deployed, and the only 
country that used actually the nuclear weapons in a war, has been long tried to find 
an appropriate answer to this question. The answer seemed relatively simple in the 
early years of post-Second World War period, since the US was the only atomic 
power. However, when the Soviet Union developed and deployed its nuclear 
weapons, the answer became more complex. Moreover, the adversarial relationship 
between these two atomic powers dominated over the international system for about 
forty-five years. Hence, the threat of nuclear war continued to hang over the 
civilization as the dark clouds during this period. In this context, nuclear deterrence 
became the dominant concept of the Cold War. In addition, the nuclear question, 
“how much is enough to deter the enemy,” became the dominant challenge in the US 
security formulation.     
With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Soviet Union, the threat of 
nuclear war between two superpowers disappeared but new nuclear dangers began to 
surface within the unpredictable framework of the post-Cold War period. In addition, 
new opportunities became visible to address these dangers. In this context, a number 
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of people including military and civilian leaders, and prominent experts or academics 
in the US began to articulate their views on the future role of nuclear weapons in the 
US national security policy. While some recommend realizing the goal of total 
elimination of nuclear weapons and abandonment of nuclear deterrence, others seem 
to reject making any radical change in the US nuclear posture. There is a significant 
divergence in connection with the question of “what rationale nuclear weapons 
should serve in the post-Cold War security environment.” Hence, there are many 
proposals for revising the US nuclear strategy to address new security environment. 
In addition, there are many arguments and counter-arguments capturing substantial 
support from different groups and consequently a contemporary debate about the US 
nuclear strategy in the post-Cold War and ongoing strategic arms reduction process.  
Today the nuclear question appears to be the following: how low the US 
should/may go, with regard to the numbers of warheads; and which declaratory 
policies (such as no-first-use, negative or positive assurance) should be accepted as 
the main strategy for the US. Accordingly, in this context, this thesis aims to shed 
some lights on the divergent views of the American society about the appropriate 
role of US nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, and the ongoing strategic arms 
reduction activities in the post-Cold War security environment. One difficulty of 
analyzing this debate that this study faces is that there is not any rigid demarcation 
line among the advocates of different proposals. Hence, supporter of one view, in 
accordance with the changing security environment and new developments, may 
shift his support to another.   
In accordance with this purpose, this study suggests the following research 
questions: 
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What roles have been attributed to US nuclear weapons during and after the 
Cold War? 
What characteristics of new security environment are mainly significant in 
the debate about the future role of nuclear weapons in the US national security policy 
in the post-Cold War era? 
What are the arguments for and against the future role of nuclear weapons in 
the US national security policy in the post-Cold War era? 
What are the rationales behind the arguments for and against the future role of 
nuclear weapons in US national security policy in the post-Cold War era? 
What are the arguments for and against the ongoing US strategic arms 
reduction activities in the post-Cold War era? 
This thesis consists of three chapters. To fulfill the portrayed aim of this 
thesis, primarily, in the first chapter, the contributions of nuclear weapons to the 
deterrence concept, in terms of success and credibility, will be examined. It starts 
with the definition of deterrence. It analyzes the requirements of deterrence policy 
necessary to be successful, and the utility of conventional weapons as an instrument 
of deterrence. Moreover, the evolution of US and Russian nuclear strategy and the 
relevance of nuclear deterrence to the Cold War stability will be presented. Finally, 
the logic behind the realization of Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and the effects 
of mutual vulnerability logic on accomplishment of the ABM treaty under the Cold 
War security framework will be analyzed.  
The second chapter aims to put forward the post-Cold War amendments in 
the US nuclear strategy, in accordance with the changing security environment and 
the developments in international politics. It begins with the examination of 
emerging new world order and new security environment. Then, the new security 
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challenges and opportunities concerning nuclear weapons will be presented. In 
addition, the value and the utility of nuclear deterrence in the new security 
environment in the post-Cold War era will be examined.  
The third chapter will put forward arguments for and against the future role of 
nuclear weapons in the US nuclear strategy in the post-Cold War security 
environment, regarding their utility to address the new security challenges. 
Moreover, it sheds light on the rationales behind these arguments or counter-
arguments. Finally, the divergent views about ongoing US strategic arms reduction 
activities and the future role of nuclear weapons will be provided.  
This thesis uses a descriptive method and attempts to delineate the parties to 
the contemporary debate about the US nuclear strategy and strategic arms reduction 
process. The sources to be used in this study are US official sources, secondary 
sources from International Periodicals on International Relations Literature, books, 
and newspapers. 
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CHAPTER-1 
1. THE RELEVANCE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE TO THE 
COLD WAR PARADIGM 
The threat of going to war (the main instrument of deterrence) is an element 
of diplomacy that has been long exercised by the actors of international system to 
deter each other from doing undesired actions. Thus, this power strategy 
(Deterrence) is a very old experience that some analysts proclaim that it is, as a 
minimum, thousands of years old.1 However, before the advent of nuclear weapons 
deterrence policies seemed problematic in terms of credibility and probability of 
success. Bearing in mind that after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
the nuclear weapons have never been used actually, at least so far, and that the 
nuclear deterrence was relevant to supporting the Cold War stability many people, 
including military and civilian leaders express their thanks to existence of these 
significant weapons as an instrument of deterrence. Accordingly, it is the aim of this 
chapter to describe the underlying facts on the dominant concept of the Cold War, 
nuclear deterrence, and its relevance to the Cold War Paradigm. Before attempting 
to do this, to comprehend more clearly this concept, it is necessary to clarify what 
deterrence means, why deterrence lacks credibility and success, and in what ways 
nuclear weapons affect deterrence policy.   
            1.1. A Review on the Theory of Deterrence:  
As Colin S. Gray speaks out, deterrence was originated from and exercised in 
accordance with “a pragmatic wisdom” arising from “experience, commonsense, and 
                                                 
1 One of these analysts, Cioffi-Rovilla states that the earliest residents of Palestine, Mesopotamia, 
China, Peru, and Mesoamerica put into practice the deterrence thousands of years ago as a policy for 
influencing group behavior. For details see Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, “Origins and Age Of Deterrence: 
Comparative Research On Old World And New World Systems,” Cross-Cultural Research, Aug 99, 
Vol. 33, Issue 3, p. 239, 26 p, available on line at: ehostvgw12.epnet.com  
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intuition.”2 Beginning with what deterrence means will be practical to comprehend 
the theory of deterrence. Originally, the word deterrence comes from the Latin word 
“deterrere” that means, “to frighten from.”3 However, until now, many specialists 
and organizations have defined  “deterrence” in their own words.4  
John J. Mearsheimer, in his study of Conventional Deterrence describes 
plainly deterrence as a way of convincing an adversary not to fulfill a specific action 
by revealing him the situation in which the expected benefits would not match its 
potential costs and risks. In this approach, deterrence calls for a rational cost/benefit 
calculation process for a specific action. 5  Furthermore, Bernard Brodie defines 
deterrence as attempts to create appropriate “disincentives” to neutralize “the 
incentives” of the opponent to destroy the defender.6 It is possible to sort many more 
different definition for deterrence however it is not the main concern in this study. 
Nevertheless, it is obvious that these definitions correctly comprise the essential idea 
in the concept of deterrence, to create a perception in the minds of opponent that the 
expected benefits from attacking may cause a high cost. Thus, the fear about the 
consequences of a specific action was the main mechanism manipulated by the 
                                                 
2  See Colin S. Gray, “Deterrence in the 21st Century,” Comparative Strategy, Jul-Sep 2000, Vol. 19, 
Issue 3, p. 255, 7p, available on line at: globalvgw6.global.epnet.com 
3 The New International Webster's Dictionary, (Naples, Fla: Trident Press International, 1995) cited in 
National Academy of Sciences’ Committee on International Security and Arms Control, The Future of 
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, (National Academy Press, Washington D.C., 1997), p. 13. Hereafter 
cited as National Academy Report (1997) 
4  For example, the National Academy Report (1997) defines deterrence in narrow sense as “to 
discourage from action by making the consequences seem frightening,” and in broad meaning as “for 
situations in which the restraint arises simply from the prospect of failure to achieve the intended 
aims, or the prospect of costs exceeding an action’s expected benefits." See, Ibid, p. 13. In addition, 
the US Department of Defense describes deterrence as “the prevention from action by fear of the 
consequences,” and as “ a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of 
unacceptable counteraction.” See US Department of Defense: Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms, Joint pub. 1-02 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 12 April 2001,As Amended Through 23 January 
2002), p. 129, available on line at: www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf 
5 Decision-makers simply evaluate the situation in which the political consequences of not attacking 
are compared with the cost of military attacking. See John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 13-23, 65 
6 See Bernard Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence,” World Politics, Volume 11, Issue 2 (Jan. 1959), 
p. 180, available on line at: www.jstor.com 
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concept of deterrence. In simple form, deterrence is utilization of threats and threat 
methods to prevent undesired action of an opponent. 
 As it is obviously seen in the definition of deterrence, some conditions must 
exist to talk about an actual practice of deterrence. First, there must be an opponent 
planning to use of force against a defender. Second, there must be a defender 
planning to offset the potential act of opponent by exploiting threat methods.7 Lastly, 
for the success of deterrence, the opponent must choose not to attack because of the 
threat posed by the defender.8  
In this context, deterrence requires clarifying both what the opponent must 
not do and the potential consequences if he does since the success of deterrence is 
likely to result from the opponent’s conclusion to go ahead or not to go ahead. 
However, it should be noted that even if the deterrer or defender is sincere to carry 
out the deterrent threat, deterrence might still fail because of the opponent’s 
ignorance on the threat.9 That is, the most critical difficulty is that a defender may 
confront an opponent anywhere or anytime “who is free to decide, possibly 
unreasonably and unwisely.”10 
At this point, it will be helpful to focus on two traditional problems of 
deterrence. One of them is to ensure that opponent gets the threat message and reads 
it properly.11 Public statements and some other methods are used to communicate the 
cost and risk of an action to the targeted opponent. However, the opponent may fail 
                                                 
 
7 See Janice Gross Stein, “Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence I: The View 
from Cairo”, in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein, (eds.) Psychology and 
Deterrence (The John Hopkins University Press, 1991), p. 36 
8 See Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis, (2d ed.) (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 
1983), p. 38 cited in Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis 
and War, p. 22 
9 See Lawrence Freedman, “Strategic Coercion”, in Lawrence Freedman, (ed.), Strategic Coercion: 
Concepts and Cases (Oxford University Press, 1998) pp. 15-19 
10 See Gray, op. cit.  
11 See Freedman, op. cit., pp. 15-19 
 8
to take or read the threat message rationally and properly because of “cultural 
barriers to understanding, internal concerns, or emotional strain.”12 In this context, a 
deterrence policy fails to generate the expected outcomes. That is why, the threat 
message must be clear and the defender must be sure that the opponent receives the 
message properly. The second one is the credibility of threat.13 If the defender’s 
statements (concerning what he may do to prevent the specific action of the 
opponent) seem merely suggestion and are expressed in blurred terms then the 
credibility of threat in particular and deterrence in general will be not persuaded.14  
As mentioned above, it is clear that deterrence brings into view a 
psychological relationship among opposing sides. Hence, the emotions, perceptions, 
and the calculations of decision-makers are at the center of a deterrence policy.15 For 
this reason, a deterrence policy should be based not only on the actual capability and 
on the willpower of the defender to carry out his commitments but also on his skill to 
convey this capability and determination to the opponent.16 In this context, it may 
seem problematic to find a way for promising or guaranteeing the success of 
deterrence. Nevertheless, for the defender actual capability, a record in the 
accomplishment of promises, clarity, and consistency in the policy statements are 
some means supposed to enhance deterrence. 17  
                                                 
12 See Edward Rhodes, “Conventional Deterrence,” Comparative Strategy, Jul-Sep 2000, Vol. 19 
Issue 3, p. 221, 33p, available on line at: globalvgw6.global.epnet.com 
13 Application of deterrence policy should contain a form of credibility based on capability, cost, and 
intentions. That is, the aggressor should understand that the defender has capability to take action. 
With this act, the cost would be over and above expected benefit from a specific action. William W. 
Kaufmann, “The Requirements of Deterrence”, in Philip Bobbitt, Lawrence Freedman, and Gregory 
F. Treverton, (eds.) US Nuclear Strategy: A Reader, (The Macmillan Press, London, 1989), pp. 171-
173 
14 See Freedman, op. cit., pp. 24-25 
15 Robert Jervis, “Introduction: Approach and Assumptions”, in Psychology and Deterrence by Robert 
Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein (The John Hopkins University Press, 1991) pp. 1-2   
16 Since the cautiously coded intentions of defender, more frequently fail to make the expected impact 
on the opponent for the fact that they seem incredible or oblivious to the opponent. See Richard Ned 
Lebow, "Conclusions," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and 
Deterrence, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991) pp. 203-210 
17 See Gray, op. cit.  
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In addition, it should be noted that the success of deterrence depends also on 
its timely practice. That is to say, deterrence is one of the other options that can be 
employed by the political leaders to pursue national interest on international arena. 
Hence, overconfidence on only deterrence strategies to protect foreign policy 
interests will lead to erroneous in policy formulation.18 
Against this background, it is possible to put into words two notions of 
deterrence in political or military context, namely deterrence by punishment and 
deterrence by denial. The former includes a threat to inflict destruction upon the 
civilian population and industry of the opponent in the form of a punitive action. The 
latter calls for the persuasion of the opponent that he will fail to accomplish its 
mission on the battlefield, if he goes ahead. While the deterrence by punishment is 
generally linked with nuclear deterrence, the deterrence by denial is usually 
associated with conventional deterrence.19  
In light of aforementioned explanations, and from a realist perspective, it will 
be correct to say that to work effectively, a deterrence policy should encompass some 
characteristic in its nature. These are the requirements of deterrence. The first 
requirement is capability. That is, the potential opponent must be convinced that the 
deterrer or defender has the capability to impose a cost exceeding the expected 
benefit from a specific action. The second requirement is will. The deterrer must 
have the will to carry out its capability if necessary and show this willingness to act 
in the specific incident. The third requirement is credibility. The enemy must be 
persuaded that deterrer would really take action in specified occasion. The forth 
requirement is Rationality. The actors must be rational to calculate both the 
                                                 
 
18 See Alexander L. George, and Richard Smoke, “Deterrence and Foreign Policy,” World Politics, 
Volume 41, Issue 2 (Jan. 1989), pp. 181-2, available on line at: www.jstor.com  
19 See Mearsheimer, op. cit., p.15 
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intentions of each other and the costs or benefits of a specific action. A deterrence 
policy, lacking these requirements, is likely to fail, at least in the theoretical 
paradigm.20  
            1.1.1.  Conventional Deterrence:  
 Before the advent of nuclear weapons, if one said deterrence, it would mean 
conventional deterrence. That is, conventional forces are the instruments of 
deterrence policy. Conventional deterrence is directly concerned with the battlefield 
outcomes. It aims to deny an aggressor accomplishing his battlefield objective by the 
employment of conventional capabilities.21    
However, even if the studies on conventional deterrence have applied 
different definitions and key terms, have asked different questions, and have tested 
different hypotheses, the outcome that came into view has not differentiated. That is, 
the conventional deterrence frequently fails, even though the potential respond of the 
defender were “clearly defined, repeatedly publicized, and defensible, and the 
committed state [gives] every indication of its intention to defend them by force if 
necessary.”22  
As Mearsheimer states in his study, it is possible to put forth two underlying 
variables to explain why conventional deterrence sometimes fails or sometimes 
holds. One of them is the potential cost and risk of the fighting. The second one is the 
probability of the success in fighting. These variables are important for the opponent 
to reach a conclusion. For this reason, it will be correct to say that when the cost is 
                                                 
20 For details see Timothy Garden, Can Deterrence Last? (Bracknell, 1984), available on line at: 
www.tgarden.demon.co.uk/writings/candet/cdl1.html, Kaufmann, op. cit., pp. 168-173, and also T. V. 
Paul, “Power, Influence, and Nuclear Weapons: A Reassessment,” in T. V. Paul, Richard J. Harknett, 
and James J. Wirtz (eds.), The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging 
International Order, (The University of Michigan Press, 1998), p. 26 
21 See Mearsheimer, op. cit., p. 17 
22 See Richard Ned Lebow, “Conclusions,” in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross 
Stein, Psychology and Deterrence, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985) cited in 
Rhodes, op. cit.             
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low and the probability of success is high then it is more possible that deterrence will 
fail. In light of historical cases, it is possible to say that occasionally employment of 
conventional forces failed to deter many opponents. The reason is that the cost in 
conventional war may be low to be accepted by the decision-makers of the 
opponent.23   
Mearsheimer presents this reality in his study. While the study includes the 
examples of both deterrence failures and deterrence successes, of the twelve case 
studies only two cases exemplify exact deterrence success.24 The underlying reason 
is that wars in conventional level can be won or if not, the losing side can frequently 
and highly survives as Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic.25 Bernard Brodie 
reaches the same conclusion by saying “the large numbers of wars that have occurred 
in modern times prove that the threat to use force, even what sometimes looked like 
superior force, has often failed to deter.”26  
            1.1.2.   Nuclear Deterrence: 
The nuclear weapons are only one of a kind that they have totally affected the 
military and security strategies in a direction different from the other weapons did.27 
As Bernard Brodie puts forth in his study of Strategy in the Missile Age, before the 
advent of nuclear weapons the most striking conventional weapons, namely tanks 
and aircrafts just gradually took their place in military planning. However, with the 
advent of nuclear weapons, the revolution in military strategy came rapidly and the 
                                                 
 
23 The cost, in the case of conventional weapons, can be tolerable for the fact that the level of the cost 
increases gradually since there is not any way to reach a quick victory by the employment of 
conventional weapons. Hence, conventional war is generally a protracted war. So a country can 
tolerate the lost by substituting them in a protracted war. In addition, it is very difficult to foresee the 
potential cost of a conventional war in advance. See Mearsheimer, op. cit., pp. 23-4 
24 See Ibid, pp. 20-1 
25 See Gray, op. cit.  
26 See Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, (Princeton University Press, 1965) p. 272 
27 See Keith B. Payne, Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, (The University Press of Kentucky, 
USA, 1996), p. 5-6   
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past military experiences began to seem problematic to conduct the future. Hence, 
the theory of deterrence has also been affected from this invention. In Brodie’s 
words, the deterrence has acquired a new value and implication.28  
As Waltz expresses, the deterrent strategies gain clarity when nuclear 
warheads remove “the necessity of fighting” and eliminate “the possibility of 
defending because only a small number of warheads need to reach their targets.”29 In 
addition, as Colin S. Gray explains, in its essence, nuclear deterrence does not differ 
from any other kind of deterrence. However, in its “plausible probability of success”, 
it is effective and almost definitely more dependable than conventional deterrence. 
Since, “it is very difficult for the recipients of nuclear threats to believe that they 
would walk away with some success from a nuclear war.”30 That is, the actual use of 
nuclear weapons in a nuclear war against an opponent does not allow him acquire 
some political benefits without suffering a huge damage in return.  
Hence, nuclear deterrence was born with the advent of nuclear weapons and 
then developed in the Cold War paradigm. 31  Moreover, it originated from the 
superpower zero-sum game that covered totally the Cold War environment.32 As 
McGeorge Bundy clarifies, it resulted from two facts. The first one is that nuclear 
weapons are different, in terms of destruction power. The second is that the world 
remained bipolar in terms of nuclear forces. Hence, the “balance of terror” was the 
most promising option to dissuade each superpower from launching a first-strike one 
another and from initiating a nuclear war that would cause unacceptable damage on 
                                                 
28 See Brodie (1965), op. cit., pp. 271-2 
29 See Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” American Political Science Review, 
Volume 84, No. 3, September 1990, p. 732, available on line at: www.jstor.com  
30 See Gray, op. cit.  
31 See Brodie (1965), op. cit., p. 271 
32 See V. Paul, op cit., p. 38 
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both side.33 The basis of nuclear deterrence is the reality of the damage that the 
actual use of these weapons may pose.34 Therefore, the cost variable that has been 
important for the success of deterrence gains a new value with nuclear weapons. 
Since in no case the cost of using nuclear weapons will be low to be accepted by any 
opponent. Furthermore, there will no way to compensate the lost since it will occur 
in a very short period. Hence, the reality of destruction anticipated in a nuclear war is 
the essence of credibility in nuclear deterrence 35 As a result, sustaining credibility, 
the central concern in conventional deterrence, ceases to exist in nuclear deterrence.36  
In this context, bearing in mind the famous statement of Clausewitz “War is 
merely the continuation of policy by other means,”37 and that a nuclear war may lead 
to the annihilation of all civilization in a matter of hours, then rationally the actual 
use of nuclear weapons in a war to pursue the political objectives seems irrational. 
That is, the actual use of nuclear weapons goes no political ends or can serve no 
rational political purpose. Hence, this underlying consideration paved the way to the 
creation of nuclear deterrence in which nuclear weapons may only justify their own 
existence.38  
Bernard Brodie was first to codify the basis of nuclear deterrence. In his study 
of The Absolute Weapon, he emphasized the threatening value of nuclear weapons by 
declaring that any country would not be so irrational to consider use of nuclear 
                                                 
33 See McGeorge Bundy, “Strategic Deterrence Thirty Years Later: What Has Changed?” in Philip 
Bobbitt, Lawrence Freedman, and Gregory F. Treverton, (eds.) US Nuclear Strategy: A Reader by 
(The Macmillan Press, London, 1989), p. 456 
34 Andre Beaufre, Deterrence, and Strategy, trans by R.H. Barry (London: Faber and Faber, 1965), p. 
35 cited in Rajesh Rajagopalan, “Nuclear Strategy and Small Nuclear Forces: The Conceptual 
Components,” Strategic Analysis, October 1999 (Vol. XXIII No. 7), available on line at: www.ciaonet 
.org/olj/sa/sa_99rar03.html 
35 See Mearsheimer, op. cit., p. 23 
36 See Waltz, op. cit., p. 734 
37 See Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret 
(Princeton University Press, 1984) p. 87  
38 See Payne, op. cit., pp. 5-6 
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weapons while “opening itself to reprisals in kind.”39 That is, the value of atomic 
weapons rests not on their actual employment in war (the traditional logic), but rather 
on the threat of their use to prevent nuclear wars. Without doubt, this can be seen in 
the famous statement of Brodie, “ thus far the chief purpose of our military 
establishment has been to win wars. From now on, its chief purpose must be to avert 
them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.” Brodie also put forth that the most 
important requirement to sustain nuclear deterrence was to take every measure to 
protect a retaliatory force. 40 Thus, the deterrent capability in nuclear level has been 
the retaliatory capability by means of the secure second-strike forces.41 
In that sense, nuclear deterrence aims to manipulate the opponent’s acts by 
the threat of inflicting nuclear strikes upon its territory.42  Theoretically, nuclear 
deterrence may be used to deter both the nuclear attacks and attacks with 
conventional forces, and chemical or biological weapons. Hence, the “nuclear” 
specifies the quality of the threat that will possibly be posed by the defender against 
the opponent.43  
Against this background, it is no an exaggeration to say that deterrent effect is 
one of the significant power dimensions that nuclear weapons possess.44 The stability 
of nuclear deterrence was founded on an undeniable reality that a nuclear war could 
generate an extraordinary devastation for both adversaries. 45  Therefore, nuclear 
                                                 
39 “Implications for Military Policy,” in The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, 
edited by Bernard Brodie (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946), p. 88 cited in Barry H. Steiner, Bernard 
Brodie and the Foundations of American Nuclear Strategy (University Press of Kansas, 1991), p. 12  
40 See Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946) p. 76 cited in 
Bernard Brodie, “The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” International Security, Volume 2, Issue 4, 
(Spring, 1978), pp. 65-73, available on line at: www.jstor.com 
41 See Waltz, op. cit., p. 737 
42 See Payne (1996), op. cit., p. 6 
43 See National Academy Report (1997), op. cit., p. 14  
44 For details, see V. Paul, op. cit., pp. 19-28 
45 See Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence And The Cold War”, Political 
Science Quarterly, Summer 95, Vol. 110, Issue 2, p. 157, 25p, available on line at: globalvgw6.global. 
epnet.com 
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deterrence brings into the game a sort of threat that is very effective and gives no 
way to failure. Unambiguously, the credibility of threat is very high. Brodie 
expresses this by saying, “ for the enemy has little reason to doubt that if he strikes 
us we will try to hit back.”46  
With the advent of nuclear weapons, deterrence literature has acquired many 
new terms. Before examining evolution of nuclear strategy, it is worth to clarify 
these key terms to broaden the understanding of nuclear deterrence in particular and 
nuclear strategy in general in the Cold War years. 
First strike: a supposed ability that means “disarming strike.” It aims to strike 
initially and severely to destroy the opponent’s capability to retaliate.47  
Second strike: as opposed to first strike aims to absorb the strike of the opponent 
and then to strike back successfully by maintaining sufficient forces. That is, a 
retaliatory force survived from enemy attack provides a capability for second strike. 
In sum, to have one of these capabilities does mean that opposing side does not have 
any of them.48 
 Extended deterrence: a country will employ its retaliatory force to protect other 
country under attack from a potential attacker.49 
Minimum deterrence: or finite deterrence covers two different meanings in its 
definition. One of them specifies the level of a potential nuclear response to deter a 
challenger. The level will essentially be minor however sufficient to deter. The other 
meaning spells out a nuclear response that aims either to deter a nuclear attack or to 
                                                 
46  See Brodie (1965), op. cit., pp. 272-3 
47 McNamara defines first strike as launching a nuclear attack so powerful to leave enemy with 
insufficient forces to retaliate. See Robert McNamara, Blundering into Disaster: surviving the first 
century of the nuclear age, (Bloomsbury, London, 1986), p. 8 
48 See Richard Smoke, National Security And The Nuclear Dilemma (New York: Random Ho use, 
1987) pp. 94-5 
49  For example, the US exercised its nuclear power to sustain extended deterrence during the Cold 
War many times to protect Europe. See National Academy Report (1997), op. cit., p. 15  
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deter a nuclear attack against deterrer’s homeland.50 The prevailing belief is that fear 
of nuclear war is tremendously effective to prevent itself. Hence, there is no 
necessity of having huge nuclear posture. 
War-fighting: offers a capability in which there are more strategic nuclear forces 
than minimum deterrence suggest. In addition, it aims to utilize selectively these 
forces against political and military targets of opponent while holding enough 
nuclear forces in reserve as the means of assured destruction threat. 51 
            1.2. Evolution of Nuclear Strategy: 1945-1990 
Following the first atomic strike in the Second World War, both politicians 
and theorists recognized easily that this sort of weapons might take the war away 
from the battlefield. The destruction made by a single aircraft in Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in 1945 was a turning point that changed everything in the strategic 
planning.52 Consequently, the US military analysts started to work out on strategic 
plans including nuclear weapons.53 However, the evolution of nuclear strategy in a 
bipolar environment was a direct result of the assumptions, intentions, and the 
relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Hence, to evaluate the 
development of nuclear strategy more properly, the bipolar character of this 
evolution will be addressed in this study. Before jumping into the details of the 
evolution of nuclear strategy, it is necessary to focus on the political context in which 
it developed.  
After the World War II had ended with victory of allies including the US, 
Britain and the Soviet Union, it was assumed that the good relation among these 
                                                 
 
50  See, Ibid 
51  See Payne (96), op. cit., pp. 67-69 
52  For details see Brodie (1965) op. cit., pp. 149-53 
53  See Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), 
pp. 54-55 cited in Cimbala, op. cit., p. 74 
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allies would endure against future challenges. However, it did not take much time 
that the clash of interests between two important allies appeared. Consequently, the 
United Nations (UN), which was established both to promote peaceful solutions 
among states without resorting to the use of force54 and to preclude a nuclear arms 
race by putting in force global nuclear disarmament,55 became the first political arena 
of these clashes.  
In the first years of the nuclear age, the failure of providing a way to manage 
atomic power through the Baruch Plan56 was a warning sign of the forthcoming 
divergence and antagonism in Soviet-American relations.57 Hence, it will be correct 
to say that the Cold War stemmed from the conflict of ideologies flanked by two 
states’ rival descriptions on peace and security in the postwar world. The security 
requirements and ideological values of the Soviet Union challenged the US interests 
in universal freedom, postwar peace, and stability.58   
When the Soviet Union took a series of campaigns that would define the 
future of Eastern Europe, such as Czechoslovak coup, and the Berlin Blockade, 
Western democracies perceived these actions as a threat to themselves59, while the 
Soviet Union was identifying all as a buffer between West and itself. On the other 
                                                 
54 For details see Smoke, op. cit., pp. 27-32 
55  See Keith B. Payne, “The Case Against Nuclear Abolition And For Nuclear Deterrence,” 
Comparative Strategy, Jan-Mar 98, Vol. 17 Issue 1, p. 3, 41p, available on line at: globalvgw6. global. 
epnet.com 
56 After employing the first atomic weapons in the Second World War, the United States offered a 
plan to put all atomic energy under the control of the United Nations in 1946. Under this plan, the UN 
would take control of the mining, processing, production, and use of nuclear materials in every nation 
in the world. Following this absolute control process, the US would destroy its atomic arsenal. 
However, the Soviet Union refused it because of its unfair nature aimed to protect atomic monopoly 
of the US. For details, see Smoke, op. cit., pp. 134-5  
57 See Joseph M. Siracusa, and David G. Coleman, “Scaling the Nuclear Ladder: Deterrence from 
Truman to Clinton,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Nov 2000, Vol. 54, Issue 3, p. 277, 
20p, available on line at: ehostvgw6.epnet.com 
58  See Timothy J. White, “Cold War Historiography: New Evidence Behind Traditional 
Typographies,” International Social Science Review (Fall-Winter, 2000), available on line at: 
www.findarticles.com 
59  See James R. Schlesinger, “The Evolution of American Policy towards the Soviet Union,” 
International Security, Volume 1, Issue 1, (Summer, 1976), pp. 38-39  
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side, American initiatives, such as Marshall Plan and the building alliance system in 
Europe were perceived by Soviets as a threat against their existence in Europe.60 
1.2.1.  American Experience: 
In 1946, George Kennan, a staff officer of American embassy in Moscow, 
was the first to voice the emerging international security environment. Moreover, he 
marked the beginning of the post-war American foreign policy. Kennan declared in 
his message that the Soviets should be contained not to expand the Communist 
doctrine into the center of Europe.61 Consequently, American security strategy was 
formulated as both containing the spread of communist ideology and balancing the 
Soviet Union’s military power throughout the world. However, fulfillment of this 
foreign policy should be achieved without war and with little effort and cost that 
would not trouble the US and would prevent it being a “garrison state.”62 Although 
the US formulated its foreign policy objective as the containment of the Soviet 
expansion, there was no enough conventional force to offset the Soviet conventional 
force and to counter a potential Soviet attack against Western Europe. Moreover, the 
weakness of European allies at that time made it impossible to build up such a force 
eventually. 63  Hence, because of this conventional inferiority, and its security 
tradition,64 the US focused on deterrence as the essence of nuclear strategy in the 
                                                 
60 Hence, the American dream of collective security began to crumble by which the US intended to 
avert belligerence with the help of its allies including the Soviet Union. However, if this strategy had 
become successful, the US would have achieved its involvement with international politics by a little 
effort and attention. Because of this failure, it was necessary for the US to search new security 
approaches. See Smoke, op. cit., pp. 33-6 
61 George Kennan emphasized a potential Soviet expansion to fill the power vacuum in the center of 
Europe caused by the Second World War. See Ibid, pp. 53-4. As Brodie explained, the US had been 
and was a status quo power. While paying no attention to obtain new areas or new sphere of influence, 
it was determined to keep what it had in his hand. Hence, the policy of keeping what it had was called 
containment. See Brodie (1959), op. cit., p. 173.   
62 Aaron Friedberg, “Why Didn't the United States become a Garrison State,” International Security 
16 (Spring 1992) cited in Payne, (Jan-Mar 98), op. cit.   
63 See Smoke, op. cit., pp. 36-9 
64 After the Second World War, as Kaufman argues, the US tried to obtain security without relying on 
violence and this policy formulation led to development of deterrence policy. See Kaufmann, op. cit., 
p. 168 
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Cold War. And since then, nuclear deterrence developed as the focal point of the US 
foreign policy and military strategy, to counterbalance “the geostrategic and 
conventional force advantages,” in favor of the Soviet Union. In this context, the US 
officials saw nuclear weapons as the crucial means of the security policy of 
containing the Soviet Union. Under this circumstance, with the support of its atomic 
monopoly, deterrence was the optimal strategy that could go this end.65  Hence, 
nuclear deterrence strategy became the expression of containment policy.66  
Since nuclear deterrence was at the heart of the US security strategy 
throughout the Cold War, the US searched all the time for the options that would 
enhance the credibility of its nuclear umbrella over the Europe and every 
administration in the US gave different answers to the requirements for deterring the 
Soviet Union. Hence, nuclear deterrence policies of the US evolved in this context.    
In the early years of the atomic age, it was assumed that deterrence would 
automatically be obtained by the threat of existing atomic bombs of the US. 67 
However, in the period of nuclear monopoly, the deterrence strategy was lacking one 
of the four requirements of deterrence, capability. That is, the US strategic forces 
                                                 
65  See Payne (Jan-Mar 98), op. cit. Two other options also might fulfill the security policy of 
containing the Soviet Union. The first one was preventive war. According to this option, with its 
atomic monopoly, the US could launch an atomic attack to eliminate the Soviet threat. The second one 
was to send a large army to Europe to counter any potential Soviet attack. However, political, moral, 
and economical considerations made impossible utilizing these two options at the time. For this issue 
see Smoke, op. cit., pp. 53-5 
66 It was generally assumed that even if the US might fail to prevent invasion of Europe by Soviet, as a 
response to this, the US bombers, only the means of nuclear delivery system at that time, under 
control of SAC (Strategic Air Command) could destroy the Soviet cities and industrial areas. Hence, 
under this hypothetical pressure, the Soviet Union would not dare attack to the US and its allies and 
thus the US would not need to carry out an atomic attack. See Smoke, Ibid, pp. 53-54 
67 However, the truth was that the US did not have enough atomic bombs to achieve this at the time. 
Following the Nagasaki and Hiroshima strike, there was not any atomic bomb in the US arsenal. The 
US had only a hundred atomic bombs even in 1949. See Ibid, pp. 55-6. Some observers argue that by 
way of spying, Stalin knew this reality. Hence, he blockaded Berlin. This blockade in 1948 verified 
the deficiency of American nuclear strategy at that time.  See Siracusa, and Coleman, op. cit. 
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were short of inflicting “assured destruction” which would later be the essence of 
nuclear deterrence. 68  
The Communist victory in China and the first Soviet atomic test in August 
1949 were two shocks that induced the US to seek new approaches to sustain 
deterrence. Since the Soviet Union was not only an ideological challenger any longer 
but also a rising nuclear opponent. Succeeding this shock, Truman administration 
started a study, known as NSC-68. It called attention to the necessity of conventional 
defense for Western Europe to deter the Soviet attack.69 Consequently, during the 
Truman administration, security policy was based on deterrence through denial 
(defense) by which it was intended to use the local defenses to deter the local 
attack.70 
In addition, believing that the Soviet Union was working on it, the Truman 
administration accelerated the development of the “super,” the fusion bomb. 71 
However, the Soviet Union was first to test thermonuclear weapon that could be 
carried by an airplane. 72 Consequently, hypothetical advantage of the US atomic 
                                                 
68 See Richard K. Betts, “Nuclear Golden Age? The Balance before Parity,” International Security, 
Volume 11, Issue 3, (Winter 1986-1987), p. 5, available on line at: www.jstor.com  
69 This review study suggested assigning enormous resources in an effort to build up a large military 
power. This would be vital “to deter, if possible, the Soviet expansion and to defeat, if necessary, 
aggressive Soviet or Soviet-directed actions or a limited or total character.” See Smoke, op. cit., pp. 
57-64 
70 See Gregory F. Treverton, “How Different are Nuclear Weapons?” in Philip Bobbitt, Lawrence 
Freedman, and Gregory F. Treverton, (eds.) US Nuclear Strategy: A Reader, (The Macmillan Press, 
London, 1989), p. 114 
71 Bearing in mind the destruction made by the Hiroshima atomic bomb, equivalent to fifteen thousand 
tons of TNT, the advent of fusion bomb was a significant moment in nuclear age that some scientists 
called it as “second stage of the atomic epoch.” Indeed, the destructive power of fusion bombs could 
only be measured in megaton of TNT while it was kiloton of TNT for fission bomb. For this issue, see 
McGeorge Bundy, Danger And Survival, (Random House, New York, 1988), pp. 197-8, and see also 
Smoke, op. cit., pp. 57-64 
72 An atomic bomb works by sudden fission of heavy uranium or plutonium atoms into smaller 
fragments. A fusion bomb works by sudden fusion of lightweight hydrogen atoms into heavier 
element. In addition, a fusion bomb has more power than a fission bomb. While there is an upper limit 
for the explosive power of a fission bomb, there is not any for a fusion bomb. See Smoke, op. cit., pp. 
58-9. The task was set by Stalin to eradicate the U.S. atomic monopoly and to develop the Soviets’ 
own nuclear arsenal and it was partially completed on 12 August 1953 with the advent of first 
transportable hydrogen bomb. See Yuri Smirnov, and Vladislav Zubok, “Nuclear Weapons after 
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monopoly, at least in the mind of American statesmen to obtain deterrence 
automatically, disappeared by following the first Soviet nuclear test.73  
The review of the Truman administration codified in NSC-68 anticipated that 
in the following years the Soviet Union would reach a capacity (10-20 bombs by 
mid-1950 and 200 bombs by mid- 1954)74 that might be able to launch an atomic 
strike to the US. Moreover, it notified that the Soviet Union could make a surprise 
attack and might change the military situation on behalf of itself. At this point, 
deterrence became more complex and more difficult, because of existence of two 
nuclear powers. 75  
   In 1950, the Korean War broke out and the problems addressed by NSC-68 
had to be ignored. After three years of war in Korea against Communist ideology, the 
US lost many while gaining little. It also became clear that Soviet threat should be 
taken in consideration beyond the geographical borders of Europe. After taking 
office, the Eisenhower administration tried to find solution to the reoccurrence of 
such war while decreasing the defense budget noticeably. While establishing a line of 
defense with its allies, this administration promoted a new military look. With its 
sufficient nuclear arsenal inherited from the former administration, and accordingly 
with the strategic superiority76, the Eisenhower administration explicitly tried to 
make use of a threat of massive nuclear attack to deter any new attack by the Soviet 
block. President Eisenhower declared that the US might use nuclear weapons in a 
manner similar to the other weapons to counter any hostile action.77 Hence, during 
                                                                                                                                          
Stalin’s Death: Moscow Enters the H-Bomb Age,” available on line at: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv 
/CWIHP/BULLETINS/b4a14.htm.   
73 See Smoke, op. cit., p. 62 
74 NSC-68, in US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1950 (Washington 
D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1977) Vol. 1, p. 251 cited in Betts, op. cit., p. 7 
75 See Siracusa, and Coleman, op. cit. 
76 See Smoke, op. cit., pp. 69-70 
77 See Bundy (1988), op. cit., pp. 246-255 
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the Eisenhower administration, national security policy was based on deterrence 
through punishment, “separating the response from the action to be deterred.”78   
The New Look documented in NSC-162/2 promoted the birth of a new policy 
of deterrence known as massive retaliation or as called “ a policy of boldness.”79 
Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles explained that the basic decision 
was based on a massive capability to retaliate, “instantly, by means and at places of 
our choosing.” Hence, the aim was to obtain “a maximum deterrent at a bearable 
cost.”80  
The number of atomic bombs rose from 50 in 1948 to roughly 1000 in 1953 
to fulfill this strategy. The US deployed the first theatre nuclear weapons (TNW), the 
nuclear artilleries, in Europe.81 By 1960 the numbers of jet bombers (B-52) arrived at 
above six hundreds. In addition, many bombers were deployed in forward bases of 
Europe. Enjoying a growing strategic superiority, the administration believed that if 
nuclear war broke out, the US would prevail over the Soviet Union by launching a 
first-strike.82  
It should be noted that Massive Retaliation doctrine was mostly welcomed in 
an environment that the US was extremely superior to the Soviet Union in terms of 
strategic bombers. Moreover, this doctrine was based not only on nuclear superiority 
but also on the strategy of calculated ambiguity.83 In a sense, this would provide a 
                                                 
78  See Treverton, op. cit., p. 114 
79 N. A. Graebner, The National Security: Its Theory and Practice, 1945-1960 (New York: Oxford 
University Press 1986) p. 276 cited in Siracusa, and Coleman, op. cit. 
80 He emphasized that the means of response against any attack would be selected by the US. The US 
did not necessarily try to be ready to match what adversary might employ. This would eliminate the 
necessity of keeping many military means. See Address by Secretary John Foster Dulles, “The 
Evolution of Foreign Policy,” in Philip Bobbitt, Lawrence Freedman, and Gregory F. Treverton, (eds.) 
US Nuclear Strategy: A Reader,  (The Macmillan Press, London, 1989), pp. 124-126 
81 See Treverton, op. cit., p. 113 
82 In the mid-1950s, believing that a “bomber gap” might occur, the air force, and nuclear programs 
were supported very well at the time. See Smoke, op. cit., pp. 71-2 
83 The US administration intentionally made uncertain the level of response against any attack with 
the intention that the Soviet would stay away from initiating any act with the fear of beginning a 
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flexibility to this deterrence strategy by allowing the US to reserve the right to 
employ a nuclear attack by its own choosing.  
Many national security specialists did not approve massive retaliation 
doctrine. They put forth two core oppositions to this doctrine. The first one was that 
it was lacking one of four requirements of deterrence, credibility.84 They argued that 
while the Soviet Union was increasing its own strategic power, the US’s 
commitments to its allies would be questionable.85   
The second criticism against Massive Retaliation was vulnerability problem 
of American strategic forces. According to the critics of massive retaliation, 
worrying about an early American massive retaliation in a crisis, the Soviets might 
hastily launch an attack to the US nuclear forces- earlier than the strategic bombers 
took off. 86  
At the time, security specialists emphasized the necessity of securing the US 
nuclear retaliation forces from a possible Soviet first-strike. By doing this, the Soviet 
                                                                                                                                          
nuclear war. This would enhance the deterrent effect in Massive Retaliation strategy. See Ibid, pp. 72-
75  
84 On this issue, William Kaufman posed an influential critique. He stated that the record of the US 
foreign policy for twenty years suggested that massive retaliation was “out of character” for the US, 
except under such occasion as Pear Harbor. See Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 174 
85 The assumption was that even if the US intended to carry out a massive retaliation following a 
Soviet attack, neither the Soviet Block nor the US’s allies would believe that the US would dare to use 
its nuclear weapons to protect its allies while putting its own cities under the danger of a potential 
nuclear retaliation posed by Soviet Block. Thus, the extension of deterrence would be futile to prevent 
any attack to Western Europe or other parts of the world. Hence, the threat of massive retaliation 
would be incredible in this context, Eisenhower administration tried to solve this credibility problem 
by declaring that a few nuclear weapons could be used against military targets in local war in the late 
of 1950s. Hence, the concept of graduated deterrence aimed to enhance credibility of threats in 
particular and deterrence in general by making possible the tactical use of nuclear weapons, if 
necessary. However, this concept was also put under severe criticisms. See Smoke, op. cit., pp. 87-90 
86 At this point, believing that the US bombers were vulnerable such an attack, the Soviet Union might 
start a nuclear war more willingly. Hence, Massive Retaliation concept might be an incentive for a 
nuclear war.  In reality, this was a past concern and it seemed to revive again. The Truman 
administration had previously dealt with this problem and tried to lessen vulnerability problem by 
scattering the bombers to more bases and by sending them into forward bases in Europe. In the mid of 
1950s, since the strategic bombers were still the main means of delivery for the US nuclear forces, it 
was assumed that even the US bombers were dispersed to many bases, the increasing numbers of the 
Soviet bombers might provide a strategic advantage to the Soviet Union to make a surprise attack to 
the US strategic bombers. Despite the US air defense, if one of them went through this air defense, 
then it would easily destroy the US bases. See Ibid, pp. 94-5 
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leaders would be deterred from attacking. Since then, it was believed that secure 
second-strike forces were necessary to sustain deterrence.87 Moreover, the security 
specialists also put forth another strategic principle at the time. They argued that the 
Soviet Union should also have such a second strike capability to establish a stable 
deterrence between two nuclear powers.88  
With the launch of Sputnik, the first artificial satellite by the Soviet Union in 
1957, the security specialists began to focus on the vulnerability problem more 
severely.89 However, the most significant event that disturbed the US leaders and the 
American community considerably was a report90 about the long-range missile test 
made by the Soviets in 1957. This time, specialists began to worry about a more 
dangerous state of affairs, a potential surprise attack of the Soviet missiles resulting 
from their short flying and warning time. The lack of knowledge about the actual 
number of the Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and the Soviet 
deception tactics about it created the famous maxim, “missile gap.”91  
                                                 
87 In the late 1950s, the motive behind focusing on second-strike forces was that it seemed that the 
Soviet Union was developing a first-strike capability, at least in the mind of the Soviet leaders, against 
the US. See Ibid, pp. 95-6 
88 The reason as they claimed was that a strategic superiority of the US might make the Soviets 
depressed about the US potential first-strike capability against them. Hence, if Soviets lacked this 
capability against the US it might induce them in a war to preempt. However, in reality, these two 
countries had a first strike capability against each other and that was the most dangerous situation. 
This situation made both states vulnerable against a first strike attack that might be posed by each 
other. Hence, under this condition, each side might have an incentive- resulting from this mutual 
vulnerability- to strike first in a crisis, rather that trying to solve it. See Ibid, pp. 97-8 
89 The US and its allies were thinking that the nuclear superiority of the US was to counterbalance the 
conventional superiority of the Soviet block. With the launch of Sputnik, it seemed that Soviet block 
was taking the nuclear superiority too. See Treverton, op. cit., p. 118 
90  This report was prepared by the Gaither Panel, and was encouraged by the Eisenhower 
administration. The Gaither Panel foresaw a “missile gap” with the Soviet Union  “producing ICBMs 
earlier and faster than the US.” See Ibid. 
91 It was assumed that in a short period the Soviet Union might be able to have a capability of 
disarming the US by increasing the number of its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) whereas 
the US did not have any. The US tried to answer this missile inferiority by deploying radar and early 
warning systems. Moreover, the “ground alert” position of the bombers was changed to “air alert” 
because of which some bombers would be ready to attack in the air consistently. Probably resulting 
from this so-called missile gap, the Soviet Union revealed a behavior that was more violent during the 
Berlin crises of 1958, 1959, and 1961. However, in reality, there was no missile gap. The Soviet had 
only four deployed ICBMs, whereas the US had none. See, Smoke, op. cit., pp. 100-3 
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The public warning of vulnerability concern came into view with the 
publication of Albert Wolstetter’s famous article of 1959, “The Delicate Balance of 
Terror.” 92  Wolstetter emphasized that deterrence was “neither assured nor 
impossible” but would be “ the product of sustained intelligent effort and hard 
choices.” He was one of the specialists who put emphasis on the necessity of a 
strategic deterrent balance between two superpowers. He argued that a secured 
retaliatory capability would carry “a stabilizing influence not only in deterring 
rational attack, but also in offering every inducement to” both the US and the Soviet 
Union to lessen the likelihood of unintentional war resulting from vulnerability 
concern.93  
From 1957 to 1961, the missile gap issue continued to affect the US nuclear   
policy.94 However, the “missile gap” never became a reality, since the Eisenhower 
administration reacted calmly against Sputnik and encouraged carefully the 
improvement and deployment of its intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) and 
Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) programs.95 
Under the pressure of these strategic thoughts, the Flexible Response 
doctrine96 as an opposite concept to Massive Retaliation became the official strategy 
                                                 
92  See Treverton, op. cit., p. 118 
93 See Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” in Philip Bobbitt, Lawrence Freedman, 
and Gregory F. Treverton, (eds.) US Nuclear Strategy: A Reader, (The Macmillan Press, London, 
1989), pp. 143-5, 161 
94 See Bundy (1988), op. cit., p. 334  
95 See Siracusa, and Coleman, op. cit. 
96 Flexible Response was never an explicit theory nor was it expressed in official documents of the 
US. However, NATO accepted it later on as general doctrine in 1967. The theorists of this doctrine, 
believing that “a stable deterrent balance” was developing between the two superpowers, put forth that 
this stability should be promoted and accepted. See Smoke, op. cit., pp. 90-4. Flexible Response was a 
term created by chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), General Maxwell Taylor. Taylor described 
Flexible Response as “a capability to react across the entire spectrum of possible challenge, for coping 
with anything from general atomic war to infiltrations and aggressions such as threaten Laos and 
Berlin.” However, Nuclear weapons would occupy a less important place within the theoretical 
structure of Flexible Response. See Maxwell Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York, 1959), p. 6 
cited in Philip Nash, “Nuclear weapons in Kennedy's foreign policy,” Historian, Winter 94, Vol. 56 
Issue 2, p. 285, 16p, available on line at: globalvgw6.global.epnet.com 
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of Kennedy Administration. This administration mainly focused on the problem of 
creating secure second-strike forces while increasing conventional forces.97  
Flexible Response, as the new deterrent posture, aimed to deter the opponent 
by matching his all military options with the same kinds. The main motive behind the 
Flexible Response was to show the Soviet leaders that in a crisis the US might enjoy 
some options to control a crisis without losing or launching an all-out war. 98 The 
Kennedy administration firstly attempted to accelerate and improve the Polaris and 
Minuteman missile programs99 that would later lead to deployment of roughly 1,700 
strategic nuclear missiles. Kennedy's buildup was partly a reaction to supposed  
“missile gap” that might bring to life in future. 100 While the US was increasing its 
strategic power both in quality and in quantity, by the time the Soviet Union still had 
only a few ICBMs and none SLBM. With its increasing strategic power, the US was 
again superior to the Soviet Union in mid-1960s. Hence, the American strategic 
superiority led to the development of new concepts. 101    
From this strategic superiority and the differentiation in strategic forces 
provided by ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers, the concept of “triad” emerged. The triad 
structure was perceived as the vital requirement of deterrence, in terms of second-
                                                 
97 See Smoke, op. cit, pp. 106-9 
98 This strategy tried to create a balance aiming to obtain mutual deterrence not only in nuclear but 
also in conventional level. This concept revived the logic of deterrence working at multiple levels, 
implicitly proposed before by NSC-68. The main purpose of Flexible Response was to enhance the 
credibility of American deterrence strategy by providing “multiple options”- at strategic, tactical 
nuclear and conventional level- available in a crisis. By using proper level of force the American 
deterrence strategy could still keep its credibility without losing or escalating any crisis. See Ibid, pp. 
61, 90-94,231 
99 The first generations of Atlas and Titan ICBMs were deployed at this time. However, the imperfect 
launch time of these liquid fuelled ICBMs and vulnerability problem made them unsatisfactory to 
sustain secure second-strike capability. However, the solid-fuelled Minuteman that could be fired 
from under-ground silos in short time and the Polaris that could be fired from submarines would 
enhance the second strike capability. See Ibid, pp. 110-14 
100  This level was 50 percent higher than the level of 1,100 estimated by the Eisenhower 
administration. Kennedy administration finally raised the number of strategic nuclear weapons from 
3,000 in April 1961 to 5,000 by July 1964. See Nash, op. cit.  
101  See Smoke, op. cit., p. 114 
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strike capability.102 At this time, in addition to 54 Titan ICBMs, the three-legged 
force comprised 1000 Minuteman land-based missiles, 656 Polaris missiles on 
submarines and 500 bombers, as projected by President Eisenhower before.103   
In addition, the US superiority in the 1960s and the theoretical spirit of 
Flexible Response, creating multiple options, led to materialization of another 
concept, known Counterforce strategy, or Control Response. (See Table 1) This 
strategy had twofold targeting missions (counterforce strike or countervalue strike) 
that would provide flexibility in a crisis in which the US could reinforce either, 
whichever necessary.104 The aim of counterforce strike was to wipe out the Soviet 
nuclear forces and accordingly, to limit the damage by removing its capacity to 
inflict punishment that these forces could impose on the US or its allies’ cities or 
forces. 105  In addition to this damage-limiting mission, the assured destruction 
mission was aiming to destroy the Soviet countervalue targets including Soviet cities, 
and industrial areas.106 
 
                                                 
102 The concept of “triad” aimed to deter the Soviet Union by a threat of inflicting unacceptable 
damage by means of three-legged force. This concept was based on the following assumption. Each 
element of triad would be ready to survive a possible Soviet attack and even if the Soviet surprise 
attack accomplished destroying one or two legs of the triad, the US would be able to retaliate with the 
surviving third one. Under this circumstance, the Soviets would be deterred from attacking. Since 
each element of triad had its own advantage and disadvantages, by keeping all legs of this system 
ready, the US would have maximum flexibility in nuclear planning. The SLBMs were the most secure 
but had low accuracy whereas the land-based ICBMs had high accuracy and vulnerability. See Ibid, 
pp. 114-5 
103 Herbert F. York, Making Weapons, and Talking Peace: A Physicist’s Odyssey from Hiroshima to 
Geneva. New York: Basic Books, 1987, pp. 193-197 cited in Bundy (1988), op. cit., p. 352 
104  Targets that would be hit in a possible nuclear exchange were gathered under two names, 
counterforce, and countervalue. Counterforce targets were military targets, such as bomber bases, 
missile silos. Countervalue targets were civilian targets such as, cities and industrial areas. See 
Smoke, op. cit., pp. 116-7 
105See Gregory F. Treverton, “From No Cities to Stable Vulnerability,” in Philip Bobbitt, Lawrence 
Freedman, and Gregory F. Treverton, (eds.) US Nuclear Strategy: A Reader, (The Macmillan Press, 
London, 1989), p. 198 
106 Under the Controlled Response strategy, the US would make counterforce strike, while holding in 
reserve necessary forces for the assured destruction mission. In 1960s, Secretary of Defense 
McNamara declared the necessary level of destruction to obtain deterrence as the death of twenty or 
twenty five per cent of the Soviet population and destruction of fifty per cent of Soviet industry. See 
Smoke, op. cit., pp. 115-16 
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Table-1: Counterforce Strategy 
 
Before McNamara period the targeting plans (known as Single Integrated 
Operation Plan or SIOP) were aiming to launch a single, massive attack on the most 
valued cities of the Soviet Union and its allies and it was the only option. It was 
estimated that such attack would kill at least 360 million people. Thinking that such 
targeting plans would have serious restrictions on deterrence policy, McNamara put 
emphasis on the existence of more nuclear options and on the targeting plans against 
the military forces of enemy (known as “no cities” approach).107  
McNamara, Secretary of Defense under both Kennedy and Johnson, saw 
Counterforce strategy as the means of preventing the enemy from attacking civilian 
population and he hoped that acceptance of this strategy would induce the Soviet 
Union to avoid attacking the US cities in the early hours of a nuclear exchange.108 
The aim was to extend deterrence into war by keeping options available to terminate 
a war even after it began. Counterforce and countervalue missions are complement 
each other. Both were aiming to prevent enemy from employing his weapons, 
counterforce by way of disarming the enemy and countervalue by way of continued 
deterrence.109 According to this plan, by keeping enemy cities in hostage position, as 
                                                 
107 See Treverton, “From No Cities to Stable Vulnerability,” op. cit., p. 191 
108 McNamara, address at Ann Arbor, June 16, 1962, in Documents on American Foreign Relations, 
1962, p. 83 cited in Bundy (1988), op. cit., p. 545 
109 The Counterforce Strategy invited many criticisms. For example, the peace movements blamed it 
for making war acceptable, military leaders for weakening deterrence. See Thomas C. Schelling, 
“Controlled response and Strategic Warfare,” in Philip Bobbitt, Lawrence Freedman, and Gregory F. 
Treverton, (eds.) US Nuclear Strategy: A Reader, (The Macmillan Press, London, 1989), pp. 224-226 
       Targeting    Assigned weapon      Mission  
Countervalue SLBMs (low accuracy)  Assured destruction 
Counterforce Bombers and ICBMs Offensive Damage limitation 
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means of influence, the US would obtain deterrence even later then a nuclear 
exchange began. 110  
In the late 1960s, the Soviet military build-up, in terms of ICBMs, finally 
began to materialize. It reached at a level more than the worst-case estimations. The 
parity, in terms of ICBMs, came about between the US and the Soviet Union by the 
late 1968. In addition, the Soviet Union made a start on the deployment of SLBMs. 
Meanwhile the Johnson administration reduced its spending on nuclear forces and 
held the number of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs at the existing level. In that sense, 
it was possible to say that the US for the first time in its nuclear strategy began to 
abandon the principle of superiority and decided on sufficiency. The sufficiency in 
strategic forces and stability in deterrence was accepted as the most desirable 
situation until the midst of 1970s 111  
With forthcoming parity and especially with the development of the Soviet 
SLBMs, McNamara, under Johnson administration, abandoned partially his damage-
limiting approach and underlined the assured destruction mission.112 Taking into 
consideration that the Soviet second-strike forces would be protected in hardened 
underground silos and be able to inflict unacceptable damage on the US and its 
allies; McNamara accepted that the US nuclear forces were not enough to achieve a 
required destruction for the damage limitation (offensive) mission.113  
                                                 
110 See Ibid, pp. 225-9 
111 In the late 1960s, the Soviet Union solved its technical problems and enhanced its strategic force 
security, especially for the ICBMs, by deploying them in hardened ground silos. The numbers of 
deployed Soviet ICBMs rose from about 200 in 1964 to 1200 in 1969. See Smoke, op. cit., pp. 125-7 
112 The other component of counterforce strategy, counterforce strike mission was agreeable in the 
early 1960s since it could really limit damage by destroying the offensive forces of the Soviet Union, 
at this time only the vulnerable ICBMs. However, with the development and deployment of the Soviet 
SLBMs, the Soviet might enjoy a second strike capability to inflict an unacceptable damage on the US 
cities. Hence, the damage-limiting mission seemed problematic because of the Soviet SLBMs, the 
least vulnerable means of delivery. See Ibid, pp. 125-6, 207 
113 The problem regarding damage limitation was that each superpower was holding a secure second-
strike force, which most probably could survive a first strike and impose unacceptable damage to each 
other. McNamara believed that the situation in which each superpower would be able to impose 
assured destruction reciprocally, was most desirable to maintain deterrence stable. At the beginning, 
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In the late 1967, considering that the basis of the US strategic policy was to 
deter nuclear attack upon the US and its allies, McNamara declared that the US could 
fulfill this by maintaining a promising capability to inflict a unacceptable damage on 
enemy in a nuclear exchange, “even after absorbing a first-strike.” He defined this 
capability as assured destruction capability. He also declared that it was an 
inevitable reality that both the US and the Soviet Union had this capability because 
of their actual and credible second-strike force capability. In this context, numerical 
superiority had limited implications. This mutual capability was main motive to 
prevent a nuclear war.114 
The other side of the damage limitation was defensive which was also 
experienced in McNamara period. At the time, this issue was at the heart of debate 
among security specialists.115 In the late period of the Johnson administration, the 
incentives for a strategic defense against the Soviet missiles resurrected because of 
increasing number of the Soviet missiles116 and the Soviet attempts to deploy an 
early version of ABM system in the region of Moscow to offset the second-strike 
capacity of the United States in the late 1960s. 117  Consequently, the Johnson 
administration declared the intention to build an ABM system known as “Sentinel” 
                                                                                                                                          
this approach was sharply criticized by senior military leaders. However, after the strategic parity 
between two superpowers was recognized, then this reality was accepted. General Curtis LeMay, the 
commander of SAC, wanted the US to be able to win a significant victory in a nuclear war and did not 
welcome a mutual assured capability. However, his successor General Thomas Power accepted this 
reality. See Bundy (1988), op. cit., pp. 545-8 
114 See Robert S. McNamara, “San Francisco Speech,” in Philip Bobbitt, Lawrence Freedman, and 
Gregory F. Treverton, (eds.) US Nuclear Strategy: A Reader, (The Macmillan Press, London, 1989), 
pp. 267-270 
115 After vulnerability issue surfaced once more with the Soviet ICBM test in the late of 1950s, the 
US, which was concerned for a Soviet surprise missile attack, began to develop the Nike series anti-
aircraft missiles to encounter the Soviet missiles. Thus, the antiballistic missiles (ABM) were under 
development in 1960s. As a result, by the middle of 1960s Nike-X system including radars and two 
missiles was developed as an ABM system. Thinking that it would commence another arms race and 
would not be effective but expensive, McNamara was strongly against the ABM system. See Smoke, 
op. cit., pp. 122-3 
116 See Bundy (1988), op. cit., p. 547 
117 See Siracusa, and Coleman, op. cit.  
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based on Nike-X technology. However, pressures from the public and war in 
Vietnam prevented the actual deployment.118 
After taking office in 1968, Nixon administration accepted a plan for 
development of the new Trident submarines and promoted a new ABM system 
known as Safeguard. 119  However, the new system also became invisible as the 
former one because of tough criticisms in Congress. Then the new administration 
chose to make use of ABM program as a bargaining advantage against the Soviet 
Union in the arms race limitation talks.120  
In this context, the Nixon administration succeeded in reaching an agreement 
with the Soviet Union in 1972, known as the SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks) about ABM program.121 The main agreement was about the prohibition of 
defense against strategic missiles for an indefinite period except at two sides for each 
superpower (later became one side for each). The SALT I Treaty encompassed two 
parts. The first part was to limit the ABM system for an indefinite duration. The 
Soviet Union decided to deploy its ABM system to defend Moscow, and the US 
preferred to deploy the temporarily ABM system for missile fields at Grand Forks, 
North Dakota. The second one was a ten-year offensive agreement, which was 
aiming to stabilize the number of missile launchers of each superpower. As 
envisaged in this agreement, the US would have 1954 ICBMs and 656 SLBMs and 
                                                 
 
118 See Smoke, op. cit., p.124 
119  When the Nixon administration projected the Safeguard ABM system in early 1969, it was 
intended to have a limited nuclear-armed missile defense system that could control accidental or small 
scale launches, both from the Soviet Union and coming nuclear powers such as China. See William 
Burr, “The Secret History of the ABM Treaty, 1969-1972,” National Security Archive Electronic 
Briefing Book No. 60, November 8, 2001, available on line at: www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB 
/NSAEBB60/index2.html 
120 For details see Bundy (1988), op. cit., pp. 549-56 
121 In 1964, the US initially invited the Soviet Union to start bilateral arms control talks on strategic 
nuclear weapons. However, the negotiations on SALT I began in November 1969. See Charles V.  
Peña, “Arms Control and Missile Defense Not Mutually Exclusive,” Policy Analysis, No. 376, July 
26, 2000, p. 3, available on line at: www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa376.pdf 
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the Soviet Union would have 1409 ICBMs (only 308 of them would be heavy), and 
950 SLBMs. The agreement was to balance the US advantage in technology with the 
numbers in favor of the Soviet.122 In the next part, this significant arms control 
success and the rationale for it will be analyzed in detail.   
In addition, when the Nixon administration took office, the US was enjoying 
a great deal of strategic forces. However, Nixon was the first president who chosen 
officially sufficiency in strategic forces. This was a significant step far away from 
superiority. 123  In 1971, Nixon administration declared the new nuclear strategy, 
“Strategic Sufficiency.”124 By maintaining sufficient forces, the US would able to 
deter a Soviet attack.125 Nixon declared that there were two factors shaping the 
strategic goal of sufficiency. The first one was the Soviet strategic build-up. The 
second one was the increasing nuclear posture in both two rivals.126 In a sense, this 
administration recognized the attraction and inevitability of parity in terms of 
strategic weapons with the Soviet Union, and the stability in deterrence as envisioned 
before McNamara.127  
 At the time, two technological developments seemed to challenge this parity 
and stability. Although the SALT I eliminated the influence of one of them (ABM 
                                                 
122  See Treverton, “From No Cities to Stable Vulnerability”, op. cit., p. 202, and Peña, Ibid, p. 5 
123  See Bundy (1988), op. cit., p. 555 
124 The new strategy would continue holding secure second-strike forces not for a purpose of first 
strike but for a purpose of inflicting unacceptable damage on the Soviet countervalue targets. Even 
with its more intense targeting plan, it was almost the same as Assured Destruction. In that sense, it is 
possible to say that the period from 1968 to 1974 was a strategic continuity that put emphasis on the 
MAD. See Philip Bobbitt, “Selective Options and Limited Responses, 1974-1983,” in Philip Bobbitt, 
Lawrence Freedman, and Gregory F. Treverton, (eds.) US Nuclear Strategy: A Reader, (The 
Macmillan Press, London, 1989), p. 338 
125 The Sufficiency principle meant that the US would maintain the assured destruction capability and 
would not permit the Soviet superiority over the US. See Smoke, op. cit., p. 127 
126 In addition, Nixon defined sufficiency in two meanings. The first one in military sense was to have 
“enough force to inflict a level of damage on a potential aggressor sufficient to deter him from 
attacking.” The second one in political sense was to maintain adequate forces to prevent the US and its 
allies “from being coerced.” See Richard Nixon, “US Foreign Policy for the 1970s,” in Philip Bobbitt, 
Lawrence Freedman, and Gregory F. Treverton, (eds.) US Nuclear Strategy: A Reader, (The 
Macmillan Press, London, 1989), pp. 387-93 
127 See Smoke, op. cit., pp. 127, 182 
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system), the other one the multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle 
(MIRV)128 was not addressed in SALT I.129 Given that that MIRVs could decisively 
change the exchange ratio in favor of first-strike attack 130  this situation might 
generate and increase the incentives for the first strike. Following this technologic 
development, the strategic balance would be in danger because of destabilizing effect 
of MIRVs on ICBMs, when both superpowers acquired them. That is, one side might 
have a tendency to destroy the other side’s ICBMs by a first-strike.131  
The Nixon administration inherited a large amount of strategic forces more 
than required for the prevailing strategy at the time. Partially with the purpose of 
finding a new mission for the excessive numbers of warheads 132 , Secretary of 
Defense, James Schlesinger, started a revision program in targeting plans in 1972. 
After a two-year study, he declared a new set of guidelines for strategic weapons.133 
The new strategic doctrine, known as “flexible targeting,” would provide additional 
options to the president beyond what mutually assured destruction (MAD) did. In 
essence, what Schlesinger  opposed was the massive destruction of enemy cities 
                                                 
128 This capability would affect the destruction power or explosive growth of strategic forces in both 
two sides, upward. With the deployment of MIRVs, the numerical ratio (the US warheads/the Soviet 
warheads) became 7300/5500 in 1980 while it was 1800/1600 in 1970 and 6100/ 2500 in 1975. See 
McNamara (1986), op. cit., p. 58  
129  The US, believing that the Soviet Union was not interested in maintaining the stability of 
deterrence, argued that MIRVing made the ABM “technically infeasible,” for this reason SALT I did 
not addressed it. See Bobbitt, op. cit., p. 341 
130 Until the late 1960s, only a few US missiles could carry three warheads. However, these three 
warheads for each missile could only be targeted at the same target and be exploded in short distance 
from each other. With the help of this new technology, each superpower could be able to direct each 
re-entry vehicle (warhead) at different targets. In addition, arrival of MIRVs increased destructive 
power of each superpower without deploying more missiles. The US was first to develop this 
technology as a response to the Soviet ABM system. With missiles, which were MIRVed, the US 
could easily saturate the Soviet ABM system. Thus, in 1966, the US started a new program for two 
new missiles, one (SLBM) called Poseidon and the other (ICBM) called Minuteman III. The Poseidon 
would carry ten MIRVs and Minuteman III would carry three MIRVs. See Smoke, op. cit, pp. 161-2 
131 See Bundy (1988), op. cit., p. 550 
132 In essence, the MIRVed Poseidon and Minuteman III were developed to penetrate the Soviet ABM 
system. However, the SALT I agreement eliminated this requirement. See Smoke, op. cit., p. 205 
133 In addition, at the time, three developments that caused a crisis in extended deterrence induced the 
US to abandon the strategy of sufficiency. These were the strategic parity between the US and the 
Soviet Union, increasing vulnerability problem of the US ICBMs and the lost of escalation dominance 
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resulting from lack of any other option.134 Believing that deterrence might fail in a 
crisis, he emphasized a requirement of “a series of measured to responses 
aggression” to be able to cease conflicts before escalating to a general war.135  
The crucial aim was to increase nuclear options at various levels with the help 
of tactical nuclear weapons and to have power over the escalation process. 
Schlesinger intended to establish a balance in conventional, tactical, and strategic 
forces. Thus, a limited nuclear war, if necessary, would be possible, rather than 
depending only on a single option of massive retaliation. 136  When the Soviets 
increased the security of their ICBMs by putting them in hardened underground silos, 
the US forsook the flexible targeting doctrine. 137 
In 1974, President Gerald Ford entered into office. President Ford and the 
Soviet Secretary Brezhnev signed an agreement known as the Vladivostok Accords. 
The agreement, which would be the basis for the next SALT, would put numerical 
ceilings for all strategic launch vehicles including vehicles for MIRVs. According to 
this agreement, SALT II agreement would be concluded by 1975.However, the 
president Ford left without reaching an agreement on this issue. 138  
Between the 1965 and 1975, the Soviet strategic buildup was significant since 
the Soviet Union deployed much larger missiles than the US ICBMs and less 
                                                                                                                                          
by NATO I Europe. MAD was vital to deter an attack against the US homeland, however it was 
unsatisfactory to deter an attack against the US allies. See Bobbitt, op. cit., pp. 339-41 
134 However, there was an ambiguity surrounding this strategy for the fact that it was not defined 
clearly, whether it aimed to destroy the Soviet military targets generally or the only Soviet ICBMs. 
The latter would mean the counterforce strike mission that had been abandoned by former 
administration. See Smoke, op. cit., pp. 205-06 
135 This would provide a means to bring back the deterrence. These options should range from a 
massive retaliation to doing nothing. See James R. Schlesinger, “Annual Defense Department Report 
1975,” in Philip Bobbitt, Lawrence Freedman, and Gregory F. Treverton, (eds.) US Nuclear Strategy: 
A Reader, (The Macmillan Press, London, 1989), p. 378 
136 It is correct to say that “flexible targeting” was an advanced form of Flexible Response. See 
Siracusa and Coleman, op. cit. 
137 See Smoke, op. cit., pp. 206-07 
138  Negotiations went slowly because of the dilemma over new weapons. At this time, the US 
deployed a new missile called Cruise and the Soviet Union deployed a new bomber known as 
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effective but many submarines. By 1975, it was able to exercise MIRV system.139 
Once the MIRVing process began in both sides, the limitations on offensive missiles 
codified in SALT I Interim agreement began to seem useless since it seemed that the 
Soviet Union was to acquire a remarkable counterforce capability against the US 
ICBMs while the US did not deploy extra warheads compliant with strategic 
sufficiency. In addition, between the 1975 and 1978, it became obvious that the 
Soviet Union improved significantly the ICBM design, the missile accuracy, and 
reliability. 140 
At this point, another strategic concern came into view. In 1976, arguing that 
the Soviet Union was realizing a strategic superiority, most of the specialists began 
to focus on again vulnerability problem.141 This vulnerability concern was known as 
the “window of vulnerability.”142 The increasing numbers of Soviet warheads and the 
unchanging level of the US warheads caused reemergence of this concern. The 
reason was again “delicate balance of terror” situation.143 At the time, the Committee 
on the Present Danger severely focused on this “window of vulnerability.”144 In 
reality, the Soviet strategic buildup in the 1970s did not bring the Soviet superiority, 
                                                                                                                                          
Backfire. Whether they were strategic or tactical was at the heart of discussion. Hence, the president 
Ford left presidency without reaching an agreement on these issues. See Ibid, pp. 171-3 
139 See Bundy (1988), op. cit., p. 559 
140 See Bobbitt, op. cit., pp. 338-40 
141 See Bundy (1988), op. cit., pp. 556-9   
142 The assumption was that the Soviet Union was holding a theoretical capability to destroy ninety 
percent of whole Minutemen ICBMs in a first strike by employing a small number of its ICBMs. See 
Bobbitt, op. cit., p. 341 
143 It was assumed that the Soviets might use their ICBMs carrying eight MIRVs to make a first strike, 
thinking that large quantity of warheads would tolerate the possible reliability and accuracy 
deficiencies. Moreover, each side, believing that the other side’s ICBMs would carry maximum 
MIRVs as far as possible, would increase the numbers of MIRVs on ICBMs. Therefore, a MIRV race 
would be inevitable. See Smoke, op. cit., pp. 164, 207 
144 The main concern of this organization was the changing strategic balance on behalf of Soviet 
Union and its implication on going strategic rivalry. In addition, the main purpose of this organization 
was to motivate public opinion against the idea of strategic détente and to promote a defense against 
the Soviet Union. See Bundy (1988), op. cit., pp. 556-7 
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in terms of warheads, since the deployment of Minuteman III and Poseidon missiles 
added more MIRVs to the US nuclear posture.145  
After taking office in 1977, President Carter initiated a study to analyze 
targeting policy and tried to pursue strategic arms control in the SALT II 
negotiations. In 1977, the Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown declared the emerging 
doctrine, the countervailing strategy. In 1980, President Carter announced a 
directive.146 Presidential Directive 59 (P.D. 59) was embodying the implementation 
of this new doctrine. P.D. 59 established the new doctrine on the flexible targeting 
while reshaping it in accordance with the new circumstances and capabilities. The 
evolution in this doctrine aimed to enhance deterrence and decrease the possibility of 
a nuclear war.147 P.D. 59 put emphasis on counterforce targeting against the hardened 
underground silos of the Soviet Union and as well as on assured destruction mission. 
It particularly gave priority to the “decapitating attack” (attacking the hardened 
underground shelters that the Soviet leaders would use in a war). It also increased 
flexibility in nuclear planning by accepting “limited nuclear options” for a prolonged 
nuclear war.148 Hence, this administration started a new plan to strengthen the three 
legs of the strategic forces.149 In addition, the Carter administration succeeded in 
                                                 
145 See Smoke, op. cit., p. 204 
146 See Ibid, pp. 227-8 
147 Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, thinking that deterrence was the main objective and that it 
called for stability, declared that the US should have secure second strike forces, maintain strategic 
balance, and have a doctrine for the use of forces to dissuade the Soviet from exploring any strategic 
advantage in a nuclear war. In addition, the doctrine would pursuit equitable strategic arms control to 
achieve strategic balance. He also argued that this doctrine was not a new departure but natural 
evolution of former concepts, especially during McNamara and Schlesinger periods. See Harold 
Brown, “Newport Address,” in Philip Bobbitt, Lawrence Freedman, and Gregory F. Treverton, (eds.) 
US Nuclear Strategy: A Reader,  (The Macmillan Press, London, 1989), pp. 406-10 
148 See Smoke, op. cit., p. 228 
149 The Poseidon submarines were equipped with the Trident I missiles and the new Trident submarine 
program was launched. The Cruise technology was to be developed to produce new bomber with 
Cruise missiles. The vulnerability problem of fixed Minuteman ICBMs would be overcome with a 
mobile missile system (the MX). See Brown, op. cit., pp. 407-8 
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signing SALT II Treaty but failed to achieve its ratification in Congress because of 
the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. 150   
Reagan administration entered into office in 1981 and replaced P.D. 59 with a 
new defense strategy. However, the new strategy was also giving priority to the 
decapitating attack. The US could be the winner in a prolonged nuclear war. The 
concept of the limited nuclear options was renamed as “horizontal escalation.”151 In 
this environment, the Reagan administration was determined to bring back the 
strategic superiority to finish the so-called “window of vulnerability.”152 Hence, the 
Reagan administration tried to acquire a “war-fighting capability” in the context of 
nuclear weapons. At the time, strong resistances against this capability inside and 
outside the US made the Reagan administration troubled to pursue this strategy.153 
In 1982, the administration moved towards a different approach in arms 
control talks. President Reagan offered reduction in nuclear weapons rather than 
putting ceilings. He put forward a reduction proposal for warheads to the level of 
5000. He renamed the SALT as START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks). After this 
supposed reduction, each superpower would hold 2500 warheads on ICBMs and 850 
ICBMs totally. Hence, the numbers of the warheads would be criterion for the 
                                                 
150 SALT II would have realized an equal total limit on the number of strategic nuclear delivery 
vehicles - ICBM and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers- initially, 2,400 and lowered to 2,250 at the 
end of 1981, and on the total number of launchers of MIRVed ballistic missiles and heavy bombers 
with long-range Cruise missiles not more than 1,320. In addition, it would have banned the 
construction of additional fixed ICBM launchers and on increases in the number of fixed heavy ICBM 
launchers. After Soviet invasion, President Carter appealed the Senate to hold up thinking on of SALT 
II. In 1980, nevertheless, he declared that the US would stick to the provisions of SALT II on 
condition that the Soviet Union would reply in the same manner. Brezhnev announced a parallel 
declaration about Soviet plan. See Peña, op. cit., p. 3 
151 The US would response a Soviet attack in anywhere (except in the US homeland), with an attack 
against the Soviet forces in a different place of the world (excepting the Soviet homeland), and with 
the same means of the Soviet attack. See Smoke, op. cit., pp. 228-9 
152 Consequently, this administration hurriedly drove the development of the B-1 bomber and the MX 
missile. It also allowed development of the neutron bomb, a better radiation weapon, considered as the 
proto typical anti-personnel weapon while letting non-living matters exists. See Siracusa, and. 
Coleman, op. cit. 
153 Especially a new campaign known as the Freeze was set in motion to stop all nuclear weapons 
programs of the two superpowers. The basic concern was the danger caused by the reality of nuclear 
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reduction rather than the number of launch vehicles as accepted in SALT 
agreements.154 
During the Reagan administration, stability in deterrence, while enhanced by 
START, was dangerously destabilized by the announcement of space-based anti-
missile shield known as formally the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) or as 
informally “Star Wars.” It was a sea change from deterrence to defense in national 
security policy. SDI would make available an impenetrable defend to take care of 
coming Soviet missiles.155 In 1983, the President Reagan declared his intention to 
abandon deterrence based on the threat of retaliation.156  Thinking that it would 
demoralize the Soviet Union and the US would obtain technological superiority, the 
Reagan administration maintained the development of this program.157  
          1.2.2.  Soviet Experience: 
As noted earlier, the primary purpose of the US nuclear strategy in the Cold 
War period was the maintenance of nuclear deterrence in which the principal target 
was the Soviets. Throughout the Cold War, the US and its allies saw the threat of 
nuclear retaliation as the only reliably effective deterrent to a Soviet attack upon the 
United States and its allies. Thus, they tried to enjoy a sense of security by means of 
deterrence policies in the Cold War paradigm. Nevertheless, bearing in mind that the 
                                                                                                                                          
weapons reaching large numbers. However, arguing that the US was still inferior to the Soviet Union, 
the Reagan administration did not support it. See Smoke, op. cit., pp. 232-5 
154 Even the Soviet Union refused the original proposal, it accepted to restart arms control talks. Since 
the main means of delivery for nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union were land-based missiles, such a 
reduction would decrease the number of the Soviet warheads, even below the US posture, which was 
keeping only just half of its total warheads on ICBMs. See Ibid, pp. 241-3 
155 The Soviet Union tried to prevent the development of the US SDI by offering further reduction in 
nuclear warheads. In 1986, Gorbachev proposed a level of zero (complete nuclear disarmament) as a 
cutback in nuclear warheads. See Ibid, pp. 247-51, 279 
156 The New York Times, March 24, 1983, p.20 cited in Sidney D. Drell, Philip J. Farley, and David 
Holloway, “Preserving the ABM Treaty: A Critique of the Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative,” 
International Security, Volume 9, Issue 2 (Autumn, 1984), p. 51, available on line at: www.jstor.com 
157 See Siracusa, and Coleman, op. cit. 
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Soviet brought a war fighting (even war-winning)158 approach to nuclear strategy (as 
opposed to deterrence), and that the nuclear strategy evolved in a bipolar 
environment (in which sometimes assumptions seemed more believable than the very 
realities), it is worth mentioning the Soviet war fighting approach to nuclear strategy 
in the Cold War paradigm.  
Throughout the Cold War, nuclear weapons held an important place in the 
Soviet military doctrine. The Soviet nuclear strategy was aiming to deny the United 
States and its allies from any military or political benefit just resulting from the 
possession of nuclear weapons, and to be capable of preventing the use of nuclear 
weapons against the Soviet Union.159 Thus, the Soviet Union employed five war-
fighting options alternatively to fulfill these aims while the importance on these 
options had shifted over time in appropriate to changing technological capabilities of 
the US and Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union, the military and political leaders with 
the exception of the Gorbachev period, in light of double-criteria, promoted the most 
desirable war-fighting options. These dual criteria were to obtain maximum 
deterrence against any attack, and to organize military forces most efficiently for a 
nuclear war.160  
The main motive behind this war planning was to use military forces to 
prevail in a conflict, in case deterrence might fail.161 Hence, the purpose of the Soviet 
war fighting options was aiming not only to thwart a nuclear war but also to be 
                                                 
158 Michael MccGwire states that “Not losing” is more suitable term rather than “winning or victory” 
for the Soviet objective in a war. See Michael MccGwire, Perestroika and Soviet National Security, 
(The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1991) p. 15 
159 See National Academy Report (1997), op. cit., p. 12  
160 These two goals were complement each other, since the Soviets was thinking that deterrence could 
be enhanced not only by maintaining a retaliatory capacity but also by increasing the launch-under-
attack and pre-emptive capability in terms of nuclear weapons. See Alan B. Sherr, The Other Side of 
Arms Control (Boston: Unwin Hyman, l988), pp. 84-7 and also Raymond L. Garthoff, Deterrence and 
the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine (The Brookings Institution, 1990), pp. 49-51 
161 See Garthoff, Ibid, p. 41  
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prepared to achieve victory in it.162 At this point, it should be noted that the so-called 
war fighting strategies of the US (the Schlesinger Doctrine in 1974, P.D. 59 in 1980, 
and Defense Guidance in 1982) were different from the Soviet war fighting approach 
since they were aiming to deter and prevent a nuclear war rather than to reach a 
ultimate victory. That is, they ignored the war-fighting potential of nuclear 
weapons.163 
These five options were the followings. The Soviet Union would seek the 
maintenance of fighting below the nuclear edge, if not, disarm the US or North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) by launching a first-strike or limit the damage 
by preempting. In addition, it would seek to launch nuclear weapons under an attack 
of the enemy using them and to be able to retaliate against an enemy after absorbing 
his attack.164 
Between 1945 and 1953, the developments in Soviet military doctrine were 
not matching the requirements of nuclear age because of “Stalinist” approach. Since 
Stalin defined the main principal for the evolution in doctrine in 1946 when he said 
that military preparation and doctrinal development of military science would be 
made in light of “the experience of the recent war.”165  
                                                 
162  Soviet Major General M. I. Cherednichenko explained this idea simply by saying that Soviets was 
“compelled to prepare our Armed Forces, country, and all the people for a struggle with an aggressor, 
first of all and primarily under conditions of a nuclear war.” See Major General M. I. Cherednichenko, 
“On Features in the Development of Military Art in The Postwar Period,” Military Historical 
Thought, June 1970, in Selected Soviet Military Writings, 1970-75 (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1977), p. 121 cited in John D. Williams, “Launch on Warning in Soviet Nuclear 
Strategy,” Air University Review, November-December 1986, available on line at: www.airpower. 
maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1986/nov-dec/williams.html 
163 At the time, the idea behind the Soviet war-fighting approach in the mind of Soviet political and 
military leaders was that socialism would be able to survive a nuclear exchange and would be the 
victor in the end of nuclear war by keeping relatively better position than the enemy does. See Sherr, 
op. cit., p. 87 and also Garthoff, op. cit., p. 64 
164  See Sherr, Ibid, p. 84 
165 People’s Commissariat of Defense Order No. 8, signed by Stalin, in Krasnaiazvezda, February 23, 
1946 cited in Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (Praeger Paperback, 1962), p. 
62 and for more details on this issue see pp. 61-71 
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Even if the advent of nuclear weapons in the Stalin period did not have an 
effect on the development of the Soviet military doctrine under the influence of 
Soviet experiences during World War II166, in the following years the role of nuclear 
weapons increased substantially. In the Khrushchev era, the advent of nuclear 
weapons and the missile technology was recognized as the revolution in military 
affairs. In addition, in 1956, Khrushchev accepted that a conflict would inevitably 
escalate from conventional level to nuclear level in which an intense massive nuclear 
exchange would take place in terms of using nuclear weapons on rockets and 
planes.167 In addition, after Stalin death, the modifications made in 1955 in Soviet 
military doctrine put emphasis on the assumption that surprising and early use of the 
nuclear weapons could damage the retaliatory capability of adversary and could avert 
his victory in a war.168 For this reason, preemption seemed as the most promising 
option and since there was no another alternative.169 
 Thus, at the time Soviet publications put emphasis on the use of nuclear 
weapons, especially tactical nuclear weapons in the early stage of a war. The main 
idea was that the Soviet Union would most probably prevail in such a war and 
                                                 
166 Since, it was assumed that a future major war would be as World War II, a protracted land war, 
hence the role of emerging nuclear weapons remained uncertain in this time. Major General S. 
Kozlov, "The Development of Soviet Military Science after World War II," Voennaya Mysl', February 
1964, p. 29 cited in Jonathan R. Adelman, “The Evolution of Soviet Military Doctrine, 1945-84,” in 
SovietArmy.com Website Documents, available on line at: www.sovietarmy.com/documents/ 
evolution.html  
167 See Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii, editor, Soviet Military Strategy, translated by Herbert Dinerstein, 
Leon Gouré, and Thomas Wolfe (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 299, 306 
cited in Ibid. 
168 At the time, the Soviets began to recognize the value of nuclear weapons in military planning and 
to secure their retaliatory capability to enhance deterrence and (if it fails), wage war. See Garthoff 
(1990), op. cit., pp. 42-3  
169 The construction of the Strategic Rocket Forces in the late 1959 as the main instrument of Soviet 
military forces and formal statements about the military doctrine seemed to give priority to the nuclear 
weapons rather than conventional. As envisaged in the new military doctrine, the SU would bring into 
play the nuclear weapons to preempt a possible nuclear attack from both the US and NATO. Pre-
emptive strike was a nuclear strike launched as a response to anticipated enemy attack. The idea of the 
preemption in military doctrine was not new but it gained a different position because of the 
effectiveness of missile delivery systems for preemption. However, as the Soviet Union increased and 
gained confidence in its nuclear capabilities to deter, this option began to lose its ground. See Sherr, 
op. cit., pp. 81-2, 91 
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accordingly should prepare itself militarily and socially to reach this end.170 This 
preemption option prevailed in strategic planning from 1955 until the late 1960s, 
because of Soviet inferiority in nuclear capability and its vulnerable forces in this 
period.171    
While Khrushchev put little emphasis on ground forces, and more emphasis 
on rockets and nuclear weapons172, the US response to Berlin crisis in 1961 and the 
Kennedy administration’s emphasis on conventional build-up paved the way 
emergence of a balanced approach involving both nuclear and conventional weapons 
in 1960s. This approach was codified in a published book in 1962, Military 
Strategy. 173  In addition, as speech made by the new Soviet Secretary, Leonid 
Brezhnev in 1965 reinforced this balance approach. Brezhnev declared that while 
emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons, he did not ignore the role of conventional 
weapons.174  
Hence, in the Brezhnev era, while the emphasis on the possibility of 
eventually escalation to the use of nuclear weapons in a war was a key part of 
doctrine, a possible conventional phase at the beginning of the war was also 
recognized. 175  Hence, this paved the way the development of military thinking 
recognizing the possibility of avoiding early employment of nuclear weapons in a 
war. Moreover, by the end of 1966, it seemed that the Soviet Union recognized the 
possibility of a conventional war without escalating to nuclear level in Europe. This 
                                                 
 
170 Even the training exercises of Soviet soldiers and their equipment were reflecting the Soviet 
perception on the fighting a nuclear war. See McNamara (1986), op. cit., p. 26 
171 See Garthoff (1990), op. cit., p. 44  
172  The main motive behind this was Khrushchev’s interest both in deterrence and in political 
employment of armed forces. However, he failed to replace deterrence for war-fighting concept. See 
Ibid, p. 47 
173  See Sherr, op. cit., pp. 81-2  
174 “All Efforts and Knowledge-For the Motherland, for the Cause of the Party: Speech of Comrade L. 
I. Brezhnev,” Krasnaya zvezda, July 4, 1965, p. 3 cited in Garthoff (1990), op. cit., p. 56 
175 See Adelman, op. cit.  
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doctrinal shift was partially influenced by the acceptance of MAD strategy in the US 
and flexible response in NATO in mid-1960. In this context, preemption was still a 
part of the revised doctrine of 1966. The Soviet nuclear capability increased 
significantly since 1966, however the alternatives for fighting a nuclear war 
continued to prevail in nuclear strategy. 176   
In the late 1960s, the development of ICBM technology and the deployment 
of the third generation Soviet ICBMs such as SS-9 had significant implications on 
the five options. The “hard-target-kill” characteristic of SS-9, while augmenting 
preemption option, provided the Soviet Union with, if not absolute, to some extent 
first strike capability.177 
In addition, at the time, the third generation Soviet missiles were positioned 
in hardened underground silos. Hence, the protection for the Soviet nuclear forces 
provided by these silos increased the possibility of surviving a US first strike and 
then retaliating in force. This paved the way the creation of the third option, 
retaliatory strike. Moreover, the deployment of Soviet SLBMs in the beginning of 
1968 improved this option.178 
By the end of the 1960s, the Soviet Union had been able to employ all five 
war-fighting options. The development in the missile technology made possible to 
store the liquid –fueled missiles (SS-19 and SS-11) in vertical position. Hence, they 
would be ready to be launched quickly. This rapid launch capability gave the Soviet 
                                                 
176 See Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Brookings, 1987), pp. 26-28 
cited in Sherr, op. cit., pp. 83-4 
177 While SS-9 missile was carrying a large warhead that was able to destroy the US ICBMs under 
hardened silos, they would fail to destroy American retaliatory capability, SLBMs and bombers. See 
Sherr, Ibid, p. 85 
178 The deployment of SLBMs was significant for the fact that it would increase the deterrent effect of 
the Soviet Union against the US first strike. See Ibid, p. 86 
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Union launch under attack option. Launch under attack would be the most promising 
war-fighting option, as a response to the enemy’s surprise first strike.179 
Perceptions on the possibility of victory in nuclear wars had played a key role 
in influencing the Soviet nuclear strategy. However, beginning in the late 1960s the 
victory claims and naturally, nuclear superiority aims began to seem obsolete. The 
requirement for military superiority had been justified the assumption that socialism 
would prevail in a nuclear war. Hence, Soviet Military officials and political leaders 
continued to question the victory and superiority issues until the mid-1970s. 180 A 
speech made by Brezhnev at Tula in 1977 clarified the Soviet position on the 
superiority and victory questions. This speech marked a significant departure from 
superiority and victory aspirations. Brezhnev also endorsed the concept of deterrence 
and the Soviet interest in “preventing both first and second strikes and nuclear war 
altogether.”181 
Soviet leaders seemed to accept the possibility of a major conventional war 
excluding the use of nuclear weapons.182 In addition, it seemed that Soviets began to 
accept the MAD as the objective condition while excluding the American notion of 
maintaining a mutual hostage condition in 1970s.183  
This doctrinal shift also increased the emphasis on the war-fighting options 
not depending on nuclear superiority. These were to retaliate after absorbing a first-
strike, to launch under attack, and to keep the fighting below the nuclear threshold. 
                                                 
179  See Ibid.  
180 In 1960s, while the military writings still were emphasizing the fighting of nuclear war, they also 
put emphasis on the destruction of such war and even “unacceptability” and “prevention” of it. For 
example, see Marshal Vasily Sokolovsky ed., Voyennaya Strategiya (Military Strategy), 3. Edition 
(Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1968), p. 239 cited in Garthoff (1990), op. cit., p. 50 
181 Leonid I. Brezhnev, “ Outstanding Exploit of the Defenders of Tula: Speech of Comrade L.I. 
Brezhnev, “Pravada, January 19, 1977, pp. 1-2 cited in Ibid, pp. 51-2. The two main motives behind 
this doctrinal shift were that Soviets began to believe the impossibility of a nuclear superiority and the 
emergence of strategic parity between superpowers. See Sherr, op. cit., p. 88 
182  See McNamara (1986), op. cit., p. 27 
183 See Sherr, op. cit., p. 88 
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Hence, the Soviets directed their efforts to bolster these three options. In 1970s, 
while the increase in the deployment of Soviet SLBMs (Delta-class) and the 
completion of basing the Soviet ICBMs underground silos were enhancing the 
retaliatory option, the deployment of early warning satellites enhanced launched-
under attack option. In addition, in the late 1970s, the Soviet Union changed the 
structure of conventional forces and command chain to enhance the conventional-
war-option. Contrary to enhancement in the three options, first-strike option, and 
preemptive option lost its attractiveness. As noted earlier, at the time a strategic 
parity came to be accepted by superpowers, in terms of second-strike capabilities, 
hence a first-strike attack seemed ineffective to disarm enemy and limit the damage. 
In addition, increasing confidence in deterrence capability became more promising 
than preemption.184 
In 1980s, these three options continued to prevail in nuclear strategy. 
Deployment of highly survivable missiles-SS-24 and SS-25 (mobile and solid-
fueled) and more long-range SLBMs enhanced the retaliatory option. In addition, 
while developments in early warning system enhancing launch-under-attack the 
conventional military exercises bolstered conventional option.185    
At the time, Soviet leaders affirmed the Soviet intentions for preventing a 
nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons. In addition, the Soviets began to see 
MAD condition as a threat to international security and promoted reduction and 
adjustments in military doctrine to create a condition in which a nuclear war would 
be less likely.186 In that sense, Brezhnev sent a message to the UN on June 12, 1982 
about the Soviet intention to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. He declared that the 
                                                 
184  In 1980s, the retaliatory capability of the Soviet Union increased with the deployment of the SS-25 
and SS-24 missiles and new long-range SLBMs. See Ibid, pp. 89-90 
185 See Ibid, p. 92 
186 See Ibid, p. 93 
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Soviet Union would not be the first to use the nuclear weapons in a war. At the time, 
writings about this issue recognized that “there would be no victors in a nuclear 
war.”187 
In 1986, Gorbachev emphasized the “complete unacceptability of nuclear 
war” and while recognizing the existence of mutual deterrence, refused its stability 
effect for security. 188  He later suggested replacement of MAD with complete 
disarmament by 2000 and reasonable sufficiency both in offensive nuclear weapons 
and in threat posture. However, this did not necessarily mean that the Soviet would 
abandon its war-fighting options. 189  
        1.3. The Rationale for the ABM Treaty during the Cold War:  
Bearing in mind that employment of the armed forces to defend a country is a 
natural enthusiasm and that each superpower experienced this way in 1950s and 
1960s, it is worth mentioning why the US and the Soviet Union decided in the early 
1970s not to deploy a nationwide ABM system to defend their homelands in the Cold 
War paradigm. In attempting to answer this question, one should recall the strategic 
nuclear context at the time and focus on what ABM Treaty brought about to life.   
With the failure of early effort to control atomic weapons, the US and the 
Soviet Union began to direct their efforts to increase strategic forces, for the sake of 
security. Consequently, a strategic competition between these two countries began to 
function. This strategic competition sometimes encountered them in dangerous crises 
such as Berlin crisis in 1950s and 1960s and Cuban crisis in 1962. Hence, after 
spending a large amount of money to build up strategic weapons, the superpowers 
began to realize that quickly developing strategic weapons would not present much 
                                                 
187 See McNamara (1986), op. cit., pp. 27-8 
188 M. S. Gorbachev’s address at the 27, Congress of Communist Party in 1986 cited in Sherr, op. cit., 
p. 94 
189 See Ibid, p. 93 
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more than uncertainty and insecurity. Taking into consideration the reality of action–
reaction process in which (believing that the other side might gain a nuclear 
advantage, each superpower was obliged to respond), they attempted to halt this 
unmanageable arms race by the mid-1950s. However, because of divergent 
perceptions and distrust, they failed to reach a substantial agreement on this issue.190 
However, the Cuban crisis, which brought the world to the edge of a nuclear war, 
paved the way emergence of some significant results. Both the two superpowers 
accepted the necessity of some arms control measures.191 
After the Cuban missile crisis, they reached a conclusion about the necessity 
for the development of the rules for nuclear rivalry. The American-Soviet nuclear 
race became stable merely as the superpowers accomplished such quantitative and 
qualitative parameters of the nuclear forces, upon which the nuclear intensification 
either horizontally or vertically could not give any rational benefits. Thus, nuclear 
weapons have acquired the function of deterrence, prevention of the use of the 
nuclear weapons against each other. Therefore, nuclear arms control formed a 
particularly important guide in the nuclear strategy of both the US and Soviet Union 
in the strengthening of the international security during the Cold War.192 That was a 
security by way of arms control.193 In the early 1970s, the US and the Soviet Union 
                                                 
190 The arms control initiatives, such as Barunch plan, “Atoms for Peace,” and “Open Skies” proposals 
sponsored by the US was responded with other proposals sponsored by the Soviet Union. Hence, there 
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191 See Siracusa and Coleman, op. cit. 
192 See Sergey Rugov, “The Prospects For Nuclear Arms Controls in The Multipolar World,” Arms 
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way came into view in 1963, The Limited Test Ban Treaty, which prohibited nuclear all forms of 
explosion, except underground. However, this exception was even satisfactory to continue arms race. 
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added a significant page, known as SALT I to the arms control process in a hostile 
strategic context. The result was the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on the 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.194 The US leaders began to promote the idea 
of ABM Treaty in 1960s. Hence, the ABM Treaty was one of the US initiatives to 
change the Soviet approaches to the role of nuclear weapons.195  As McNamara 
explained, the reason was that establishment of a nationwide Soviet ABM system 
would force the US to make principal modifications in its force level.196  
In the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, the United 
States and the Soviet Union agreed that each might have only two ABM deployment 
areas. The Treaty permitted each side to have one limited ABM system to protect its 
capital and another to protect an ICBM launch area. In addition, precise quantitative 
and qualitative limits were codified on the ABM Treaty. At each site, there might be 
no more than 100 interceptor missiles and 100 launchers. Both Parties agreed to limit 
qualitative improvement of their ABM technology, (e.g., to develop, test, or deploy 
ABM launchers capable of launching more than one interceptor missile at a time or 
modify existing launchers to give them this capability,) and deploy systems for rapid 
reload for launchers were all banned. Both sides agreed to prohibit development, 
testing, or deployment of sea-, air-, or space-based, or mobile land-based ABM 
systems and their components. In addition, the Treaty provided for a U.S.-Soviet 
                                                                                                                                          
The second and third one were Outer space Treaty, and the Seabed Treaty; the former prohibited the 
placement of weapon of mass destruction into earth orbit or onto the moon, the later on the ocean 
floor. Finally, the last one in 1960s was the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) aiming to limit the spread 
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Standing Consultative Commission to promote its objectives and implementation.197 
A 1974 amendment reduced the number of permitted operational ABM sites to one 
for each side.198 As noted earlier, each side began to develop and deploy a limited 
ABM system; hence, a complete prohibition seemed impossible.199 
 The SALT I agreements was a turning point addressing both to the arms 
control and to the strategic relations between the US and Soviet Union.200 From a 
realistic approach, the ABM treaty was a significant step for the prevention of 
nuclear war and for the confidence on arms control as a means of security. In a sense, 
it was officially recognition of the deterrence policy as the most favorable condition 
and the existence of mutual deterrence in the strategic relations of superpowers.201 
That is, ABM Treaty focused on maintaining the essential Cold War condition of 
deterrence, mutual vulnerability.202 The prohibition of ABM system aimed to hold 
the US and the Soviet Union vulnerable to each other’s missile attack, in that sense; 
this treaty supported the assumption of the mutual vulnerability recognized firstly by 
both superpowers in the mid-1950s.203 The chief American negotiator in the SALT I 
negotiation, Gerard Smith defined this strategic context at the time clearly. He stated 
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that there was a situation of mutual deterrence. No matter which side would launch a 
first strike, since the other side would be able to launch a retaliatory attack by means 
of its secured second-strike forces.204 Because of the secured second-strike forces of 
them, the US, and Soviet Union recognized that neither would prevail in a nuclear 
war nor would attempt to launch a surprise nuclear attack. However, worrying about 
the technologic developments that might provide strategic superiority with any of 
them, the US and Soviet Union tried to reduce the risk of a nuclear conflict by 
signing the ABM Treaty. Consequently, it is possible to say that the ABM Treaty 
aimed to continue the mutual deterrence relationship and the existing strategic 
stability between the two superpowers at the time.205     
With this background, the rationale for the ABM treaty can be explained by 
three approaches that were supporting each other at the time. It was accepted by each 
superpower that any ABM system would be ineffective, destabilizing, and 
expensive.206   
Such a system would be ineffective because the technology of offense had 
been maintaining an advantage over the defense from the beginning of the nuclear 
age.207 That means offensive system most probably would overcome a defensive 
system in a competition. The offense would be able to saturate the defense by 
employing some sort of penetration devices.208  At the time, the Soviet Marshal 
Krylov, the Commander in Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, expressed this by 
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saying that offensive missiles carried a quality by which they became invulnerable, 
especially while flying in mass.209 Under this condition, the offense had both the 
technical and economic advantages over the defense. Hence, the offense would be 
able to overcome the defense with a less cost and in a short time.210  
 Any ABM system would be destabilizing for two reasons. First, each side 
would try to increase its offensive capability to prevail over the ABM system of the 
other side and immobilize it by deploying extra offensive strategic forces. It would 
cause and speed up the arms race without increasing the security.211 Hence, the arms 
race would be in the form of offense-defense race. The assumption was that if one of 
the two superpowers established a nationwide defense system, in return the other side 
would try to increase its offensive forces to overcome the defense. The increase in 
the offensive forces of one side would motivate the other side to increase the 
defensive capability further. 212  McNamara explained this reality to the Soviet 
Premier Aleksei Kosygin in 1967. He emphasized that the appropriate US response 
to a possible Soviet ABM system would be the increase in the number of the US 
offensive posture to maintain deterrence since it would be cheaper to deploy more 
offensive forces than to enhance the ABM deployment.213 Hence, the action-reaction 
course, the most important motivation for the ABM Treaty214  and the affect of 
security dilemma would make it an endless process with no benefit in return.  
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Secondly, the situation of MAD was the cornerstone of the strategic 
balance215 and the stability between the US and the Soviet Union. Any ABM system 
would weaken the assurance on the second strike forces and would eliminate the 
assured side of assured destruction capability.216 In this context, it was generally 
accepted during the Cold War that the ABM systems would challenge the second 
strike capability of the superpowers to impose assured destruction against one 
another. Believing that an effective ABM system would destroy as much as 
necessary warheads of other side, and would be able to nullify the supposed 
retaliatory capability of the other side, either superpower might have an incentive to 
start a strategic nuclear first strike in a crisis, and therefore it would weaken 
deterrence and destabilize the strategic balance. In that sense, the prohibition of 
ABM system was seen as the keystone of stability in the US-Soviet Union strategic 
relations. 217  In addition, it embraced the prevailing principle of Cold War arms 
control, the MAD logic.218 The reason was that each superpower would be certain 
about each other’s position for not deploying rapidly a national defense and for 
preserving retaliatory capability as the main requirement of deterrence against any 
attack and of the nuclear security.219   
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As a conclusion, it is possible to say that three key terms- nuclear deterrence, 
arms control, and rationality covered the Cold War thinking.220 Nuclear deterrence 
spared the world and civilization from a nuclear devastation by deterring its own use, 
arms control became successful to alleviate superpower tensions and promote further 
cooperation between two superpowers by making reciprocally clear their intentions. 
In addition, the carefulness of each superpower not to challenge the other side’s main 
interest made it possible to escape a nuclear exchange standing on a thin ice and 
hostile ground.221      
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CHAPTER-2 
2. THE US NUCLEAR STRATEGY IN THE POST-COLD WAR 
ERA 
 Throughout the Cold War, nuclear weapons (as an instrument of nuclear 
deterrence) had an important role in the US security strategy, however the dissolution 
of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union were some of radical 
changes that paved the way a reassessment in nuclear strategy of the US. With the 
end of Cold War, the security conditions have changed. The new security 
environment seemed volatile, indecisive, and dominated by regional security 
challenges.222  
Explaining the end of Cold War, the bipolar system, and the Soviet-American 
rivalry continues to be a heated discussion among the theories of international 
relations trying to shed light on these developments. However, there is a little 
disagreement among them on the reality of emerging a new international system 
different from the Cold War system.223 Even more than a decade after the collapse of 
Cold War international system (portrayed as bipolar), the characteristics of that new 
system are still ambiguous. Nevertheless, it is certain that “a fluid and complex 
system” continue to evolve.224 Accordingly, it is the aim of this chapter to shed light 
on the underlying principles of the US nuclear strategy (still continuing to evolve) in 
the post-Cold War security environment.  
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            2.1. A New Security Environment  
Throughout the Cold War, the US nuclear strategy was formulated as a 
response to the threats, in the form of both nuclear and conventional, mainly posed 
by the Soviet Union. The severity of nuclear danger for the US was only gauged with 
the number of Soviet nuclear warheads. As a result, the US, as well as the Soviet 
Union deployed thousands of nuclear warheads. However, the dramatic changes in 
international system, the end of the Cold War and dissolution of Soviet Union, were 
the turning points of nuclear age dominating in international relations since the late 
1940s. These dramatic changes allowed new security challenges to run free. In this 
context, there are two main roots of the nuclear danger. The first one is legacy of 
Cold War, a world of large nuclear arsenals. The second one is increasing 
proliferation of nuclear weapons to many states.225 
In the absence of nuclear competition, the rationale, and the role for the 
excessive nuclear warheads in the US nuclear strategy began to seem problematic in 
addressing the challenges in the post-Cold War era. Understanding the US nuclear 
strategy in the post-Cold War era requires an analysis of the new security 
environment with its challenges and opportunities and the “new world order” that 
will substitute Cold War bipolar framework.  
2.1.1.  A New World Order: 
International structures seem to develop “through a life cycle” similar to 
complicated organic systems. They emerge, live, and end.226 This is true for the 
bipolar system dominating in the Cold War years. The Cold War system can be 
described as East-West ideological and military competition in which the bipolar 
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“discipline” kept the local conflicts and tensions under control. 227  Thus, such a 
disciple did not permit eruption of regional conflicts that might threaten   
superpowers’ interests.228 It had an order beset not only by high risk but also by high 
stability resulting from the momentous peril of escalation in nuclear weapons.229 
Contrary to the bipolar discipline framework, in the post-Cold War era regional 
countries do not necessarily feel themselves to be obliged to comply with any 
“disciple” and rather felt themselves more liberated to practice antagonistic 
“political, ideological, and, in some cases, religious objectives through the use of 
force.”230 
Throughout the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union were the only great 
powers. Moreover, interactions between them were the determinants of international 
structure.231 The collapse of the Soviet Union brought about a structural change in 
international system, and the phrase “new world order” now appeared to cover the 
rising international structure. This phrase “new world order” has been generally used 
to define immense transformations in the central guidelines of international relations. 
However, there has been little consensus of what it really signifies. This dramatic 
transform had changed the “bipolarity in the distribution of power” and the 
ideological confrontation between “communist and capitalist blocs.” The emphasis 
on the military power “as the core determinant of international order and security” 
appeared to shift toward “economic, political, and societal forces.” In this context, it 
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has also generated a debate among observers over the emergence of what kind of 
world order (unipolar, or multipolar).232 The main concern of observers including 
academics, journalists, and decision-makers has been to define precisely the 
emerging “new world order.”233 It was generally assumed that the “new world order” 
would be shaped mostly on the preferences of the US, since it was the only great 
power 234  ruling geo-strategic, the economic, the political, and the ideological 
structures all over the world.235 On September 11, 1990, President George H. W. 
Bush pictured the “new world order” as “An era in which the nations of the world, 
East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony.”236  
In the early years of the post-Cold War period, the prevailing belief was that 
the international structure would become, at least temporarily, unipolar. Columnist 
Charles Krauthammer initially defined this moment as “unipolar moment” while 
putting emphasis on the temporary nature of this structure and its potential tendency 
towards multipolar system as in the case of pre-World War I era.237 However, before 
the Operation Desert Storm, there was not any implication about the unipolar 
position of the US and about what it would entail. However, even with the 
contributions of the Arab nations, and with the consent of the China and Soviet 
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Union in UN, the US responded Kuwait invasion by Iraq. It was the first appearance 
of the so-called “unipolar moment.”238  
The developments in subsequent years as in the case of former Yugoslavia, 
Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina showed that American leadership and ad hoc 
coalitions were preconditions to deal with global problems. In addition, in spite of 
negative responses from European states, the expansion of NATO eastwards was 
another mark about the unipolar position of the US.239 However, there are some 
constraints over the US influence and capability to form the future order by its own. 
When the nuclear dimension enters into picture, the structure is not the unipolar.240 
Since, even weak countries having nuclear capability may pose limits upon the 
strong country like the US. Such magnetism in nuclear weapons causes the spread of 
nuclear weapons and makes it difficult to bring to an end it.241 A strong country like 
China realizing nuclear parity (second-strike capability) with the US may easily limit 
the policy choices of the US in its region.242 
The verb “moment” seems to be correctly used to define the transition period. 
As Kenneth N. Waltz states, the durability of unipolarity is lesser than the other 
distribution of power arrangements. The world order “became bipolar after the 
Second World War, unipolar with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and as the 
new millennium dawns it is gradually becoming multipolar once more.”243 James 
Schlesinger raised a parallel idea. While stating that the new order would be 
dominated by nationalized competitions and cultural tensions, he also declared that 
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the future order would go back to world structure before 1939, to the multipolarity.244 
Hence, at the end, a system of multipolarity is likely to emerge but “all poles will not 
be equal in all respects.”245 As Waltz puts forth, the unavoidable transition from 
unipolarity to multipolarity is occurring in Asia since the re-establishment of 
international balance of power will be at the mercy of China and Japan in light of the 
domestic developments and outside reaction of these countries. 246  In addition, 
Brzezinski argues that the upcoming international order will be shaped by the 
resolution of crucial troubles in the three central regions including Europe, Far East, 
and the Middle East.247  
In this context, it should be noted that during the Cold War international order 
promoted the sub-system orders. However, today it seems that the sub-system 
structures is likely to help the formation of new world structure. Since the end of 
Cold War, many analysts put emphasis on the sub-system transformations and their 
impacts on the emerging international order. They divide the world into several 
regions and analyze the affects of some trends including globalization, 
democratization, fragmentation, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) on these tiers and over the emerging global order.248 
One of these analysts is worth mentioning, especially after the September 11 
terrorist attacks to the US. Donald M. Snow in his study, The Shape of Future 
published in 1995, analyzes the emerging international system under two separate 
subsystems, “the First and Second Tiers.” He defines the members of the first tiers as 
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the countries sharing the political ideology of democracy and having market-based 
economies. The second tiers include the rest of countries of world, lacking “the 
commonality and shared values.” He states that the most critical problem is how the 
countries in the first tier “relate to” the ones in the second tier, or “vice versa.”249 
Hence, the core question is whether the events of September 11 are the symbol of the 
current relation between two tiers. 
Against this background, it is possible to say that the evolution in 
international arrangements toward any system has not yet finished. The 1990s was 
futile to substitute the Cold War structure with consistent rules and structure 
organizing the international system. The phrase of “Post-Cold War Era” seemed to 
match well the transition period250 at least until September 11, 2001. Since after 
September 11, the statement that “the world will never be the same again” seems to 
be accepted by many people including academics and policy-makers.251 As some 
argue, the conclusion can be derived from this event “is that the geographical 
position and the military power of the United States are no longer sufficient to ensure 
its security.”252 Moreover, it became a sign of the end of “the unipolar moment” in 
international relations, although the debate “what kind of world order and power 
structure would characterize and then emerge from this moment” had not finished.253 
 While history runs its direction toward the 21st century, as noted earlier, it is 
still too early to give exact picture of world system and its principles.254 However, it 
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is certain that while the danger of nuclear war decreasing, the instability increased. In 
addition, it is certain that the rising security settings differentiate from the past, 
without the nuclear dimension. For this reason, the term “second nuclear age,” which 
implies that the future challenges would mostly be related to nuclear security, is the 
best that we call the moment. 255  
2.1.2.  New Security Challenges and Opportunities:  
As some argue, the years of 1990s was both “the best of time” and “the worst 
of time,” in terms of international peace and security. It was “the best of time,” since, 
the possible danger of a nuclear war between two superpowers disappeared, and the 
Cold War ended. At the same time, it was “the worst of time,” because (with the end 
of Cold War and with the collapse of Soviet Union), a transition period from one 
system to another (with its disorder nature, and new security challenges) began to 
surface.256 
The concept of security has a very broad meaning. Traditionally it signifies “a 
condition of being protected, free from danger, safety.” However, now the concept of 
“security” comprises the notions such as “global environmental dangers, disease, and 
economic and natural disasters.” In addition, throughout the Cold War, the phrase 
“security challenge” implied dominantly a nuclear war between two superpowers.257 
However, the phrase “new security challenges” now generally implies the security 
issues including  “the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the growth of 
ethnic nationalism and extremism, international terrorism, and crime and drug 
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trafficking.”258 A full understanding of the new security environment calls for a 
thorough, issue-by-issue analysis beyond the scope of this study. In this context, 
since this study entirely deals with nuclear weapons, it is necessary to confine the 
concept of security in accordance with the scope of this study. Hence, the term 
security in this study is related to the nuclear security or insecurity and the security 
challenges to nuclear proliferation, smuggling, terrorism, and management of 
excessive fissile material stockpiles. In addition, with new security opportunities, it 
will be attempted to shed light on the new opportunities on arms control activities, 
process and achievements, especially on START in the post-Cold War era.  
New Security Opportunities: 
 International peace and security are the common interest of all nations. One 
of the important means that goes this end has been disarmament. Since their 
creations, the danger of using nuclear weapons has been the dark cloud hanging over 
peace and security. The international community tried to cease this danger since the 
beginning of Cold War. In the depths of Cold War, with Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)259, it was intended to firstly limit the spread 
of nuclear weapons, secondly stop the nuclear arms race, and finally realize the 
abolition of nuclear weapons. However, in the Cold War security framework, this 
commitment did not seem as practical as to be fulfilled.260 Moreover, throughout the 
Cold War, especially between 1960s and 1980s, the nuclear arms control initiatives 
failed to finish the Soviet-American nuclear rivalry or realize “a complete 
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disarmament.” They merely became some accepted rules to prevent the realization “a 
mutual annihilation” resulting from this strategic competition.261  
In 1990s, the dramatic changes in the international political landscape, as 
some argue, brought a “window of opportunity” to address this danger more 
vigorously. Following the disappointments of Cold War, the new security conditions 
let swift and significant developments on many counts.262 With the end of Cold War 
and the collapse of the Soviet Union, a significant opportunity came into view to shy 
away from the cliff of nuclear war by decreasing the enormous Russian and US 
nuclear stockpiles and achieving an ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.263 
Both superpowers took remarkable steps to reduce the danger of a nuclear 
war. With the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987, they eliminated all 
new class of missiles including cruise missiles and all ground–launched missiles with 
ranges between 500 and 5500 kilometers.264 Through START treaties, a significant 
strategic arms reduction process began. Moreover, this process, coupled with some 
measures taken after the Gulf War to enhance non-nuclear norms and non-
proliferation was seen as the beginning of erosion in “the distinction between the 
vertical arms race and horizontal proliferation.”265 Following these developments, the 
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which ended the Soviet conventional 
superiority, brought significant limits on conventional forces in Europe.266 Moreover, 
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the NPT was indefinitely extended, and conferences on the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) were begun.267 Against this background, it should be noted that since 
START process is directly connected with the aim of this study, it will be attempted 
to shed some light on START process in much detail.268 
The negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union on START began in 
Geneva in 1982. It was the first treaty aimed to reduce the numbers of nuclear 
warheads. After nine-year negotiations, START I was signed by Presidents George 
H. W. Bush and Gorbachev on July 31, 1991.269 Because of its scope, in essence, it 
was a multilateral treaty decreasing the strategic offensive forces of the US and 
Newly Independent States (NIS) of former Soviet Union (Russia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Ukraine) to an equal ceiling, 6,000 warheads and 1,600 offensive 
delivery means including land-based ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. 270 
However, because of counting rules, the real reduction in warheads would be much 
more than the formal treaty limits.271 In addition, there would be no more than 4,900 
warheads on ICBMs, and SLBMs and 1,100 on mobile ICBMs. After signing the 
Lisbon Protocol, all successor states to former Soviet Union became parties to 
START I in 1992. After ratification fulfilled by all parties, the treaty entered into 
force in 1994. By the end of 1996, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine had completed 
the transfer of all nuclear weapons in their territories and became parties to the NPT 
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as non-nuclear weapon states. 272  At the time, the Soviet Union declared that 
provisions of START I would be followed only if the 1972 ABM Treaty continued to 
remain in effect.273 After seven year period, on December 5, 2001, the US and Russia 
fulfilled their commitments and concluded the implementation of START I. 
However, as envisaged in START I the US and Russia did not eliminate the 
dismantled warheads from delivery means and as a result, they had to store them 
(estimated as 5000 warheads stockpile for the US and 13,000 warheads stockpile for 
Russia.) START I will continue to be in effect until December 5, 2009. 274 
During Washington summit in 1990, Bush and Gorbachev declared that after 
START I was signed, they would start new discussions on further reductions. Hence, 
in 1991, the negotiations on START II started with the Soviet Union and later 
continued with Russia. In June 1992, Presidents Bush and Boris Yeltsin reached an 
agreement on essential provisions of START II. There was an important 
development in this agreement. The “destabilizing” MIRVed ICBMs would be 
included in reduction process.275 In January 1993, the bilateral START II was signed 
by the US and Russia. As required in this treaty, the US and Russia will reduce the 
number of their deployed strategic nuclear weapons to a level selectively between 
3,000 and 3,500.276 This treaty also put a ceiling on the number of warheads on 
SLBMs, as 1750. Both sides will eliminate all land-based ICBMs with MIRVs. 
Implementation of START II would be fulfilled by January 1, 2003. Ratification of 
this treaty firstly delayed until START I entered into force.277 President Bush sent the 
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agreement to the US Senate after signing and US Senate ratified START II in 1996. 
Boris Yeltsin submitted START II to the Duma for ratification in 1995. However, 
because of tough disagreement among the members of Duma, it failed to ratify 
START II until April 18, 2000.278  
Duma members expressed their concerns on the US upload capability (“the 
ability to return warheads placed in storage back to delivery vehicles”), on the 
Russian inability to implement the elimination of MIRVed ICBMs by 2003 and 
finally on the US future intention towards national missile defense. To refer these 
concerns about START II, the US and Russian signed a document called “Joint 
Statement on Parameters of Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces” at Helsinki in 
March 1997. As envisaged in this document, they accepted to sign a protocol 
extending the time limit of START II to December 31, 2007. They also agreed to 
start consultations on a START III treaty after START II entered into force and 
deactivate by December 31, 2003, all strategic nuclear systems considered to be 
eliminated under START II (Russian SS–18s and SS–24s, and the American missile 
experimental, MX).279  
After Vladimir Putin came to power in Russia, START II was ratified by 
Duma. However, the Duma also put forward some conditions with ratification. 
According to Federal Law on Ratification, under  “extraordinary circumstances” 
such as US withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty or on the occasion that a new 
treaty not signed by December 31, 2003, the Russia would evaluate the situations and 
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decide on the future of START II. It also stated that the entry of START II into force 
would be depended on US approval of the 1997 agreements on the ABM treaty.280 
As noted earlier, in 1997, the United States and Russia agreed to begin 
negotiations on START III treaty once START II entered into force. START III 
would put a ceiling on warheads between 2,000-2,500 in each country. It would 
include measures to endorse “the irreversibility of the weapons elimination process” 
and measures about the transparency, and the warhead destruction.281 In a meeting in 
1999, Russia offered further reductions to a level of between 1000 and 1500 
warheads in each side. 282  The US refused further reductions and declared that 
START III level would be between 2,000 or 2,500 warheads.283 In  2000, the US 
prepared “a draft text of START III” and proposed amendments to the ABM treaty. 
However, the disagreement over US intentions on national missile defense (NMD) 
system became an important obstruction to START II’s entry into force and, to 
consultations on START III.284 
In November 2001, the new President George W. Bush declared his objective 
to decrease US strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 within 10 
years. President Putin responded Bush’s proposal in kind and repeated Russia’s 
intention to reduce strategic warheads to 1,500 in each country by a treaty. However, 
pronouncing that consultations and agreements are “tedious, time-consuming, and 
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unnecessary,” the Bush administration refused to embody further reductions in a 
treaty.285  
On 13 December 2001, arguing that ABM Treaty prevents the capability of 
US to acquire means to defend itself against potential terrorist or rogue-state missile 
attacks, President George W. Bush also pronounced that the US would withdraw 
from the 1972 ABM Treaty in six months. About this issue, he also sent a diplomatic 
note to Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine in December 2001.286  With a 
different approach from the past warnings, Russian President Vladimir Putin 
declared that withdrawal would be a “mistake” but would not damage US-Russian 
relations.287 As a result, it seems that even the US withdrawal from ABM treaty 
would not prevent strategic arms reduction process. In a press conference, President 
George W. Bush declared that the US and Russia reached an agreement on the 
necessity of a treaty for strategic reduction. He also declared hopefully that there 
might be an agreement in May 2002.288 Actually, on May 24, 2002, the Presidents 
Bush and Putin signed a treaty reducing the numbers of the US and Russian nuclear 
warheads by two thirds. As envisaged under this treaty, known as “the Treaty of 
Moscow,” they will reduce their arsenals to between 1,700 and 2,200 nuclear 
warheads by 2012.289  
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  New Security Challenges: 
             Nuclear Proliferation: 
 The worries concerning the spread of nuclear weapons do not only belong to 
post-Cold War era. As noted earlier, Barunch Plan was the first attempt to establish 
some international control on these weapons. Atoms-for Peace proposal and 
establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were the others.290 
In addition, the phrase “proliferation” had come into the policy dictionary in 1950s 
and 1960s.291 However, only after China’s nuclear test in 1964 was discovered, both 
the US and Soviet Union growingly attempted to limit the spread of these 
weapons.292 For the US, the main motives behind these efforts (enhancing politic 
disincentives, raising technical obstacles, and establishing nonproliferation 
institutions) has been that the spread of nuclear weapons would give rise to the novel 
dangers to the US and intensify the worldwide and local instabilities.293 Hence, Non-
proliferation regime, comprising the 1968 NPT294 and the related agreements aiming 
to “support and enforce the treaty”, made an effort to deal with the spread of nuclear 
weapons by categorizing the world countries under two groups. The first group 
comprises the five nuclear weapon states detonating a nuclear device before 1 
January 1967, the US (1945), Soviet Union (1949), Great Britain (1952), France 
(1960), and China (1964). The second group includes the rest of states in the world, 
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as non-nuclear weapon states.295 All five states signed NPT and acquired a legitimate 
rank as nuclear weapons states. In the following years, three more states (non 
signatories to the NPT, India, Israel, and Pakistan) acquired considerable nuclear 
capabilities.296 
The phrase “proliferation” signifies the efforts of a state or a non-state unit 
“to transfer, develop, or acquire” WMD including nuclear, chemical or biological 
weapons and the delivery systems for such weapons.297 However, this study will 
mainly deal with the nuclear proliferation and its security implications in the post-
Cold War era.  
The decade of the 1990s had been the period of new apprehensions because 
of increase in both horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation. 298  While the 
dominant nuclear danger of the Cold War, a possible nuclear exchange between two 
superpowers, came to an end with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the proliferation 
of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and their delivery systems 
began to pose a rising threat upon the US and its allies all over the world.299 
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 Since the end of Cold War, as a minimum, the number of countries holding, 
obtaining, or developing the NBC capability has amounted to 25.300 During the Gulf 
War, the detection of Iraq’s developed nuclear program and delivery system for 
nuclear weapons became “a wake-up call” for increasing proliferation.301 In addition, 
while state-level proliferation is causing some important challenges, non-state actors 
are also becoming a main source of proliferation concerns. The proliferation 
concerns in non-state level will be addressed with the issue of nuclear terrorism in 
the following section. 
Since the end of Cold War, most of the nuclear proliferation activities have 
taken place in the Asia continent. Today, the main concern of proliferation originates 
from the Pakistan, and India in South Asia, Iraq, and Iran as a response to Israel in 
the Middle East, North Korea in East Asia. Many of them are able to gain entry to 
“nuclear-related imports” from Russia and China. Even, some of them became able 
to export such materials. Bearing in mind that the possibility of a nuclear rivalry and 
even a nuclear war among them is a reality, these developments call for an alert 
notice.302 On January 29 2002, the President Bush declared that Iraq, Iran and North 
Korea, and their terrorist partners, established “an axis of evil” creating “a grave and 
growing danger” because of their search for WMD capability.303  
Against this background, it should be noted that at present some states such as 
Russia and China have some roles in both vertical and horizontal proliferation. In 
addition, because of growing threat posed by China and North Korea, there is a rising 
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temptation in Japan towards nuclear capability that may promote further proliferation 
in its region.304  
Since NPT was entered into force in 1970, the nonproliferation regime had 
been doing well “beyond the expectations” of its creators. 305 It was believed that the 
numbers of states possessing nuclear weapons would amount to between 15 and 20 
by the mid-1970. Furthermore, it was expected that the list of the proliferating 
countries would include West European Countries, (France, Italy, West Germany, 
Sweden and Switzerland) and Japan. However, except France, the other countries 
opted for being a non-nuclear state.306  
In addition, the developments made in the early years of post-Cold War 
period- the denuclearization of all Newly Independent States of former Soviet Union 
(except Russia), South Africa, Brazil and Argentina, frozen of North Korea's 
emerging nuclear program, and the destruction of Iraq's nuclear infrastructures- 
seemed as reversal of nuclear weapons proliferation. 307  Furthermore, it was 
anticipated that the disarmament efforts between the US and the Soviet Union would 
encourage nonproliferation efforts.308 
In reality, with the end of Cold War, the nuclear proliferation increased 
because of three interacting realities. Firstly, in the 1990s the scientific knowledge 
about making nuclear weapons did spread to numerous countries. 309 Secondly, the 
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disintegration of the Soviet Union and collapse of its security control -“designed for 
a single state with a closed society, closed borders, and well-paid, well-cared-for 
nuclear workers”310 increased the incidence of uncontrolled nuclear proliferation, 
fostered by the outflow of fissile materials.311 Ever since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union the security measures for nuclear weapons and materials in Russia- “with 
open societies, open borders, desperate, underpaid nuclear workers” has deteriorated. 
312  Low paid or not paid employees and security deficiencies have produced a 
environment wherein increasingly fissile materials became available for “sale” in 
black markets or else for “transport” to the proliferating states or global terrorist 
groups.313 The increasing organized crime in Russia is providing an environment for 
effectively robbery, marketing, and smuggling of fissile materials, and even 
warheads.314 In addition, the Soviet’s unemployed scientists became available for 
hire to work in nuclear programs of other countries.315 For instance, as some argue, 
several former Soviet nuclear scientists are now running Iran nuclear program.316  
Thirdly, unmatched conventional superiority of the US paradoxically 
increased the attractiveness of NBC weapons for opponent states and non-state 
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groups including    terrorists. After the Operation Desert Storm, some regional states 
against the US, such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, began to survey the means of 
asymmetric responses. Hence, they consider unconventional means as necessary 
options to counterbalance US conventional military superiority. 317 
 In this context, the 1998 became an exceptional year, in terms of increasing 
proliferation acts. During this period, India and Pakistan gained and made medium-
range ballistic missile tests and some other advanced nuclear device tests. It was 
estimated that North Korea began to build clandestine nuclear weapons facilities in 
Yongbyong. In addition, it made “a three-stage” ballistic missile test over Japanese 
territory. With the help of Russia, China, and North Korea, Iran built up two missiles, 
the Shehab 3 and the Shehab 4 at the time.318  
Current rising accessibility into NBC equipment, knowledge, and capability 
created a novel dynamic for proliferation. This accessibility is arising from the 
eagerness of some state suppliers such as Russia, North Korea and China, or 
corporations within those states to buy and sell such materials. In the Northeast Asia, 
North Korea, and China are the two countries, while making significant and ongoing 
progress in their NBC weapons and missile forces, sponsoring proliferation 
actions.319  
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In the South Asia region, India and Pakistan sharing the same border (became 
“self-declared nuclear powers,” after nuclear explosive tests in May 1998) have 
become the main concern for the nuclear proliferation. Because of regional tensions 
among them such as disagreement over Kashmir, and purpose and threat sensitivity, 
the strategic programs of each other have being reciprocally affected by one 
another.320 This led to development of a “minimum” nuclear deterrent relationship321 
and “a slow-speed,” nuclear and missile arms race between India and Pakistan, with 
its implications on the potential spread outside the region.322 The risk of resort to 
nuclear weapons resulting from miscalculation, accident, or intention is momentous 
in future Indo-Pakistani conflicts.323 Since India has increasing conventional military 
superiority over Pakistan, Pakistan may compensate this inferiority by using nuclear 
weapons in future conflicts with India. Both countries have developed necessary 
nuclear delivery systems, in the forms of nuclear-capable aircraft, and ballistic 
missile. 324  In addition, this adversary relationship carries the risk of increasing 
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Chinese and Russian contributions to these countries in missile and nuclear 
programs.325 
In addition, in the Middle East, the convergence of economic tensions and 
regional oppositions are the main reasons that bring about the proliferation of nuclear 
as well as biological and chemical weapons and the delivery system of such 
weapons. A number of states in the Middle East are determined to build up or obtain 
NBC weapons and missile delivery systems and some states made substantial 
development in this way. Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria in search of these capabilities 
are the countries of proliferation concern. The adversarial relations and competition 
over regional hegemony are the main motives behind the ambitions of acquiring 
biological, chemical, and especially nuclear weapons for Iraq and Iran. 326  
In addition, bearing in mind that Israel has nuclear options, the Arab-Israeli 
clash is another motivation for further proliferation in the region. At present, Iran 
does not comprise a nuclear-weapon capability. However, it acquired necessary 
technology and infrastructure to construct a bomb.327 In addition, it is estimated that 
Iran is intending to obtain nuclear weapons, by way of its domestic progress or by 
purchasing clandestinely sufficient fissile material to manufacture them. While 
Operation Desert Storm created essential environment to reverse the Iraqi 
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proliferation process, the lack of efficient inspection and monitoring since 1999 are 
the main source of concern for Iraq’s current proliferation efforts. According to a 
U.S. Defense Department 2001 report, Iraq still preserves “scientists, engineers, and 
nuclear weapons design information”, however, it “would need five or more years 
and significant foreign assistance” to reconstruct its nuclear facilities and fabricate 
nuclear devices. If it acquires adequate fissile materials illicitly, the time will 
decrease significantly. 328  
At this time, Syria does not have necessary infrastructure and scientists to 
create a nuclear weapons program. While it is not aiming to develop nuclear 
weapons, it has ambitions to develop nuclear technology. At the time, it has only a 
“small Chinese-supplied research reactor” under IAEA safeguards and short-range 
tactical missiles, “potential means of delivery for NBC weapons.”329  
In addition, given that Libya is an African country suspected for endorsing 
regional destabilization and terrorism, Libya under Qadhafi authority is another state 
for proliferation concern. While it is lacking expertise, finance, foreign support to 
build a nuclear program, according to U.S. Defense Department 2001 report, since 
the suspension of UN sanctions in 1999, Libya has enlarged its efforts to acquire 
NBC weapons and missile programs. An incident in January 2000, in which missile 
components from Taiwan destined to Libya was seized in England, increased the 
proliferation concerns in this country.330  
             Nuclear Terrorism:  
With the events of September 11, the world witnessed the realization of a 
scenario anticipated earlier by many people dealing with security issues. In addition, 
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the world learned how terrorism might cause a huge panic or inflict large numbers 
casualties. However, the most striking aspect of these events is that the world 
absolutely recognized the possibility of that next one might be nuclear one.331 At this 
point, the main concern will be the prevention of nuclear materials (weapon-usable) 
from falling into the hands of terrorists. The increase in the number of countries 
producing fissile materials has amplified the possibility of falling these materials into 
the hands of terrorist groups.332 As said by the director of the US Central Intelligence 
Agency, George J. Tenet, the terrorist organizations are vigorously seeking the 
Internet to obtain “information and capabilities for chemical, biological, radiological, 
and even nuclear attacks.” 333  As some argue, “nuclear weapons are inherently 
terrorist weapons.”334 Since terrorism does not matter about whether the target is 
civilian or not and comes without warning, then nuclear weapons are the definitive 
means of terrorism in inflicting unimaginable devastation.335  
The potential threat of nuclear terrorism is not a new phenomenon. During 
the Cold War, the US Atomic Energy Commission prepared a classified report, 
known as “ Screwdriver Report,” on the hazards of nuclear terrorism.336 In addition, 
on April 25, 1945, Secretary of War Henry Stimson was the first to notify that “the 
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future may see a time when such a weapon may be constructed in secret and used 
suddenly and effectively with devastating power by a willful nation or group against 
an unsuspecting nation or group of much greater size and material power.” However, 
until the late 1970s, the nuclear threat was anticipated from nation-states and only 
since that time, nuclear terrorism became focal point. The importance and the scale 
of this threat became clear, after the events of September 11 have disturbed the 
world. Following these events, many people began to notice sincerely the threat of 
terrorism with WMD. 337  
Now, the threat of well-ordered international terrorist groups (determined to 
pose annihilation upon people and motivated by religious and ideological beliefs) 
became a part of real world. As IAEA Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei 
declared,  “the recent attacks in the United States were, however, a wake-up call to 
us all that more can and must be done.” Hence, it will be realistic to take these tragic 
events of September 11 as “ a wake up call” to enhance the security of nuclear 
materials if we do not want to experience a nuclear one.338  
In essence, the most upsetting nature of terrorism is its unpredictability and 
randomness with reference to targeting, timing, scale of damage and emotional 
panic.339 Hence, it will be sensible to say that the threat of nuclear terrorism is and 
will be unsystematic in occurrence, “asymmetric” in essence and “multidimensional” 
in range.340 Since the technical knowledge of the producing nuclear weapons as well 
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as chemical and biological agent is widespread, what the terrorists need to make a 
nuclear explosion is “ 4 to 6 kilograms of plutonium or 15 to 20 kilograms of HEU” 
for a nuclear weapon.341 A former manager of the Livermore Laboratories declared 
several years ago “If the essential nuclear materials like these are in hand, it is 
possible to make an atomic bomb using the information that is available in the open 
literature.”342 
As declared by a high British official in the London Times, Osama bin Laden, 
the leader of terrorists participating in the events of September 11, acquired the 
bomb, or the nuclear materials from Pakistan. At the time, Pakistan took into custody 
three nuclear scientists to investigate their likely relation with the Taliban, and 
Laden. After that, in November, Laden himself stated that he acquired nuclear 
weapons, as a means of “deterrent.”343 While these claims have not been proved, 
there is no doubt that some global terrorist groups are seeking nuclear weapons. In 
2001,the chief of the directorate of the Russian Defence Ministry responsible for 
nuclear weapons informed two terrorist cases in which the terrorists tried to “break 
into Russian nuclear-storage sites.”344 In addition, as said by senior bureaucrats of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency and Western governments in 2000 a 
number of violations about Russian nuclear security measures took place. For 
example, Taliban agents sought to employ Russian scientists.345    
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Two terrorists groups are the main concern for nuclear terrorizing at the time. 
The first one is bin Laden group, and the second one is the Aum Shirinkyo group. It 
is well known that Osama bin Laden perceives the acquirement of weapons of mass 
destruction as a “religious duty.”346 Osama bin Laden and his friends are suspects of 
trying to purchase bomb-making components “at various times” since 1992. The 
Aum Shirinkyo group, after nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway in 1995, 
apparently has been in search to acquire a nuclear warhead from Russia. In addition, 
there is a claim about the Islamic Jihad organization that tried to obtain a single 
atomic weapon from the Russia.347  
In the 1990s, the Aum Shirinkyo group sought vigorously to employ 
“adherents” from Russia's nuclear design facilities, and even “student physicists” 
from Moscow State University. It bought a land in Australia to supply natural 
uranium for enrichment. In 1993, according to claims, its members wanted to get 
together with then-Russian Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov to talk about the 
possibility of buying a nuclear warhead. (These claims were not confirmed.)348 
As noted earlier, Russia still holds huge stockpiles of fissile material 
(plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU)) in its nuclear complex with poor 
protection. Hence, the starting point for terrorists to obtain nuclear material or a 
warhead is Russia.349 Some believe that Al Qaeda could already control a stolen 
Soviet-era tactical nuclear warhead or enough weapons-grade material350 to make an 
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atomic bomb, functioning, but less efficient. Moreover, there is a consensus in the 
US government that Al Qaeda most likely has obtained the lower-level radionuclide 
strontium 90 and cesium 137. These materials may not be used to produce a nuclear 
detonation, but they are radioactive contaminants that could be scattered by 
conventional explosives, known as a radiological dispersion device, or “dirty 
bomb.”351   How the threat of a “dirty bomb” is real became obvious when the 
Attorney General John Ashcroft declared, “an American terrorist associated with Al 
Qaeda has been planning to explode a radiation-laced dirty bomb” in the US.352 
Another terrific form of nuclear terrorism is an attack to nuclear reactors. As 
reported by “The Sunday Times” of London in October, several intelligence 
assessments put forward that the anticipated target of the fourth plane destroyed in 
Pennsylvania, would be a nuclear power reactor. The fourth plane was flying far 
away from Washington, as said by these assessments, hence the correct objective for 
it “may have been one of several nuclear plants in its flight path, with the single still-
operating unit at Three Mile Island seeming the most likely.”353 While these claims 
certainly are beyond the verification, however it is a reality that there are some 
diagrams of U.S. nuclear power plants among discovered data of terrorist’s targets in 
Afghanistan.354 If such an attack against a nuclear plant were successful, the number 
of casualties could be extremely high because of the resulting spread of radioactive 
material. In 1981, an environmental impact statement prepared by the US Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) estimated that a large truck bomb used against a 
                                                 
351 See Barton Gellman, “U.S. nuclear sensors on alert for terror,” The Washington Post, March 4, 
2002, available on line at: www.iht.com/cgi-bin/generic.cgi 
352 The New York Times, What a “dirty bomb” could do, Wednesday, June 12, 2002 
353 See Daniel Hirsch, “the NRC: What, me worry?” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 58, No. 1, 
January/February 2002, pp. 38-44, available on line at: www.thebulletin.org/issues/2002/jf02/jf02 
hirsch.html 
354 See Porth, op. cit. 
 83
nuclear reactor in a highly populated area could cause 130,000 fatalities. 355  In 
addition, as declared by Edwin Lyman, the scientific director at the Nuclear Control 
Institute in Washington, DC, the danger that terrorist attempting to make a 
radiological bomb through civilian nuclear reactors is high.356  
The US Vice President Dick Cheney stated in a press conference in London 
in March 2002 that fear about the potential use of weapons of mass destruction “is 
very real.” The al Qaeda terrorist network was “aggressively seeking to acquire” 
WMD. There is a possibility of “marriage,” among the terrorist organizations and 
“those who hold or are proliferating knowledge about weapons of mass 
destruction.”357 
Nuclear Smuggling: 
Illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and equipments is an attempt of nuclear 
proliferation. Since, illegally created nuclear weapons could be used in terrorist 
attacks or in conflicts against any nation, the risk posed by it is a global 
apprehension. Moreover, given that such materials and equipment continue to be 
vulnerable to likely stealing and smuggling because of inadequate safety and security 
measures, the possibility of falling these material into the hands of proliferating 
states or terrorist groups using such materials and equipment for illegal aims will be 
high.358 
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Illicit trafficking of nuclear materials is not a new observable fact. The 
possibility of nuclear smuggling was being discussed in the US Congress in 1946. At 
the time, when J. Robert Oppenheimer, “the father of atomic bomb”, was asked 
whether the components of atomic bombs could be smuggled or not, his answer was 
“Of course, it could be done.”359 Moreover, the US Department of Energy (DOE) has 
been pursuing these efforts for just about many years, to an extent that its 
accumulated records include attempts since 1966. However, before the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, incidents were usually frauds.360  
Nuclear smuggling is only the one easiest and cheapest way for terrorists and 
proliferating states to acquire nuclear materials. Hence, with the end of the Cold 
War, this demand caused the creation of a black market for fissile material. The 
black market emerged in Moscow, Germany, and many other European countries. 
The rising black market, as called by security specialists the “loose nukes” dilemma, 
has developed to an extent that almost any person is able to make a deal to purchase 
“uranium, plutonium, and other weapons grade material on the street.”361 According 
to IAEA, the number of reported trafficking of illicit nuclear materials incidents has 
been sharply increasing to an extent that doubled since 1996.362  The stolen and 
smuggling materials include highly enriched uranium and plutonium, nuclear reactor 
and submarine fuel, and some substances of the nuclear industry including lithium, 
beryllium, radium, and palladium.363 
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Without a doubt, since the early 1990s, the smuggling of nuclear materials 
has increased because of worsening financial and safety measures in the nuclear 
infrastructures of the former Soviet Union. Nearly all attempts of nuclear robbery 
and smuggling have been militarily harmless, because stolen materials including 
low-grade uranium, cesium-137 or cobalt-60 are ineffective to make a fissile 
weapon. Nevertheless, a number of confirmed cases (about 15 to 20) in which 
weapons-usable materials have been internationally seized in the past decade, are 
likely sign of only a small part of “what has been circulated through smuggling 
channels.”364  
In addition, some high-status incidents identify a diffusion culture of bribery 
in the Russian nuclear facilities that might signify further secret trade of fissile 
material, weapons components, and even nuclear weapons. For example, in two 
confirmed cases in the 1990s, Russian administrators of classified defense plants 
made an attempted to sell plutonium to foreign scientists.365 In 1998, workers from a 
Russian nuclear facility in Chelyabinsk were arrested while “attempting to steal 
fissile material of a quantity just short of that needed for one nuclear device.” At the 
time, a Russian worker from a lab in Arzamas was blamed for  “attempting to sell 
documents on nuclear weapons designs to agents of Iraq and Afghanistan for $3 
million.” In addition, in January 2000, Russian seized four sailors from a base on the 
Kamchatka Peninsula “with a stash that included radioactive materials.” It was belied 
that they had stolen these materials from their submarine. 366 
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As said by the IAEA's records, since January 1, 1993 there have been around 
600 illicit trafficking occurrences. Of the 400 reported attempts of illegal trafficking 
recorded by IAEA were performed by states. The confirmed illicit trafficking 
activities involving nuclear material are approximately 175 cases. Of these cases, 18 
cases are including HEU or plutonium. However, the amount of acquired nuclear 
material has not been adequate to make an effective nuclear explosive.367 
 In addition, as stated by records accumulated by experts from the Institute for 
International Studies (IIS), within the last decade the amount of stolen weapons-
usable uranium and plutonium from nuclear facilities of the former Soviet Union has 
added up to roughly 40 kilograms. Almost all the stolen materials have been seized, 
except two kilos of highly enriched uranium stolen from a research reactor in 
Georgia. However, as estimated by a researcher at IIS, the actual quantity of lost 
weapons-grade material might be ten times bigger than is formally identified. 
Moreover, according to these accumulated records, the chief route of illicit 
trafficking to trade nuclear material has changed during the last decade from Western 
Europe (in the early years of post-Cold War period) to Central Asia, the Caucasus, 
and Turkey.368  
Even if the virtual scale of smuggling in weapons-grade and weapons-usable 
nuclear materials is not known, it is certain that they have been robbed from Russian 
complexes. Over a decade, the sum total of stolen nuclear material (1.5 kilograms of 
90-percent-enriched weapons-grade in 1992, 3.0 kilograms of 90-percent-enriched 
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weapons-grade uranium in 1994, four grams of highly enriched uranium in 1999 and 
the unconfirmed amount stolen in 1998, supposedly fairly adequate for an atomic 
bomb) seems upsetting.369   
Management of Excess Fissile Material Stockpiles: 
The production of the fissile materials- especially the plutonium and HEU, 
the main ingredients of nuclear weapons- have been continuing in civil and military 
industries since 1944.370 Over the past five decades, the quantity of fissile materials 
amounted to many hundreds of tons. As said by assessments, while the US maintains 
almost 100 tones of plutonium and some 645 tones of HEU, Russia keeps 160 tones 
of separated plutonium (including both military and civilian stockpiles), and 1050 
tones of HEU stockpiles.371  
 With end of Cold War, because of the dismantlement of nuclear weapons “at 
rates of 1500-2000 per year” in both the US and former Soviet Union/Russia as 
envisaged in bilateral agreements, a significant amount of fissile materials have 
become excess to the military requirements of both the US and Russia.372 While the 
US and Russia will no longer have to keep enormous stockpiles of plutonium and 
HEU, the ongoing process of dismantled nuclear weapons continues to increase the 
level of these stockpiles (in weapon usable form) creating severe proliferation 
opportunity, possible ecological, and health problems.373  
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As declared by the US, its 50 metric tons of the plutonium and 175 tons of 
HEU is surplus to military needs in its nuclear stockpile. 374  Moreover, Russia 
declared that “up to” 50 tones of plutonium and 500 tones of HEU is excess to its 
military needs in nuclear stockpile.375 However, it continues to produce plutonium 
“at a rate of approximately 1.5 tones per year” because of its functioning reactors. In 
this context, there is the dilemma of “what to do with” the huge surplus fissile 
material stockpiles in the long term while both countries have initiated programs to 
guarantee that surplus material “is never again used in weapons.” 376  
Since the nuclear arms reductions process of the US and Russia is in progress, 
the challenge of managing the excessive fissile materials is going to grow. While the 
dismantlement of nuclear warheads is a sign of lessening in the threat of a nuclear 
war between the US and Russia (former Soviet Union), it is also a symbol of 
emerging security problems related to management, safeguard, and disposing of such 
materials irreversibly to prevent reuse.377  
Given that the US and Russia will reduce deployed strategic nuclear forces 
from START I level to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads in 2012, then it 
seems that the problem will become more severe. By taking into consideration the 
“estimates of material per warhead,” and the future warhead level for both the US 
and Russia roughly as 2000, if they agreed to reduce their stockpiles of fissile 
materials, then they would not need to keep the 90 per cent of their readily available 
plutonium stockpiles (for the US, 90 tons of excess plutonium and for Russia over 
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150 tons). These figures would be greater for HEU (for the US over 500 tons excess 
HEU and for Russia roughly 1000 tons).378 (See Table 2) 
 
Table-2: The US-Russian Plutonium/HEU Stockpiles  
 
 Fissile material stockpiles (Tons)      US Russia 
Total fissile material Stockpiles (Plutonium/HEU) 100/645  160/1050 
Declared Excess to date (Plutonium/HEU) 50/175 50/500 
Excess if stockpiles limited as 2000 warheads 
(Plutonium/HEU) 
90/540 150/950 
 
Given that considerable amounts of fissile materials in weapons-usable form 
have become excess to military requirements of both the US and Russia, and that 
they are vulnerable to theft and smuggling as noted earlier, the need for the effective 
management approaches becomes more urgent to stop or at least to decrease nuclear 
proliferation and to reduce actually nuclear weapons.379 As Victor Mikhailov, former 
Russian Minister of Atomic Energy previously recognized the reality, “Real 
disarmament is possible only if the accumulated huge stocks of weapons-grade 
uranium and plutonium are destroyed.”380 Hence, to control nuclear proliferation and 
to make a start for intense, clear, and irrevocable reductions in nuclear weapons 
require some promising methods to manage the crucial elements of nuclear weapons 
-plutonium and HEU.381 Regardless of the security measures taken for the stockpile 
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380 Address to the International Atomic Energy Agency, quoted by TASS, September 22, 1992 cited in 
Bunn (2000), op. cit., p. 57  
381 See Bunn and Holdren, op. cit., p. 404 
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of excess fissile materials, given that they still are in weapon-usable form, they are 
and will be the main source of potential security risks.382  
Bearing in mind that weapon-usable plutonium is obtained both from the 
spent fuel of civilian nuclear power reactors (reactor grade-60-70% Pu-239)383 and 
from the dismantled nuclear warheads (weapons grade-more than 93% Pu-239), and 
that the security of civilian fissile materials is not completely satisfactory, excessive 
plutonium stockpiles emerges as a main concern.384 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, to manage these problems, the US has 
initiated many programs to work together with the former Soviet states, setting a 
price of hundreds of millions of dollars each year. These programs aim to increase 
the security of these materials, the transparency of precedent production, disposition, 
and present stockpiles, to stop further production and to realize disposition of the excess 
materials. Despite some advances in these programs, there are many problems related to 
these programs.385 In accordance with the scope of this study, and because of its 
implications on the further strategic reductions, some challenges concerning the 
reduction of excessive fissile materials will be addressed. There are two important 
challenges for the excess fissile materials. The first challenge is related to providing 
a secure interim storage space to these materials. The second one is related to 
realization of the decided objective, making reduction of excess fissile materials 
irrevocable.  
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The main source of this problem significantly results from the transformation 
in the economic and political environment in the former Soviet Union/Russia.386 
Since the US has both financial and storage capacity to deal with its excess materials. 
It has sufficient secure storage capacity for plutonium at its Pantex facility near 
Amarillo, Texas, and for HEU at its Y-12 facility at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and is 
able to build more, if necessary.387 At Mayak site, with the support of the US a 
secure storage is under construction for the excess fissile materials from dismantled 
Russian weapons. However, its capacity is not enough to pile up all the fissile 
material from Russia’s dismantled warheads by now. In addition, the construction of 
new one faces financial shortages. Since Russia fails to match its commitments.388 
The phrase “disposition” is generally used for the step of nuclear weapon-
material management aiming to amplify “the difficulty and cost of their recovery and 
reuse for weaponry.” 389  The disposition options can be categorized under three 
groups: “1-burning the material as fuel in nuclear reactors, 2- mixing the material 
with pre-existing high-level radioactive wastes in an immobilized waste-form for 
geologic disposal, 3- disposing of the material in locations whence recovery is 
difficult or impossible.”390  
With no trouble, HEU may well be mixed together with the “non-explosive 
uranium isotope U-238” to create low-enriched uranium (LEU), which is usable in 
civilian types nuclear reactors as a cheaply fuel. In addition, the opposite process to 
get weapon-usable HEU from the LEU is calling for “sophisticated and costly 
uranium-enrichment technology”, still not available to many countries. Hence, the 
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excess amount of HEU, relatively bigger than the amount of plutonium stockpiles, 
and its quality to be easily used for making nuclear weapons,) do not pose problems 
as much as plutonium in disposition process.391 Since LEU fuels include 3-5 per cent 
of U-235, and they are not attractive for weapon creators, given that the smallest 
amount (90 percent) necessary for making a nuclear explosive.392 
Plutonium may well be mixed with U-238 to create mixed-oxide (MOX) -a 
mixture of plutonium dioxide and uranium dioxide-, fuel utilizable in reactors, 
however this method is very expensive. Hence, MOX fuel is not cost-effectively as 
much as the LEU fuel. In addition, the opposite process (to obtain weapon-usable 
plutonium from MOX) does not require so sophisticated technology.393 In addition, 
considering that forever storage of excess plutonium (at nuclear reactors or nuclear 
warhead sites) is not practical because of its drastically higher costs and its 
vulnerability risk to theft or damage, management of the plutonium stockpiles creates 
more problems than that of HEU. 394  
The US has determined to blend down its excess HEU to LEU to make 
useable as fuel in reactor. The 14.3 tons of excess materials was blended down at (the 
United States Enrichment Corporation) USEC’s Portsmouth enrichment plant in July 
1998. An extra 50 tons has been moved from the Department of Energy (DOE) to 
USEC (a former government corporation, privatized in July 1998) to be blended 
down, likely to be concluded in 2005. Moreover, 38 tons of these materials will be 
blended down in Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and burned in TVA plants in 
some years. There are some plans for further disposition of the rest of its excess 
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HEU.395 In 1992, the US and Russia agreed to transfer 500 metric tons of HEU from 
Russian nuclear weapons after being blended to LEU to be sold as reactor fuel.396 
500 metric tons of HEU is an adequate amount of fissile material to build over 
20,000 nuclear weapons. The estimated price of this purchase is $12 billion. Russia 
would gain very much desirable money for reestablishing the Russian nuclear 
security in return for unnecessary material and the US would obtain fuel for nuclear 
power reactors.397 Even with many difficulties, the implementation of this agreement 
is effectively continuing. Until November 2001, the USEC had paid money for 137 
metric tons of HEU, sufficient to create over 5,400 weapons.398 
The picture concerning the disposition of excess plutonium stockpiles is more 
complex than that of HEU. In June 2000, the US and Russia reached an agreement to 
dispose of 34 metric tons of excess plutonium. Russia determined to convert its 
plutonium into mixed-oxide fuel. However, since Russia needs both the financial 
support and new reactors to burn the material as fuel, Russia’s excess weapons 
plutonium program gave no significant results. The US accepted to donate $200 
million to the Russian program, promised another $200 million later, and requested 
other countries to support the program. However, financial promises from these 
countries -“including about $100 million from the United Kingdom, approximately 
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$60 million from France, and roughly $34 million from Japan”- so far are not 
adequate. 399  
Because of domestic disagreement on the “technical uncertainties,” the 
Clinton administration had agreed to follow a “dual-track approach” to plutonium 
disposition. It considered to turn 25.6 tons of the plutonium into MOX fuel and to 
immobilize an additional 8.4 tons in ceramic and glass. If one of the two methods 
failed to be feasible, the other one would be used. In addition, since a quantity of the 
excess materials is not available to be MOX fuel, the Clinton administration decided 
to follow both two ways. However, as implied by Energy Secretary, Spencer 
Abraham, at the present the Bush administration intends to “dispose of almost all the 
plutonium by converting it into MOX fuel.” As said by Abraham “reducing costs” 
(estimated 6.6 billion for the full “dual-track” program and at present 3.8 billion) was 
a key reason to discard immobilization. The Energy Department will convert 25.6 
tons of the plutonium to MOX and expose an additional 6.4 tons to “enhanced 
purification” before converting process. Nevertheless, since two tons of the material 
(that would be immobilized by the Clinton administration) is not appropriate for 
MOX, the Energy Department will handle it for lasting storage space rather than 
immobilizing. In addition, it will distinguish an additional two tons of plutonium to 
be converted to MOX fuel, “to meet the 34-tonne goal of the U.S.-Russian 
agreement.” 400 
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2.2. The Amendments in the Nuclear Strategy of the US  
Throughout the Cold War, there were some divergent views among the US 
decision-makers about targeting, and level of force structures. However, “a broad 
anti-Soviet consensus” tolerated differences concerning the political and military 
goals of US nuclear policy formulated as deterrence.401 Hence, containment became 
a rational design to direct the US nuclear and foreign policies. With the dramatic 
changes in security environment, the US nuclear security policies have changed 
considerably. The changes in the international strategic environment launched by the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War brought about both the 
inquiries and pressures together to modify the role of nuclear weapons in protecting 
the national security of the US in the post-Cold War security environment. Since the 
dominant threat (Soviet nuclear attack) is gone, the response (the threat of nuclear 
retaliation against it) is not any more the underlying principle of the US nuclear 
strategy. As former US Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin argues, the Soviet Union, 
the main drive behind the US strategy, the size, and shape of force structures, the 
type of weapons, and the size of defense budgets, disappeared. This triggered a 
“strategic shift” beyond the containment of the Soviet Union. 402  Hence, in this 
section, it will be attempted to define the amendments in the US nuclear strategy 
aiming to address post-Cold War security challenges. However, it should be noted 
that since strategy is a dynamic nature and the US nuclear strategy continues to 
change in accordance with new security requirements, the scope of this study is 
restricted to analyzing the amendments in the US nuclear strategy that has come 
about by the time of the Bush administration nuclear posture review in 2001. 
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With the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet Union, 
many people began to think that the nuclear era is fading. The security opportunities 
as noted early supported this trend. On the contrary, nuclear weapons still have an 
important role in US military plan, to an extent that “their maintenance and 
targeting” is costing roughly $25 billion a year.403  
Given that strategy is an “art” of employing available national power 
elements to match the national policy objectives, a full understanding of US nuclear 
strategy in the post-Cold War era requires an analysis on the role of nuclear weapons 
(power elements of nuclear strategy).404 As noted earlier, during the Cold War, the 
role attributed to nuclear weapons was to deter a nuclear or conventional attack from 
the Soviet Union to the US and its allies. With the disappearance of Soviet Union, 
the rationale is gone. An early attempt to define a new role for nuclear weapons came 
into view in 1989. A group of people (including President Bush’s National Security 
Advisor Brent Scowcroft) from government, military services, academic circles 
prepared a report reviewing the past and future of nuclear weapons. The reports 
recognized “increasingly capable Third World threats” as rational to preserve nuclear 
weapons.405 The Military Net Assessment in 1990 and Secretary of Defense Richard 
Cheney later referred to WMD as justification for maintaining nuclear weapons.406  
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In 1989, when the US brought to an end planning a global war with the Soviet 
Union, a broad review of nuclear weapons and targeting policy began. While this 
review paved the way reduction in the number of targets in the SIOP, and it also 
caused to enlarge the geographical range of targeting.407 
The classified Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP) issued during 
the Gulf War, officially aimed to target countries able to developing WMD with 
nuclear weapons.408 In 1991, the Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA) confirmed 
previous intentions by stating that non-strategic nuclear weapons “could assume a 
broader role globally in response to the proliferation of nuclear capability among 
Third World nations.”409 A report (created in 1991 at the command of General Lee 
Butler) concerned about the formation of a “Nuclear Expeditionary Force” to attack 
to the adversaries by using some strategic and tactical nuclear weapons to defend US 
allies. Nuclear targeting lists involved the so-called rogue states such as Iran, Iraq, 
Libya, and North Korea in spite of existence of US negative security assurances to 
non-nuclear states, parties to NPT.410  
In 1992, John J. Welch, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, in Congress 
meeting   declared that “the emphasis of the deterrence equation has been shifted 
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from just deterring the development or use of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union, 
to deterring the development or use of nuclear weapons by other countries, as 
well.” 411  In addition, the first Commander of STRATCOM (substituted SAC), 
General Butler stated in The New York Times, “our focus now is not just the former 
Soviet Union but any potentially hostile country that has or is seeking weapons of 
mass destruction.” 412  Before the 1990s, proliferation was not included as an 
important driving force behind the US nuclear planning. Hence, the targeting model 
upon proliferating states by using nuclear weapons is to some extent a new notion in 
the US nuclear policy.413  
In early 1992, Secretary of Defense Cheney initiated a review known as the 
“Hoffman panel” to revisit the US nuclear policy. This panel would modify directive 
of 1981 (NSDD-13) issued under Reagan administration. However, the panel failed 
to finish its review because of administration change.414 Hence, it is possible to say 
that the strategy of “prevailing” in a nuclear war under Presidents Reagan officially 
continued to stay alive under Bush administration.415 
After entering into office, Clinton administration initiated an official review 
of the nuclear posture in October 1993. The nuclear posture review (NPR) aimed to 
identify the role of nuclear weapons in strategy and to put forward the principles 
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related to force structure, safety, and prospective utility of nuclear weapons. The 
review seemed as “a White House-sanctioned Pentagon study” fulfilled by civilian 
officials in collaboration with military officers.416 Since the beginning of nuclear age, 
1994 NPR was the first to address all topics including “policy, doctrine, force 
structure, command and control, operations, supporting infrastructure, safety, 
security, and arms control.”417  
The NPR created five essential principles related to the US nuclear strategy. 
Firstly, it declares that the role of nuclear weapons in the US security relatively 
diminishes. Secondly, the US needs lesser nuclear weapons at present. Thirdly, 
because of the present uncertainty concerning the future, especially related to the 
denuclearization of the NIS, the US has to make available a “hedge.” Fourthly, the 
US continues to have deterrent posture both for itself and for its allies (reaffirms 
commitment to NATO and Pacific allies). Finally, the US will carry on setting “the 
highest international standards of stewardship for nuclear safety and security, 
command and control, use control, and civilian control.” The NPR anticipated the 
security threat from the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass 
destruction.418 Especially, the NPR endorsed the significance of nuclear deterrence 
for the US defense and encouraged the permanent survival of a nuclear Triad.419 
Against this background, it is possible to say that the 1994 NPR put emphasis 
on the attempts to “lead” the world to decrease the importance of nuclear weapons. It 
confirmed the US commitment to START II and signified willingness for further 
reductions (as envisaged under START III). Bearing in mind that the threats to US 
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do not decrease and new threat may emerge, it also called attention to a “hedge,” 
calling for an capability to bring back the US nuclear posture to START I levels. 420 
Hence, the US would continue to maintain adequate nuclear weapons “to deter any 
future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting 
against” the US crucial interests and to persuade it that being in search of nuclear 
capability would be ineffective. 421  In essence, while approving considerable 
reduction in the size of US nuclear weapons, the NPR refused deep reductions such 
as below START II level.422 However, in the NPR, the US made a decision to 
totally abolish non-strategic nuclear forces (NSNF), to enhance nuclear safety and 
security measures and to associate with and help Russia in these activities under the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction program. In addition, Russia continued to be “the 
focus of the Posture Review” because of its huge nuclear capability to jeopardize 
“the survivability of U.S. nuclear forces.” Hence, by “lead and hedge” approach the 
US aimed “both to cooperate with Russia wherever such cooperation is possible, and 
to prepare realistically for possible tensions or disruptions of that relationship.”423 
 Following this NPR, it became clear that expansion of nuclear targeting to 
the Third World would be challenged by the reductions further than the START II 
treaty. The Strategic Advisory Group (SAG) subcommittee revealed that increasing 
the target list worldwide “would be difficult if the number of nuclear weapons 
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continued to decline.” In general, the number of ready nuclear weapons would not be 
adequate to target Russia and China, in addition to regional hostile countries.424 In 
addition, General John Shalikashvili gave details to President Clinton about the 
problem related to “achieving further strategic force reductions” to the level as 
envisaged under START III and about the incapability of the US nuclear posture to 
achieve the goal of “prevailing” in a nuclear war.425 
To address these challenges (such as going down to START III level and 
changing the “prevailing strategy” of Reagan) the Clinton administration in 
November 1997 issued a new nuclear guidance 426  and changed the US nuclear 
strategy in significant way. It abandoned guiding principle of nuclear strategy under 
the Reagan administration, "prevailing" in a nuclear war.427 By replacing the goal 
with achieving “a secure deterrent,” Clinton administration succeeded in taking the 
approval of the Joint Chiefs for further reductions. 428  The presidential decision 
directive (PDD) aimed to form a nuclear posture to “be able to absorb a nuclear 
strike and still have enough force surviving to constitute credible deterrence,” while 
conforming the pledge of negative security assurances. The US would make use of 
nuclear weapons first if the US engaged in a conflict with a nuclear-capable state- 
“reserve the right to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict whether its CW (chemical 
weapons), BW (biological weapons) or for that matter conventional (weapons).” The 
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US would hold the right of using nuclear weapons first against a state violating “the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty or an equivalent international convention,” and against a 
state attacking the US or its allies in collaboration with a nuclear-capable state.429  
As specified in PDD, nuclear weapons would have a less important role in the 
US nuclear security strategy “than at any point during the nuclear era.” However, it 
reaffirmed that nuclear weapons would be required to deter “aggression and 
coercion” by using a threat of reaction that “would be certain and overwhelming and 
devastating.” It allegedly included targets lists of “rogue states,” likely to be hit in 
regional conflicts. 430  While reducing the quantity of nuclear weapons aiming at 
Russian conventional forces, The Clinton PDD-60 included several types of targets 
in China. It also launched a “concept of preparing targets in other countries,” called 
adaptive planning.431 
President George W. Bush in his presidential campaign declared that he 
would “leave the cold war behind” and “rethink the requirements for nuclear 
deterrence.” After entering into office, he offered a proposal to decrease the US 
strategic nuclear stockpile from “its current level of 7,200 warheads to between 
1,700 and 2,200 warheads.”432 He also initiated the second review of nuclear posture 
in the post-Cold War era. The Bush administration’s review was congressionally 
mandated to make clear US “nuclear deterrence policy and strategy…for the next 5 
to 10 years,” and created by the Pentagon in association with the Energy 
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Department.433 New nuclear posture review indicates a principal modification in US 
nuclear strategy and an extension of the role of nuclear weapons. 434 
The new Nuclear Posture Review aims to change the preparation of the US 
strategic forces from “the threat-based approach of the Cold War to a capabilities-
based approach.” The “capabilities-based approach” is expected to make available “a 
credible deterrent at the lowest level of nuclear weapons consistent with U.S. and 
allied security” against impending opponents accessing “to modern military 
technology, including NBC weapons and the means to deliver them over long 
distances.” It also aims to create a strategic posture not only relying only on 
“offensive nuclear forces” but “a range of capabilities” to deter countries from 
“undertaking political, military, or technical courses of action that would threaten 
U.S. and allied security.” It also aims to create “a range of options” for the President 
in future conflicts with any aggressor. The NPR puts forwards “a New Triad” formed 
by offensive capabilities, defensive capabilities, and “a responsive defense 
infrastructure.” The offensive capabilities will include ICBMs, SLBMs, long-range 
bombers with nuclear weapons and non-nuclear capabilities aiming to enhance the 
credibility of offensive deterrence. Given that offensive capabilities may fail to deter 
aggression in post-Cold War security environment, the defensive capabilities will 
encompass “active and passive defenses” as being a guarantee against the failure of 
deterrence. The “responsive defense infrastructure” will develop, build, and maintain 
offensive forces and defensive systems. In this context, the report states that “...the 
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Russian resolution of ratification, adopted in 2000, contains unacceptable provision 
contrary to the new strategic framework and establishment of the New Triad.” 435 
The review refers to Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria as “the 
countries that could be involved in immediate, potential, or unexpected 
contingencies.” In addition, it identifies China as a state may be engaged in “an 
immediate or potential contingency,” because of its continuing nuclear 
modernization programs and strategic intentions. While Russia is still keeping huge 
nuclear capability, review indicates that  “a (nuclear strike) contingency” is likely but 
not expected.436 
Some argue that the new NPR gives an impression of emerging a novel 
national security model. It seems to shift away from MAD to as called by John H. 
Cushman Jr. “unilateral assured destruction.”437 This indicates that the US will hold 
ready all feasible alternatives to deter the attacks with weapons of mass 
destruction.438 
2.3. The Value of Nuclear Deterrence in the Post-Cold War 
Period  
With the end of the Cold War, the materialization of dramatic transformations 
in the international structure seems to call for the revision in “the theoretical 
assumptions” upon which nuclear deterrence strategies has rested for the past four 
decades.439  Since traditionally deterrence has relied on states, however non-state 
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actors “acting on irrational and non-Western principles” might mostly be 
undeterrable.440 
Nuclear weapons as an instrument of deterrence have been at the center of 
security planning over five decades. During cold war, the role of nuclear weapons 
was to deter nuclear and conventional attacks. Following the end of Cold War and 
emergence of increasing WMD proliferation problems, this fixed role was expanded 
to deter any attack, range from conventional to nuclear, biological and chemical. 
However, the deterrence role for nuclear weapons is still a problematic theme, 
continuing to promote much debate, as in the case of the Cold War. The debate is 
about the value of nuclear weapons as an instrument of deterrence. Disarmament 
advocates have been critically against nuclear deterrence. They assert that confidence 
on nuclear weapons and deterrence carries too much risk. They reject deterrence and 
offer a process of abolishing nuclear weapons.441 For example, retired General Lee 
Butler, former commander in chief of Strategic Air Command, sharply criticizes US 
confidence on nuclear deterrence. He says “Deterrence failed completely as a guide 
in setting rational limits on the size and composition of military forces. To the 
contrary, its appetite was voracious, its capacity to justify new weapons and larger 
stocks unrestrained.”442 
In opposition to this proposal, some argue that nuclear weapons should be 
used to deter other states from attacking with nuclear weapons, rather than with 
biological and chemical weapons. That is, they suggest confining the role of nuclear 
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deterrence to “core function of deterring nuclear attacks.”443 In addition, some argue 
that nuclear weapons is still central to cope with the use of weapons of mass 
destruction, and to discourage the nuclear, biological and chemical proliferation.444 
 The aim in this study is not to be part to the ongoing debate, but rather to 
shed some light on the challenges to nuclear deterrence that became more visible 
with the events of September 11, and on the limits of nuclear deterrence in the new 
security context.   
The reality that comes out of the end of Cold War is that a most frightening 
probability, “World War III” did not happen. Nuclear deterrence had an important 
role on going to this end. The robustness of nuclear deterrence was relying on the 
belief that a retaliatory capability based on “second-strike forces” of each 
superpower almost certainly could pose unacceptable damage. Hence, from a realist 
perspective, the US and Soviet Union as rational actors, when faced in a crisis, would 
collect the related data, identify and arrange their interests in danger. Finally, in light 
of this process, they would evaluate all options, and draw a conclusion how to 
continue in accordance with “a logical calculation of what will maximize their 
returns.”445 
The security environment in which the nuclear deterrence will be practiced 
has changed significantly since the end of the Cold War. In addition, concerns about 
the value of nuclear deterrence against a rogue states or sub-national groups armed 
with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons began to increase.446 However, the 
more forthcoming difficult challenge for nuclear deterrence seems to arise from sub-
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national groups, especially from the terrorist groups. Since as stated by Sam Nunn, 
“deterrence was designed to work against nations, not non-state actors who may have 
nothing to protect and nothing to lose.”447 
An assessment of “Why Deterrence Worked” in the Cold War context will be 
practical to define potential weakness of U.S. nuclear deterrence in the post-Cold 
War era. Firstly, the only dominant target of nuclear deterrence, the Soviet Union 
was “a risk-adverse,” and somewhat “rational” opponent failed to exploit the weak 
sides of US nuclear deterrence strategies. Secondly, the context, in which the nuclear 
deterrence policies were practiced, enhanced the possibility of being successful. 
Since the two superpowers were able to focus on each other’s intentions and 
deterrent capability, and did not feel obliged to deal with additional severe incidents. 
Thirdly, the deterrent relationship between them, “assured vulnerability” much or 
less brought about a “strategic caution.” Finally, the acceptance of war-fighting 
strategies by the US for nuclear deterrence contributed to weaken or counterbalance 
theory of victory of Soviet Union and to enhance deterrence.448 In this context, as 
said by Lawrence Freedman deterrence did work since “it was not ask to do too 
much. The East-West conflict became institutionalized and relatively stable over 
time.”449 
During the Cold War, the target of nuclear deterrence was to prevent one 
hostile power from using an arsenal of existing weapons to the other. In the 21st 
century, it is to deter multiple potential adversaries not only from using existing 
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weapons, but also to dissuade them from developing dangerous new capabilities in 
the first place.450 Hence, in the post–Cold War context, the US nuclear deterrence 
policies have to address to threats posed by several states, non-state units, or even 
persons. The new targets of deterrence are likely to be much unpredictable and 
irrational. Due to the unfamiliarity relating to values and objectives, creating “a 
mutually understood deterrence relationship” seems to be extremely complicated. 
Hence, even if deterrence become likely on paper, it is not likely to be dependable 
actually. The variation in “leaderships, decision-making processes, risk tolerances, 
threat perceptions, goals, values, and determination, and simply the potential for 
idiosyncratic behavior,” is the main difficulty to create one general prescription of 
deterrence as in the case of Cold War deterrence policies.451 In a study run under 
Research and Development (RAND) cooperation, U.S. Regional Deterrence 
Strategies, Kenneth Watman, and Dean Wilkening tried to analyze how it could be 
complex deterring regional aggressors in the post-Cold War era. One of the 
important findings is that deterring of the regional aggressors is likely to be difficult 
“if they expect their hold on power to erode if they do not take risks.”452 In this 
context, it is obvious that the Cold War principle of deterrence only relied on 
“punishment and retaliation” is not any longer applicable to regional challengers 
armed with chemical and biological weapons.453 
While this is the one side of problem related to nuclear deterrence, deterring 
the non-state actors, especially terrorist groups is the other side. Since how nuclear 
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terrorism is real is noted above, there is no need to analyze it again. However, it will 
be attempted to shed some light on the limits of nuclear deterrence against non-state 
actors. 
After the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, one of 
the realities recognized by the world is that how the cost of terrorist attacks with the 
full of hate to kill innocent civilians can be so large.454 The other one is that the 
nuclear deterrence believed to deter any power from attacking the US, the world's 
greatest nuclear power, became unsuccessful to prevent these attacks. The Pentagon, 
in order to bring back some security value to nuclear weapons and deterrence, have 
suggested that use of nuclear weapons be an choice in “war against terrorism.”455 
However, to what extent it will make sense to the terrorist groups is still ambiguous.  
In essence, it will be imprudent to wait that terrorists are susceptible to the 
deterrence logic based on “an identifiable adversary, rational calculations, and the 
fear of the threat of overwhelming retaliation.” 456  As generally said, the most 
dangerous weapon is an individual who may risk all what he has. Terrorists are such 
actors who even may risk their own lives. Hence, the rational-actor model on which 
deterrence depends seems to loose its ground. In this sense, given that the success of 
deterrence policy results from risk sensitivity of the opponent, the effectiveness of 
deterrence against terrorists seems impossible.  
Terrorists may not be frightened by the threat of retaliatory nuclear attack 
since they do not have their own countries to be held hostage.457 Hence, it seems 
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extremely improbable that the threat of using nuclear weapons would immobilize the 
terrorist organizations’ activities. Terrorist organizations do not concentrate their 
members or equipment in specific physical sites. To a certain extent, they scatter 
them in cell forms hard to locate in metropolitan and countryside around the world. 
For instance, some terrorists participated in the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
attacks were residing and working in the US.458 In addition, even if some states 
secretly supporting these terrorist organizations in logistic can be held responsible for 
these actions, and threatened with nuclear retaliation to deter them from helping such 
organizations, the existence of many organizations without sponsoring states make 
utility of deterrence problematic in this process.459  Moreover, the legitimacy of any 
response against any state sponsoring terrorist activities of the non-state actors is 
another important difficulty that may cause many criticisms in international arena as 
in the case of US response against Sudan and Afghanistan, which were held 
responsible for sponsoring the terrorist attacks on the American embassies in Kenya 
and Tanzania.460 
  In addition, the threat of using nuclear weapons, or even the actual use of 
them against a terrorist organization, while failing to deter it from using WMD, may 
somewhat provoke it in the opposite direction. Since terrorists are frequently 
encouraged by a “psychology of heroic response” to apparent hostility, even if it 
claims their lives. The threat of nuclear weapons or actual use of them against 
terrorists may seem a justification in their sense to respond in kind.461  
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The most dramatic side of terrorism that may well make the utility of nuclear 
deterrence impossible is the existence of the individual, who might one day use his 
scientific knowledge and experience against civilizations. While the identification of 
such an individual without making a terrorist action is much more difficult than the 
well-organized global terrorist organizations, the possibility of realization of such a 
terrorist action in future by such an individual (under influence of psychological 
disturbance or motivated by some ambitions) seems more problematic, if not 
impossible, for the application of deterrence.462  
Against this background, it is possible to say that traditional deterrence relied 
only on the threat of nuclear retaliation seem to lack utility to address to these new 
threats. In addition, as noted earlier the US intention to withdraw from ABM Treaty 
signifies the denial of deterrence, or directly the traditional side of it based on the 
logic of mutual vulnerability.463 In this context, as said by J.D. Crouch, assistant 
defense secretary for international security policy in the recent NPR briefing, 
recognizing the uselessness of the traditional approach to deterrence based on only 
offensive nuclear weapons, the US will base the new deterrent concept on a mixture 
of offensive and defensive, and nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities.464 However, 
how this transformation in deterrence concept will be effective to prevent terrorist 
attacks is still a matter of time.  
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CHAPTER-3 
3. THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE ON US NUCLEAR 
STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION: 
Since the beginning of the nuclear age, the proper role of nuclear weapons 
has been at the heart of debate and has been the main concern of many people on 
nuclear issues. This debate has a history dating back to prior period of the first 
atomic explosion in 1945, known as Trinity.465 However, as noted earlier under the 
Cold War security environment “a broad anti-Soviet consensus” tolerated 
divergences on the political and military goals of the US nuclear strategy to be 
purified within the concept of deterrence.466 Hence, during the Cold War this concept 
became the main criterion in formulating US security policies and nuclear force 
structures.  
In this context, in the following years the debate between the proponents of 
MAD and proponents of nuclear utilization theory (NUTs) took a seat at the heart of 
US nuclear strategy. While MAD was based on the countervalue targeting, NUTs 
was based on counterforce targeting. The supporters of NUTs argued that nuclear 
weapons should have more function than being only an instrument of deterrence and 
that they could be used as the same other military tools. Now, a public debate 
between marginalists and traditionalists began.467  
With the end of the Cold War, a number of people ranging from military, 
religious, and political leaders to lay individuals began to articulate the necessity of 
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revising the role of nuclear weapons in the US national security strategy in particular 
and in the international relations in general. As it seems, they are divided broadly 
between those who believe that nuclear weapons as an instrument of deterrence are 
still essential and those who propose most radical change in the role of nuclear 
weapons, such as abandonment of deterrence and total elimination of nuclear 
weapons or deeper reductions. In this context, some experts define these two groups 
as marginalists and traditionalists (proponents of status quo, START II level). 
Marginalization of the role of nuclear weapons does not automatically require that 
the US remove its total nuclear arsenals.468 The marginalist proposals range from the 
total elimination of nuclear weapons to virtual arsenal and virtual abolition 
(minimum deterrence).469  
The Abolitionists thinking that the destructive strength in nuclear weapons is 
too enormous to be even used as a rational threat and the traditionalists rejecting the 
further nuclear warhead reductions below the START II stand on the extremes of this 
debate. The difference between the abolitionists and other marginalists is that the 
proponents of virtual arsenals and minimum deterrence, while wishing for the 
abolition of nuclear weapons, propose some level short of abolition as a transition 
step. In addition, the main difference between virtual arsenals and minimum 
deterrence is that the later proposes some operationally deployed warheads to be 
used if necessary while the former proposes an end state where there are not any 
operationally deployed warheads, ready-for-use.  
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Consequently, there is a variety of divergent views and an ongoing debate 
over the appropriate role of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War period. In fact, the 
debate is about the future of nuclear deterrence and its contributions to international 
security and stability. The advocates of the total elimination of nuclear weapons 
primarily reject the nuclear deterrence. The commonality among the opponents of 
total elimination is that they think that total elimination of nuclear weapons is 
impossible in near future. While some of them offer deep reduction in nuclear 
stockpiles, all still emphasize the deterrent value of nuclear weapons. Moreover, it 
seems that new security opportunities such as the ongoing START process and the 
extension of NPT indefinitely encourage this debate. For example, in August 1997, 
former US Defense Secretary, William Cohen explained his views on nuclear arms 
reductions, by saying “I feel that we are on the right track, that the Joint Chiefs are 
committed to going lower, that there is a national commitment to get lower and lower 
levels to the point where we don't have them.”470 
All the parties to debate seem to find an answer to the nuclear questions 
including how low the US can/should go or how much is enough, with regard to the 
number of nuclear warheads. Accordingly, it is the aim of this chapter to shed light 
on the divergent views and proposals on this issue. It should be noted that the 
proposals presented in this study by no means possibly cover all of them. However, 
they will be the ones that represent the core idea of each group. 
Against this background, it seems that categorizing the various proposals 
promoted by various actors is a practical way to go this end.471 Hence, this study will 
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classify these proposals under four main headings: the nuclear abolition, virtual 
arsenals, minimum deterrence, and the traditional approach (a robust deterrence).  
    3.1. Nuclear Abolition: 
The suggestions concerning the abolition of nuclear weapons were in no way 
peculiar to the Cold War paradigm. Throughout the Cold War, the morality, and 
rationality of using nuclear weapons (actual use or the threat of use) had been 
discussed. Even earlier than the use of atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
a number of scientists run the Manhattan Project tried to thwart it.472 While the Cold 
War was deepening, some attempts were made to decrease the value of nuclear 
weapons in security planning. These attempts ranged from the Barunch Plan, the 
Atoms for Peace proposal, and NPT to “nuclear freeze” movement in 1980s.473 
However, all of them fell short of realizing the goal of total elimination of nuclear 
weapons within the Cold War framework. Hence, while desirable, total elimination 
was not possible.474 The end of the Cold War has paved the way not only increase in 
the debate over abolishing nuclear weapons but also grow in the encouragement for 
the belief that zero posture supports the US interest.475  
In addition to the increase in the abolitionist trend in the US, worldwide 
attention for the opportunity of realizing the goal of nuclear abolition increased due 
to the end of the Cold War and the significant reductions in US and Russian nuclear 
stockpiles. It is easily seen in the attempts made by the Canberra Commission, the 
International Court of Justice, and prominent former U.S. and foreign military 
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officers.476 For example, in July 1996, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The 
Hague arguing “A threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons that is contrary 
to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter” declared unanimously 
“There exists an obligation under international law to pursue in good faith and bring 
to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under 
strict and effective international control.” 477  In 1996, together with 19 retired 
generals and admirals from the US, 61 generals announced their position by a 
declaration “calling for the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons.”478 
In the US, the nuclear abolitionists including retired generals, scientists, 
defense analysts and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) seem sincere in their 
proposal arguing that a total elimination is possible. In addition, the most remarkable 
side of this trend is that some of the abolitionists are former US policymakers such as 
secretary of defense Robert McNamara, President Jimmy Carter, and former Air 
Force Commander Charles Horner.479 It will be correct to say that the main aim of 
the abolitionists is to shift the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons from the 
periphery to the center of security policy formulation in the US.   
Before going to examine some proposals by the American advocates of 
nuclear abolition, it should be noted that many of the abolitionists became the 
members of NGOs concerning nuclear abolition, such as the Henry L. Stimson 
Center, and the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. 
Hence, while presenting the abolitionist proposals, the reports prepared by these 
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institutions on this issue, with the help of these people will be accepted as a 
reference.  
 Paul H. Nitze, former arms control negotiator and ambassador-at-large 
during the Reagan administration, was the first to challenge the traditional approach 
to the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy.480 In his article, he 
states that nuclear weapons are improbable to be valuable “in deterring aggression” 
in the situations as demonstrated in the Persian Gulf War. The US should abandon 
relying on nuclear weapons, and think about changing its “strategic deterrent from 
nuclear weapons to a more credible deterrence based at least in part upon “smart” 
conventional weapons.”481 
In their article, two experts from Stimson Center, Barry M. Blechman, and 
Cathleen S. Fisher argue that the US enduring reliance on nuclear weapons in its own 
security contradicts with its efforts to persuade possible proliferating states that 
“nuclear weapons are neither a legitimate nor an effective means of protecting 
national security.” During the Cold War, such an approach was both justifiable and 
needed but it is not any more convincing in the post-Cold War period. Since the 
nuclear weapons have small importance in addressing the rising new dangers such as 
humanitarian disasters, economic crises, and ethnic conflicts, while creating a risk of 
accidental or unintentional use  “in a proliferated world.” The US has dominant 
conventional military capabilities to deter or if necessary defeat potential regional 
aggressors. Against this background, the target of the US should be the gradual, 
verified elimination of all WMD from all nations. They argue that if the US is 
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sincere to discontinue the spread of weapons of mass destruction, in that case it must 
enhance the nonproliferation norm and “delegitimate the weapons.”482 
Against his military career as the commander of US strategic nuclear forces, 
retired general Lee Butler’s statement on December 4, 1996 at National Press Club 
seems to take significant attentions from inside and outside the US. Concerning 
about the existing weight of nuclear weapons on US security policy even after the 
end of the Cold War, he changed his position from “advocate of nuclear deterrence to 
public proponent of nuclear abolition.” He explains the reason of this change as his 
concerns on destructiveness of nuclear weapons. They are “inherently dangerous, 
hugely expensive, and militarily inefficient.” He also concerns about intensifying 
disappointment on the continuation of US Cold War policies in new security 
environment, such as expansion in the role of nuclear weapons as an instrument of 
deterrence, “discriminatory” nature of NPT creating serious uncertainty for pledges 
of “the nuclear powers to eliminate their arsenals” and the possibility of spread of 
nuclear weapons to irrational actors.483 These are, much or less, common arguments 
for the abolitionists.  
He explains his intentions by saying  “My purpose in entering the abolition 
debate was to help legitimize abolition as an alternative worthy of serious and urgent 
consideration.”484 He declares that it is possible to build an international authority on 
some proposals concerning the future of nuclear weapons. First, there is no 
justifiable role for nuclear weapons and the huge cost of their use goes beyond “any 
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asserted military utility.” Second, the elimination of nuclear weapons is more 
necessary than “the deadly chemicals and viruses already widely declared immoral, 
illegitimate, subject to destruction and prohibited from any future productions.”485 
Retired general Andrew J. Goodpaster, former Supreme Allied Commander in 
Europe, made a joint statement with general Butler in 1996 about the waning 
usefulness and ongoing dangers of nuclear weapons including “accidents and 
unauthorized launches, and thefts of weapons or weapons materials and threats or 
actual use by terrorists or domestic rebels.” He also supported the Butler proposal for 
reducing numbers of nuclear weapons and “lowering their alert status, meanwhile 
exploring the feasibility of their ultimate complete elimination.” 486  However, it 
seems that general Goodpaster changed his position after this joint statement and in 
fact, he is now supporting the statement of former Secretary of Defense William 
Perry, “the fewest number in the fewest hands.” He also purposes to reduce the 
number of nuclear warheads to “one to two hundred at most” without high alert 
status, and to place the warheads in secure storage, rather than total elimination.487 
Another retired general calling for abolition of nuclear weapons is former US 
Air Force Commander, Charles A. Horner. He argues that while the collapse of the 
Soviet Union became a sign of the end of Cold War, the Desert Storm marked the 
beginning of another war against the proliferation of WMD. In this context, he 
emphasizes the shrinking usefulness of nuclear weapons. The US has to build up and 
keep conventional forces to counter the entire conventional threats. Together with 
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some defensive arrangements, conventional forces should be suitable to counter any 
threat of WMD “beyond the current requirements to deter” the use of nuclear 
weapons by Russia and China.488 He argues that existence of an irrational actor, or an 
actor, rational sufficiently to judge “that no American president would use nuclear 
weapons on him” actually reduces the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons. He states 
that the US has enough conventional forces, “such as B-2's and laser- guided bombs 
and things of this nature” to deter such actors with access to nuclear weapons and to 
the restricted nuclear capability.489 In 1994, he declared, “The nuclear weapon is 
obsolete. I want to get rid of them all.” While questioning the utility of nuclear 
weapons in harmony with other generals, he additionally puts the immorality of 
using nuclear weapons against civilians in a retaliatory strike. He also argues that the 
cost of possessing nuclear weapons transcends the return benefits. While putting 
forward the total elimination of nuclear weapons, he also states the necessity of 
ballistic missile defense without nuclear weapons, which can be used as assurance to 
promote other countries to “sign up for no nuclear weapons.”490 He declares that the 
US must develop a strategy to go zero nuclear weapons in phased reductions and in 
cooperation with other nuclear weapons as envisaged in Article VI of NPT. He 
argues that a four-phased policy as proposed by a report prepared by Henry L. 
Stimson Center may be appropriate to go to zero posture.491   
The report prepared by Stimson Center in 1995, known as An Evolving U.S. 
Nuclear Posture, states that the end of the Cold War and the threats of nuclear 
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proliferation call for an essential review on the role of nuclear weapons in the US 
defense policy as well in international security. In the new security environment, 
while the utility of nuclear weapons is decreasing “in securing US interests,” it 
creates rising threats to “the security of the US and other nations.” The reality of 
nuclear weapons brings about “risks of nuclear accidents and incidents, and of the 
inadvertent or deliberate use of nuclear weapons in a crisis.” Moreover, persistent 
dependence on nuclear weapons weakens worldwide attempts to convince “other 
countries not to acquire nuclear weapons.” In this context, “there is no military 
justification for current or planned nuclear force levels.” A policy of constraint on 
international confidence on nuclear weapons is only key to reduce nuclear dangers. A 
US policy aiming to realize a phased-reduction, together with a sincere and decisive 
pledge for eliminating all weapons of mass destruction in the end would be in favor 
of US national security.492 
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Another prominent US policy-maker calling for abolition is the former 
secretary of defense under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, Robert McNamara. He 
is one of the members of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear 
Weapons, established by the Australian government in late 1995. In accordance with 
the commission’s report, issued in August 1996, McNamara recommends that the 
nuclear weapon states commit themselves to the elimination of all nuclear weapons. 
The report states that because of its enormous destructive power, nuclear weapons 
have no military utility, “other than the belief that they deter that opponent from 
using nuclear weapons.” Their employment against an adversary without nuclear 
weapons “is politically and morally indefensible.” The “indefinite deployment” of 
them brings about “a high risk of their ultimate use through accident or 
inadvertence.” The ownership of them by several nations motivates others to obtain 
them, “reducing the security of all.”493  
McNamara also argues that nuclear weapons do not have any utility but 
deterring the nuclear attack by enemy, so if the enemy does not have them, the US 
does not need them. While emphasizing the “some existential deterrence” value of 
nuclear weapons, because of its risky nature as in the case of Cuban crisis, he ignores 
this value. Elimination of nuclear weapons is very much desirable since employing 
them against an adversary with nuclear capability is “suicide” and against an 
opponent with no nuclear capability is “immoral.” He is also against the 
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establishment of ballistic missile defense as proposed by general Horner, while 
supporting disarmament.494 
Joseph Rotblat, one of the nuclear scientists in Manhattan Project, is also 
calling for nuclear abolition. He left his position at this project before the first 
nuclear test was made. In the following years, because of his efforts to reverse the 
nuclear arms race in an international organization of scientists known as Pugwash 
Conference on Science and World Affairs, he was awarded with the Nobel Peace 
Prize. He defines the road to zero; firstly confinement of the role of nuclear weapons 
as to deter nuclear attack and secondly a nuclear no-first-use treaty. In this 
arrangement, the US would be in the most favorable position because of its huge 
non-nuclear power. Hence, the US should not necessarily worry about the abolition 
of nuclear weapons.495 In addition, as a member of the Canberra Commission on the 
Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, like McNamara, he is also supporting the proposals 
in the report prepared by this institution.496  
The former senator Alan Cranston, represented California in the U.S. Senate 
from 1969 to 1993, is another prominent abolitionist. He argues that the urgent threat 
is the launch of a nuclear weapon “without authorization or by accident.” This risk is 
increasing because of deterioration in the Russian command and control over its 
arsenal. In this context, the  “launch-on-warning” posture is making the threat more 
serious. Hence, launch-on-warning posture (high-alert, hair-trigger status) should be 
brought to an end. Then, the US commitments as well as the other four nuclear 
powers under Article VI of the NPT clearly toward abolition should be realized. 
Total elimination of nuclear weapons is the just means to prevent “rogues or 
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terrorists who want to smuggle a bomb in on a ship or across a border. Neither 
deterrence nor missile defense will suffice.” The US should lead in going to total 
elimination. A Nuclear Weapon Elimination Convention can “require the 
dismantling and destruction of every nuclear warhead on Earth, an inventory of all 
weapons-usable fissile material, a ban on its production, a reliable verification 
system, and an absolutely certain enforcement regime.” The nuclear question is a 
moral question and nuclear deterrence, based on the threat to destroy innocents is an 
undeserving policy for the US and symbolizes a collapse in moral principles.497 
Another crucial supporter of total elimination is the author Jonathan Schell. In 
his book The Gift of Time, he argues that what the nuclear strategy (deterrence) calls 
for was to abandon the basic moral principle, which states that “even in retaliation” 
the threat of killing innocent people is incorrect. In this context, it is the gift of time 
to consider that the goal of moving to zero is practical and reachable. In the words of 
Jonathan Schell, it is an opportunity to “annul the suicide pact dictated by the 
doctrine of deterrence.” The road to abolition passes from the dissolution of 
deterrence.498 He recommends thoroughly free the world from all nuclear weapons. 
He states that the nuclear powers, declared and undeclared, should decrease their 
nuclear weapons to zero.499 
Finally, one more call for total elimination comes from the US religious 
groups. For example, Bishop Leroy T. Matthiesen states that the end of Cold War 
creates “a window of opportunity” to lastly liberate the humankind from the threat of 
nuclear total destruction.500  
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At this point, it should be noted that according to public polls conducted by 
some NGOs, the public opinion in the US is in favor of either reducing or 
eliminating nuclear weapons. For example, the public polls conducted by The 
Mellman Group for The Henry L. Stimson Center in 1997and in 1999 put in the 
picture that American public supports the reduction and elimination of nuclear 
weapons as a purpose of U.S. nuclear strategy. The percentage of Americans 
supporting the elimination of nuclear weapons was 36 in 1997 and 44 in 1999.501 
However, it seems that the reliability of polls on the public opinion is still 
questionable. Since, some other public surveys, for example performed by the 
University of New Mexico's Institute for Public Policy (IPP) in 1999, shows that the 
US public powerfully supports the US nuclear deterrent and recognizes nuclear 
weapons as important instrument for protecting US “status, influence, and America's 
way of life.”502 
   In summary, from the abolitionist perspective, there is no rational utility 
for the nuclear weapons but deterring their use, which is an option that would vanish 
in the course of total elimination. The reality of nuclear weapons and human 
fallibility constantly bring about the likelihood of their actual use, a disastrous for all 
civilization; ownership of nuclear weapons by some legitimizes and stimulates the 
others to have them. In addition, the existence of nuclear weapons is the likely cause 
for further proliferation because of robbery and illegal trafficking of nuclear 
materials; this proliferation will threaten the security of all, including the weapon 
states themselves; and a “nuclear-weapon-less” US would be the only country to 
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benefit mostly from the abolition, because it would still stay the most powerful state. 
The abolition of nuclear weapons is the commitment of the nuclear weapon states 
under the Article VI of the NPT requiring a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament under firm and efficient international control. 
Against this background, it should be noted that there are three most serious 
criticisms leveled against the proposals for nuclear abolition. The first one is that the 
goal of abolition is utopian vision since the knowledge of how to make the weapons 
cannot be disinvented. The second one is that if there is an agreement to abolish all 
nuclear weapons, the verification will be the most difficult issue. Hence, there may 
possibly be some violators, openly or secretly. The third one is that the nuclear 
weapons prevent the conflicts among major powers and so keep the stability alive, 
the disappearance of them may cause resurrection of such wars. However, the 
abolitionists answer these criticisms by proposing some provisions that will be put in 
an abolition agreement or by putting forward some counter-arguments. For the 
utopian argument, retired general Butler argues that the ending the Cold War was a 
utopian dream but became a reality. There are rational and pragmatic steps, as put 
forward by the Stimson Center study, or by the Canberra Commission to eliminate 
nuclear weapons. In fact, the problem is not the feasibility of course but the 
willingness to follow it.503 A world without nuclear weapons but with the knowledge 
of rebuilding nuclear weapons is much more bearable than a world with a number of 
proliferating states seeking to obtain nuclear weapons “under capricious and arbitrary 
circumstances.”504 He also argues that the task is to make 5 percent of the world 
nuclear-free, since “95 percent of the nations of the world already are nuclear-free.” 
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On this issue, the author Jonathan Schell argues that the abolition does not require 
the elimination of the nuclear knowledge. “Slavery was abolished but no one 
disinvented it.”505 In addition, it is the knowledge of how to recreate nuclear weapons 
that makes abolition possible, since ownership of the knowledge of recreating 
nuclear weapons would have the deterrent value, as Schell calls “weaponless 
deterrence.” The states that intent to profit from the abolition of nuclear weapons by 
remaking and employing nuclear weapons, should keep in mind that others will have 
the same capacities, and may response in kind. This would work as a deterrent as in 
the case that ownership of nuclear weapons deters use of them.506  
For the verification argument (existence of potential violators), former US 
Air Force Commander, Charles Horner argues that even after “an abolition 
agreement,” the peril that any state would reproduce nuclear weapons is grave. 
However, the number of nuclear weapons would not be enough to destroy the 
possible nuclear-free countries such as the US, Russia and China. Hence, their 
response would be more severe against the violators. In this context, no one could 
dare to violate such agreement.507  
On this issue, McNamara declares that “the risk of not eliminating” is too 
much grave to be compared other risks including possible violation risks. 508  In 
addition, nuclear scientist Rotblat argues that the “verification within a range of 99 
percent accuracy might be possible.” He also recommends that a “societal 
verification” system be established in which “citizens-including scientists- acquire a 
legal obligation to report on any efforts” to produce nuclear weapons, biological and 
chemical weapons. Since scientists are must to build weapons, they easily detect and 
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report on violations. He also agrees on the seriousness of nuclear danger exceeding 
the violation risks as McNamara states.509 Schell offers to maintain a capability for 
nuclear rearmament “in a fixed lead time” in reply to a potential violator. Hence, 
ownership of a capability for nuclear rearmament in a nuclear-weapon-free world 
would deter the potential violators.510  
For the stability argument, retired General Butler argues, “Nuclear weapons 
did not and will not, of themselves, prevent major wars, and their presence 
unnecessarily prolonged and intensified the Cold War.”511 
3.2. Virtual Nuclear Arsenals: 
The notion of virtual arsenals carries two meanings in its essence. The first 
one specifies the potential use of excess fissile materials (dismantled from warheads 
and produced in civilian nuclear programs) by both the nuclear and non-nuclear 
states to rebuild nuclear weapons. The second one signifies an “imaginary” existence 
of nuclear weapons. That is, the nuclear weapons do not physically become ready to 
be used but the knowledge and the experience for assembling them become ready to 
rebuild them.512 The second meaning is relevant to the scope of this study. 
While the proponents of abolition articulate a vertical disarmament that 
reduces the number of nuclear weapons to zero, the proponents of virtual arsenals 
speak out a horizontal disarmament that “involves progressively standing down, 
dispersing, disassembling or partially dismantling arsenals.” 513 Under the rubric of 
virtual nuclear arsenals, this study will accumulate the proposals- sometimes 
accompanied by deep reductions (generally up to or lower than 300 but above zero 
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warheads)- such as de-alerting and deactivating nuclear weapons, separating 
warheads from delivery vehicles, removing some components of warheads and 
storing warheads far from the delivery vehicles. There is a clear definition for end 
state under the abolitionist trend, to eliminate all nuclear weapons “until none exist in 
the world.”514 For the proponents of virtual nuclear arsenal, there is not such clear 
definition for an end state. 
Some proponents of this posture argue that the international system has not 
developed in a direction that would permit a total elimination. However, it makes 
possible to take some measures to remove almost the danger of unauthorized or 
accidental employments of nuclear weapons, decrease the possibility of using them 
in local conflicts, abolish virtually the global stockpiles of warheads and fissile 
materials, and prevent the nuclear rebuild-ups and proliferation.515 In addition, some 
analysts argue that because of “the spread of the civilian nuclear power” and the 
progress in nuclear technology, the aspiration of abolishing nuclear weapons and 
related capabilities is not feasible. However, prohibiting “the existence of all 
assembled, ready-for-use weapons” would be not only feasible but also in favor of 
US interests. While decreasing the role of nuclear weapons in international relations, 
this posture will sustain “their alleged benefits” and prevent the great powers from 
being vulnerable to nuclear blackmail.516       
Michael J. Mazarr, one of the key proponents of virtual arsenal proposal, 
defines four criteria for any potential disarmament as an end state in favor of both the 
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international and US interests. Any disarmament form should allow for preserving 
the US national security at the high level as it before. The risk of escalating to 
nuclear level in a war among great powers has to be retained at the beginning. The 
assurances, negative or positive, against nuclear threats and the US allies’ security 
concerns must be involved in it. In this context, he argues that the US official policy 
at the time, minimum deterrent posture and complete disarmament proposal as the 
end points fail to match these criteria.517  
Against this background, he defines the end state as the point where all 
nuclear weapons would be disassembled and would not be ready for use. In addition, 
all the components of them including warheads, delivery vehicles, and fissile 
materials would be under the international inspection. Weapons and delivery system 
would separately be stored to make easy the detection of any violation. In this 
context, the UN would make rebuilding nuclear weapons illegitimate with the 
exception of under special conditions wherein states could be able to reassemble 
nuclear weapons. Every former nuclear state would keep the parts of “their nuclear 
weapons and the reassuring knowledge” that each would be able to reconstruct 
nuclear weapons “within a fixed amount of time.” Against any violator intending to 
take the advantage of this situation, the states, which would have the capability to 
reassemble nuclear weapons, would rebuild  “ a few dozen of their own.” Hence, 
“deterrent by the threat of retaliation would have been reestablished.”518   
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In this context, a virtual arsenal posture would reduce the threats of actual use 
of nuclear weapons, deliberately or accidentally. It would address the “loose nuke” 
dilemma. In addition, it would enhance the non-proliferation regime. However, to go 
this end state would not be easily, and there would be some challenges. They would 
include the difficulty of convincing nuclear states that this end state would be in 
favor of them, requirement of a powerful verification system, assurance against 
violations, providing the survivability of virtual arsenals, difficulty of deterring CBW 
without ready-for-use weapons, and maintaining the idea that a war among great 
powers would pose intolerable damage.519    
To diminish the risk of accidental or unauthorized nuclear missile attacks, 
another proposal is to “de-alert” and “de-activate” nuclear forces. A group of 
prominent American experts, Harold A. Feiveson, Bruce G. Blair, Jonathan Dean, 
Frank N. Von Hippel among them, in their book published in 1999, propose three 
phases to realize deep cuts “in which all the weapons remaining at each stage are de-
alerted and a large part are deactivated.” As stated in the book, the term of “de-
alerting,” means implementing necessary measures to extend the amount of time 
necessary to activate nuclear forces for launch. In addition, the term of “de-
activation” signifies a situation in which the nuclear weapons are not ready-for-use 
and the required time for making them ready would take weeks or months. 
Removing warheads from missiles is an example of deactivation. Proponents of this 
end state argue that the measures under de-alerting and deactivation are swiftly put 
into practice since they are reversible steps and do not necessitate as much formal 
negotiation as those of reduction treaties. 520  De-alerting comprises some 
arrangements concerning physical or technical restrictions to delay launches of 
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nuclear weapons. In a de-alerting regime, the numbers of nuclear weapons do not 
necessarily matter, but the their operations do to decrease the prospect of inadvertent, 
unauthorized, or accidental launches.521 
In the first phase, the US and Russia would approve the Compressive Test 
Ban Treaty, reiterate their loyalty to ABM, destroy the majority of tactical weapons, 
decrease the number of their operational warheads to 2000, de-alert or deactivate 
their nuclear forces, and implement an compressive counting method on warheads 
and fissile materials. In the second phase, the US and Russia would decrease the 
number of their total warheads to 1000. At this stage, other nuclear states, declared or 
undeclared would involve in this reduction process. Finally, in the last phase, the US 
and Russia, Western Europe, and China would decrease the number of their total 
warheads to 200 or smaller number, “with most of these deactivated, primarily by 
verified separation of nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles.” Some of the 
warheads under a 200- warheads limit would have survivability against any surprise 
attack. The size of such posture might be between 10 and 20 and might be deployed 
on submarines.522   
The main rational for these experts to propose such posture is the emergence 
of some risks with the end of the Cold War and the failure of the abolitionists to 
addresses them from a realistic perspective at the time. These threats include the 
growing proliferation possibilities resulting from Russian financial crises and huge 
nuclear stockpiles, the ongoing danger of high alert status of nuclear weapons of both 
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the US and Russia that could bring about a possibility of launching accidentally or 
mistakenly and an increase in the risk of nuclear proliferation as in the case of Indian 
and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998. Hence, such a mixture of deep reduction and de-
alerting, as stated in the book, would enhance non-proliferation regime, reduce the 
possibility of smuggling or stealing the nuclear materials by terrorist group or illegal 
suppliers. In addition, it would reduce the risks of launching accidentally or 
inadvertently and provide a favorable environment, such a small number of nuclear 
warheads, to go further on the road to total elimination.523    
Another prominent advocate of de-alerting proposal is senator Sam Nunn, 
former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Sam Nunn and Bruce 
Blair, in their article,  “From Nuclear Deterrence to Mutual Safety,” declare that by 
de-alerting they do not suggest the abolition of nuclear weapons, but abolition of 
“hair trigger” status of them, while maintaining a “deterrent effect virtually as 
powerful as the Cold War variant.” De-alerting is different from the “de-targeting” as 
proposed by Clinton-Yeltsin agreement in 1994, “which can be reversed in a matter 
of seconds.” De-alerting posture would be a remedy both for the nuclear dilemma of 
“safeguarding detached nuclear warheads,” fissile materials and nuclear knowledge, 
and the severe risks related to the worsening of Russian nuclear control and 
command.524  
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Another proponent of virtual arsenals is retired admiral Stansfield Turner, 
former director of the CIA. He puts emphasis on three perilous risks. The first one is 
the possibility of accidental or inadvertent nuclear missile launches from Russia due 
to weakening of the safeguarding and control systems on Russian nuclear weapons. 
The second one is the possibility of a nuclear explosion made by “a rogue state or 
terrorist group”, because of falling nuclear weapons into their hands. Because of 
deterioration in the relations between them or an uncontrollable mistake, the third 
one is the possibility of a nuclear exchange between Russia and the US as in the case 
of Cold War.525  
He argues that the goal of reducing nuclear weapons is necessary to thwart 
the nuclear proliferation by rogue states and terrorist groups. In this context, to 
reduce the number of Russian and US nuclear warheads below 1,000 calls for a 
rigorous verification system and involvement of China, France, and Britain in the 
reduction process. With his proposal of a new nuclear triad, he proposes firstly to 
decrease “states of readiness” to prevent accidents, secondly to reduce the role of 
these weapons in US military strategy, and thirdly to try to free the world from 
nuclear weapons.526 Subsequent steps would be de-alerting, devaluing, and disarming 
nuclear weapons. By de-alerting, the dangers of accidents or mistakes would be 
reduced. In addition, the determination of nuclear superpowers for progressing 
swiftly towards “a more stable nuclear posture” would be demonstrated to 
international community. By devaluing, Turner proposes to create “strategic 
escrow,” which means that the US and Russia would put their de-alerted warheads 
into storage sites, far away from their launch vehicles. They would establish a 
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counting system on them. Against any violation, they would be able to reassemble 
their nuclear weapons. In addition, the US would declare a no first-use policy for 
nuclear weapons. Then it would lead to “expand the 185-nation Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty into a treaty of no first-use”, which might comprise a provision 
of “making any first-use of a nuclear weapon a crime against humanity, with 
automatic economic, political, and even military sanctions.” As the last portion of 
devaluing, the US would establish “modest defenses against accidental or small 
deliberate.” By disarming, he argues that it is not achievable in the near future. 
However, conventional arms control process would be supplemented with “de-
alerting and devaluing to be in position to evaluate whether disarmament is 
feasible.”527    
He defines the end state as “zero ready nuclear warheads in the world, 
including, of course, Israel, Pakistan, and India.” Then the warheads and deliver 
vehicles in “strategic escrow” would be eliminated until a decided level would 
remain such as “200 or 500 or perhaps more, but with all warheads in escrow, the 
world would be much safer.”528 
Another proposal in line with this posture comes from Morton Halperin, who 
worked in the National Security Council during the Nixon and Clinton 
administrations.529 He also puts emphasis on the risk of inadvertent, unauthorized, or 
accidental use and its catastrophic costs because of the existence of nuclear weapons. 
He proposes three steps to reach an end state. In the first step, the international 
community, with the approval of the UN Security Council, would guarantee to take 
action together against any state employing the threat of using nuclear weapons on 
                                                 
527 See Ibid. The meaning of the term “escrow” is that something placed in escrow can, if required, 
could be pulled out of it to reuse. See Schell (1998), op. cit., p. 107  
528 See Turner, op. cit. 
529 See Schell (1998), op. cit., p. 107 
 136
any other nation, in any case or any state trying to violate nuclear disarmament 
process. Moreover, all countries would come to an agreement not to utilize nuclear 
weapons as an instrument of policy including the actual use or the threat of use.530 
 In the second step, all states would recognize the decision of the International 
Court of Justice on nuclear weapons and promise to complete the total elimination of 
nuclear weapons as envisaged under the NPT. Finally, in the third step, this global 
cooperation on nuclear disarmament would be put into practice gradually. Under a 
treaty, all nations would eliminate all warheads more than 2000. Inspections system 
would be established to perform inspections on declared arsenals and to investigate 
for undeclared nuclear warheads. In addition, civilian nuclear programs would be 
under inspection. All nations would accept not to carry out tests or other research. 
All existing nuclear warheads would be disconnected from delivery systems within 
five years and would placed in storages. Then nuclear cores would be separated from 
warheads. All the separated components of warheads would be placed into storages, 
“invulnerable to a surprise attack.” Finally, all nations would decrease “their storage 
of nuclear cores to no more than two hundred.”531 
Against this background, it is possible to summarize the benefits of a virtual 
arsenal end state as following; the risks of accidental, unauthorized or inadvertent 
nuclear launches would be decreased, the role of nuclear weapons in international 
system would be marginalized, the possibility of nuclear proliferation would be 
reduced. It would carry a deterrent effect against violation attempting to break out of 
the system. In addition, it would strengthen non-proliferation regime and be a 
starting point in reaching at the goal of total elimination.    
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While the critics of virtual arsenal agree that such a system might bring some 
considerable benefits, however they raise some counter arguments against it. 
Kenneth Waltz argues that while decision-makers of nations do not believe that small 
number of nuclear weapons is enough for deterrence, they will not accept weaponless 
deterrence. Virtual arsenals would be unstable and a deterrence posture without 
second-strike capability as envisaged under virtual arsenals, would not work. 
Moreover, while the extended deterrent effect of US large amount of weapons is 
being questioned, the deterrent effect of a virtual arsenal will be more dubious.532 
Another counter argument is related to the uncertainty of a virtual arsenal system’s 
the contributions to international peace. Even though it reduces the danger of 
accidental or unauthorized launches, it carries some risks concerning “rapid 
armament or rearmament.” In addition, such a system is not likely in near future. 
Since there are some states relying on nuclear weapons for their security.533    
Another criticism is against the de-alerting posture. A group of experts argues 
that de-alerting posture would not contribute to the safety and stability concerns but 
would worsen the fundamental security of nuclear weapons. Primarily, many of “de-
alerting proposals are unverifiable and some would lead to crisis instability.” De-
alerting weakens an essential requirement of deterrence; a retaliation capability to 
thwart any opponent from “assuming it can achieve a fait accompli.” In addition, de-
alerting of US nuclear weapons would encourage surprise attack “by making an 
effective first strike possible at very low attack levels.” Hence, such a posture would 
not only intensify apprehensions but also increase the motivations to make a first-
strike. It would weaken the credibility of US commitments to its allies and worsen 
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“the disparity in U.S. and Russian theater nuclear force levels.” Hence, they argue 
that if allowed, de-alerting would be “a back door to unilateral nuclear 
disarmament.”534 In addition, Adm. Richard W. Mies, the commander in chief of US 
Strategic Command, argues that “de-alerting” proposals endanger the current 
stability “against a pre-emptive first strike” by decreasing the credibility and 
survivability of US nuclear forces and by increasing the vulnerability of them which 
creates incentives to strike first. He also argues that there is no any “hair-trigger” 
situation by which de-alerting” proposals justify their case.535 
3.3. Minimum Deterrence: 
The phrase “minimum deterrence” has comprised two meanings in its 
definition until now. The first one means that a state use the nuclear weapons as an 
instrument of deterrence only to deter the use or the threats of use of nuclear 
weapons against itself. The second one refers to the degree of nuclear response and 
the smallest number of nuclear weapons, which will be satisfactory to deter. 536 
However, there is no a consensus on how small number of nuclear weapons is 
sufficient for a minimum deterrence policy. Hence, there are some various proposals 
for minimum deterrence level imagine some hundreds warheads or sometimes 
around one thousand. On this issue, one analyst argues that while there is a 
consensus on the necessity of reducing radically the nuclear arsenals of superpowers, 
the proposals for minimum deterrence disagree on the scale and the quality of 
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reductions. 537  Moreover, another one argues that there is no a “metric for 
determining force levels, configurations, performance, and destructive power” under 
minimum deterrence policy.538     
The argument for minimum deterrence hinges on the basic assumption that 
the size of nuclear weapons is not necessarily important for the stability, but their 
level of survivability against a surprise attack. The scale of the nuclear warheads will 
be the smallest one, once the degree of nuclear warheads’ survivability is high. Since 
the numbers of warheads, of which a state will use as a threat to launch against an 
opponent’s cities, do mater to deter, rather than the number of warheads necessary to 
destroy the opponent’s nuclear forces, given that the opponent does not any missile 
defense.539 In this context, the concept of minimum deterrence is generally related to 
countervalue targeting and a capability for second strike540 that is necessary to form 
“a truly stable nuclear balance.”541   
The notion of minimum nuclear deterrence, by no means, emerged with the 
end of the Cold War. Its foundation dates back to 1950s, to the Eisenhower 
administration. It was put forward by US Navy as a response to the vulnerability 
problem of US bombers. In this context, it was expressed as a two-sided policy, 
establishment of “a small secure retaliatory deterrent” on the one side and 
achievement of some conventional capabilities on the other. In the Cold War security 
framework the US rejected such a posture because of its would-be limits on US 
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nuclear deterrent. 542  However, the concept remained alive under the names of 
minimum, finite, or pure deterrence and the objective has been to create “ a force 
structure at much lower levels of nuclear weapons” able to survive and deter an 
attack with the threat of retaliation. 543  With the end of the Cold War security 
environment, the notion of minimum deterrence resurfaced in the US. The reason 
behind proposing a minimum force posture is that it may provide an environment to 
go deep reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the US and Russia.544 Some argue that 
the rationale behind START process is to take the US and Russia to “a minimal 
deterrence, and reassurance-focused nuclear posture” to deter the actual use or the 
threat of use of nuclear weapons by opponents.545 By this process, it will be possible 
to go deeper nuclear level among the five declared nuclear states.546 
In 1991, the National Academy of Sciences’ (NAS) Committee on 
International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) proposed to reduce the numbers of 
the US and Russian nuclear arsenals to 1000 to 2000 warheads. It also declared that 
the nuclear weapons should not have any role except deterring their own use by 
others.547 In addition, at the time Congressional Budget Office offered a similar 
reduction.548 In a sense, these two proposals were along the line with the concept of 
minimum deterrence. They also implied that “under certain conditions” a radical 
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deep reduction in nuclear arsenals would be possible.549 In 1993, three US strategists, 
McGeorge Bundy, William J. Crowe and Sidney D. Drell, recommended to reduce 
the numbers of the US and Russian nuclear weapons to 1000 or to 1500 warheads, 
coupled with some other proposals such as adoption of no-first use policy and 
limitation on the role of US nuclear weapons as deterring only nuclear attack. They 
argued that by no means such a reduction would be “ the lowest level obtainable by 
the early twenty-first century.”550 Another analyst calling for a minimum deterrent is 
Kathryn Schultz arguing that the only role of US nuclear weapons currently “is to 
deter the use of nuclear weapons by other nations.” She declares “We do not need to 
maintain a war fighting capability to do this, only a retaliatory force, and only for as 
long as any nation has significant numbers of nuclear weapons.” The US can use 
conventional forces to counter other threats. It is not necessary for the US to preserve 
“a minimum deterrent force” beyond 1,000 warheads deployed on Trident 
submarine-based ballistic missiles. She also recommends further reductions for the 
US and the other nuclear states.551 
There are some other proposals for minimum deterrence envisaging a further 
reduction to the level of one thousand warheads. The most striking side of these 
proposals is that proponents of virtual arsenals or the abolitionist approach support 
these proposals. In this context, it seems that one thousand warhead-goal is generally 
seen as a transition step or a one step further towards the total elimination of nuclear 
weapons or virtual arsenals. As argued by Keith Payne, lack of development in the 
abolitionist trend has paved the way a current move in this approach, except the final 
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aim. After recognizing the reality that shifting the goal of eliminating all nuclear 
weapons from the periphery to the center of arms control may evaporate the support 
of the others proposing further nuclear reductions, but not complete abolition, many 
abolitionists gradually put emphasis on deep reductions, such as a few hundred 
weapons, “to move their policy forward.” A report prepared by NAS’ Committee on 
International Security and Arms Control in June 1997, as she argues, is the best 
example of this change.552 This report proposes to reduce US and Russian nuclear 
arsenals to 1,000 total warheads, and subsequently, contingent on security 
environment, to a few hundred warheads (roughly 300), together with sufficient 
verification systems and transparency measures. It also proposes to limit the role of 
nuclear weapons as an instrument of “core deterrence,” which means deterring the 
only nuclear threats against the US and its allies and argues that the US could reach 
the lowest possible level to carry out the core deterrent purpose from the level of 
1000 warheads. The rational behind the total 1000-warhead level is its advantages for 
establishing assured survivability, fulfilling core deterrence mission, and achieving 
reductions without demanding reductions in the nuclear arsenals of other nuclear 
weapons. Finally, the Committee puts forth the word “prohibition” as an alternative 
to “abolition” because of impossibility of really freeing the world from the likely 
return of nuclear weapons and their roles in international relations. Abolitionist 
retired General Lee Butler is among the Committee members.553 
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Another report prepared by the Committee on Nuclear Policy in 1999, named 
as Jump-START: Retaking the Initiative to Reduce Post-Cold War Nuclear Dangers, 
offers strikingly to decrease drastically the quantity, the role of US and Russian 
nuclear weapons. The Committee mentions the decline in the Russian command and 
control over nuclear weapons and prospects of nuclear proliferation and recommends 
that the US, together with Russia, decrease the number of nuclear weapons to 1,000 
“deployed strategic nuclear weapons within a decade” and further through mutual 
verification, to 1,000 “total nuclear weapons on each side.” In addition, it proposes to 
eliminate hair-trigger alert status of all nuclear forces and involve all nuclear 
weapons states in these processes. Among the members of the Committee, there are 
abolitionists, such as Alan Cranston, Robert S. McNamara, and proponents of virtual 
arsenals, such as Frank von Hippel and Harold Feiveson.554  
In addition, a report issued in June 2001 by three nongovernmental 
organizations and a group of experts, including Bruce G. Blair, Frank N. Von 
Hippel, Jonathan Dean, and Steve Fetter, is another one supporting a deep reduction 
to the level of 1,000 warheads in the US nuclear arsenals, together with active and 
reserve warheads. It puts emphasis on the risks of accidental and unauthorized use of 
nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferations. While obviously stating the benefits of 
“verifiable and permanent” international prohibition process on nuclear weapons, it 
articulates the difficulty of realizing the prohibition in the short term, within ten 
years. Under this circumstance, it argues that the US should implement a fresh 
nuclear strategy enhancing its national security and promoting nonproliferation, 
“regardless of whether or when nuclear prohibition is achieved.” Moreover, the main 
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core of this policy would be confining the role of US nuclear weapons to deter “the 
use of nuclear weapons by another country.” It also argues:   
“No plausible threat can be foreseen that justifies the United States 
maintaining more than a few hundred survivable nuclear weapons over the next 
decade or beyond. Nor does any plausible threat require the United States to maintain 
the ability to launch large numbers of its nuclear weapons promptly, in a matter of 
minutes, or even in a matter of hours.” 
Against this background, it recommends that the US decrease “unilaterally” 
the numbers of its nuclear weapons to a level of 1000 warheads. Such a policy would 
promote Russia to accept “a safer nuclear posture” other than the launch-on-warning 
and other nuclear states to pursue further nuclear reductions.555   
In addition, in their article, Robert A. Manning and Zachary S. Davis argue 
that a minimum deterrence force would be adequate for the US to deal with any 
probable threats and the main security concerns in the new security environment. The 
end of the threat of all-out nuclear war, and growing US advantage on “high-
technology conventional military capabilities” provide an opportunity to de-
emphasize the nuclear weapons in US defense planning. They propose to reduce the 
numbers of declared weapon states’ nuclear weapons to “the level of 100 to 200 or 
fewer weapons, coupled with the retention of a substantial virtual arsenal -“the 
capability to rebuild arsenals close to post-START levels within an anticipated 
warning time.” In addition, it would be supplemented with some declaratory policies 
such as no-first use, negative and positive security assurance.556 
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Robert Kerrey, a former Democratic senator and William D. Hartung, director 
of the Arms Trade Resource Center at New School University’s World Policy 
Institute, in their article, argue that the Bush administration’ NPR should move the 
US “toward a minimum deterrent posture involving hundreds, not thousands, of 
nuclear warheads.” It would be a significant pace to reduce and finally eliminate 
nuclear weapons as envisaged under the NPT. Two or three of US Trident 
submarines (each capable of launching 192 independently targetable warheads) could 
offer over sufficient “destructive power to deter any nation from contemplating a 
nuclear attack on the United States, its allies, or its forces.” In addition, a minimum 
deterrent posture would lead to modify the role of U.S. nuclear weapons from 
deterring attacks with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons to only the use of 
nuclear weapons against the US its and allies. US conventional superiority is 
adequate to deter a state with chemical or biological weapons and possibly even a 
country with a small nuclear arsenal. They also argue that the US should “take as 
many US nuclear weapons as possible off high-alert status,” because of the danger of 
an accidental launch, which became apparent when President Yeltsin allegedly 
considered to initiate an attack against the US “after Russian radars mistook a 
Norwegian satellite launch for a U.S. missile attack.”557 
On January 9, 2002, two strategists, Ivo H. Daalder, and James M. Lindsay 
arguing that in contrast to the Cold War years, the US currently has “unquestioned 
conventional military superiority,” declared that this advantage may be reversed by 
“the possession, threat, and use of nuclear weapons by others.” Hence, the 
marginalization of the nuclear weapons in this context will be in favor of the US. 
They recommend that the US employ a deterrent policy based on “guaranteed 
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retaliation, not on damage limitation.” Since Russia is not any more an enemy and no 
other possible adversary has higher than some dozen warheads, the requirement of 
the US deterrent policy is just preserving “nuclear forces sufficient” to clarify its 
intentions to “retaliate with devastating effect against anyone who dares attack it or 
its interests.” In this context, the US should reduce the numbers of its nuclear 
weapons to a level of 1,000 warheads, deployed on submarines. Such a force level 
would be “sufficient to meet even the most demanding deterrence contingency.” 
Since “un-inventing” nuclear weapons is impossible, such a force posture, coupled 
with the CTBT, would reduce the threat of nuclear weapons.558 It should be noted 
that in 2000 James M. Lindsay recommended that the US decrease the number of its 
nuclear weapons to a level, below a thousand warheads. He also argued that it is no 
reasonable to claim that the US could not “deter the rest of the world with 2,500 
warheads but not 1,000 or 1,500.” In addition, as estimated by the Defense 
Department going down to 2,500 warheads would save $1.5 billion a year. Hence, 
going down to 1,000 might save hundreds of millions of dollars. 559  
Against this background, it will be correct to say that minimum deterrence 
posture seems to take the most considerable supports from American experts at the 
present. However, there are some counter arguments. Some argues that a minimum 
US strategic arsenal is one of the most troublesome suggestions that in fact might 
retard nonproliferation by removing “extended deterrence from nuclear-capable 
allies who might then be motivated to develop their own nuclear deterrents.” 
Reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons would not reduce the risks related to 
                                                 
558 See Daalder, and Lindsay, op. cit.  
559 See James M. Lindsay, “The Nuclear Agenda: Arms Control and Missile Defense Are Back in the 
News,” Brookings Review, Fall 2000, Vol. 18, No. 4, (The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C.), 
available on line at: www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/press/review/fall2000/lindsay.htm  
 147
nuclear weapons, since the stated dangers are generally resulting from lack of care.560  
In addition, George H. Quester argues that “at least” one argument against a 
minimum deterrence posture seems to beat such an approach to deterrence. It is 
related to the contributions of nuclear weapons to crisis stability. That is, reducing 
the number of retaliatory forces may worsen the crisis stability by increasing the 
incentives to launch a first strike in a crisis. There will not be any substantial saving 
from going down a minimum level. Since there are some difficulties related to 
dismantling warheads and since, it is an expensive activity. In addition, the morality 
of targeting cities and as result innocent peoples is another problem with minimum 
posture. Finally, he concludes that if the US and Russia remains “well above 
minimum deterrence” they may discourage nuclear proliferation or restrict it to a few 
states with a minimum deterrent level.561 Moreover, Adm. Richard W. Mies argues 
that to think that “nuclear danger” is purely proportionate to the scale of nuclear 
weapons and consequently minor is certainly better is a incorrect conviction.562  
3.4. Traditionalist Approach: a robust deterrence 
The proponents of this posture do not want to make drastic modifications in 
the US nuclear strategy. They tend to support a US nuclear policy based on a robust 
nuclear deterrence. Some experts remarkably picture what the proponents of the 
traditional approach believe. First, the traditionalists argue that total elimination of 
nuclear weapons is a utopian idea since it is impossible to disinvent nuclear weapons. 
Moreover, some attempts such as marginalizing or eliminating nuclear weapons 
might have some “paradoxical” effects, such as an increase in the international 
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unsteadiness or in the possibility of clash. They argue that it is the reality-the US, as 
being the “only conventional superpower,” would benefit a total nuclear 
disarmament- that makes other states oppose a complete disarmament.563  
Secondly, they worry about the uncertainty related to the future of Russia 
such as possibility of resurrection of an anti-western Russia, because of the failure of 
its ongoing reforms. Hence, they support preservation of US nuclear capability “as a 
residual deterrent” function, if necessary. Third, they aim to maintain a nuclear 
option, accompanied by a conventional option, to deter the use of WMD. Finally, as 
experienced in the Cold War years, they argue that nuclear weapons are the 
fundamental element to prevent a war among great powers. Hence, they prefer to be 
prudent against these uncertainties and to maintain a nuclear posture around the 
START II level.564 They think that a US nuclear posture below 3000-3500 warheads 
would not be in favor of US to pursue its national interests in international arena. As 
declared by one former chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, below a level of 3500 
warheads, it would be impossible to preserve the strategic triad.565 Moreover, in 1995 
General Shalikashvili declared, in testimony before the Armed Services Committee 
that “Our analysis shows that even under the worst conditions the START II force 
levels (3000-3500 warheads) provide enough survivable forces, and survivable, 
sustained command and control to accomplish our targeting objectives.” 566  In 
addition, as a reaction to the General Butler announcement about the appropriateness 
of complete elimination of nuclear weapons, commander of US Strategic Command 
                                                 
 
 
563 See Cambone and Garrity, op. cit., pp. 76-7 
564 See Ibid, pp. 77-8 
565 See Theresa Hitchens, “Clinton Review Challenges Triad; Decision Tilts on Russian Relations,” 
Defense News, (28 February 1994): 3 cited in Mlyn, op. cit., p. 194 
566 Quoted in Congressional Record Wednesday, June7, 2000 106th Congress, 2nd Session, Statement 
of Senator Levin on the Kerrey Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2001, 
available on line at: http://levin.senate.gov/floor/060700.htm 
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(STRATCOM), General Eugene Habiger, in 1997 declared that any strategic 
reduction in the US nuclear forces below START II levels would indicate that the US 
is “no longer deterring the superpowers.”567 
In the post-Cold War period, the Clinton administration’s nuclear posture 
review in 1994 became the most important representation of continuing traditional 
approach. Since after it was partially publicized, or it became apparent what changes 
it brought, the criticisms began to rise against it. It might partially have a role for the 
growing calls for the abolition of nuclear weapons. For example, retired general 
Butler argues, “the Nuclear Posture Review was an essential but far from sufficient 
step toward rethinking the role of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world.” 
Moreover, against NPR’s recommendations such as nuclear weapons are to “hedge” 
against a resurgent Russia and to deter attack by weapons of mass destruction, he 
replies that “overt hedging against born-again, Soviet-style hardliners is as likely to 
engender as to discourage their resurrection,” and that “elegant theories of deterrence 
wilt in the crucible of impending nuclear war.”568  
Moreover, the traditional approach can be seen in the statement made by 
William J. Perry, the Secretary of Defense under Clinton administration. He said, 
“Recent international upheavals have not changed the calculation that nuclear 
weapons remain an essential part of American military power.” NPR's suggested 
nuclear posture as the START II level would be sufficient to: “deter a hostile Russian 
government by holding at risk a range of assets valued by its political and military 
leaders, maintain a strategic reserve force to ensure continued deterrence of other 
                                                 
 
567 General Eugene Habiger, “Officials Caution against Nuclear Cuts,” The Air Force Times, 17 
February 1997, p. 33 cited in Matt J. Martin, “No End in Sight: A Review of Post-Cold War Nuclear 
Theory, “The Graduate School of International Studies (The University of Denver, 10 March 1997), 
p. 19, available on line at: home.earthlink.net/~bova/Nuclear.pdf 
568 See Butler (1996), op. cit. 
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nuclear powers, account for weapons on systems, which are not available due to 
maintenance and overhaul.” In addition, a START II level would be suitable for 
maintaining the concept of a triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers 569 
Walter B. Slocombe is another advocate of traditional approach. He argues 
that it is not the time to get rid of US nuclear weapons. He says, “I believe that 
nuclear weapons will continue to fulfill an essential role in meeting our deterrence 
requirements and assuring our nonproliferation objectives.” In the near future, the US 
has to have a consistent and flexible nuclear deterrent, “ survivable against the most 
aggressive attack,” and “assured in its safety against both accident and unauthorized 
use.” Proliferating states obtain nuclear weapons not because the US possesses them 
but because they think they need nuclear weapons to respond to regional opponents, 
and to augment their position among their neighbors. Without a nuclear response by 
the US, a likely proliferating state would not back from acquiring a WMD capability. 
In addition, the expansion of a reliable “US nuclear deterrent to allies has been an 
important nonproliferation tool.” Contrary to the claims made by some, nuclear 
weapons are safe and not vulnerable to accidental or unauthorized use. More over, 
when taken as a whole, the security hazards of preserving nuclear weapons are 
prevailed by the security, and non-proliferation benefits coming from nuclear 
deterrence.570 
                                                 
569 See Perry (1995), op. cit. 
570 The nuclear weapons are still vital as a deterrent against two main threats. First, Russia still has 
large strategic and tactical nuclear forces and due to decline in its conventional military power, Russia 
can put emphasis on its nuclear weapons. Future of Russian policy is not certain and the US should 
pay attention to the possibility of having the need to deter the Russian nuclear threat once more. 
Second, nuclear weapons are a deterrent against the threats posed by rogue states with potential 
WMD. Hence, “abolition in the near future is not a good idea.” See Statement of the Honorable 
Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, before the Senate Governmental Affairs 
Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services Hearing on Nuclear 
Weapons and Deterrence, 12 February 1997, available on line at: www.stimson.org/zeronuke/ 
forum/slocombe.htm 
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In addition, Robert G. Spulak, a senior analyst at the Strategic Studies Center, 
Sandia National Laboratories, defines the abolitionist trend as the nuclear stigma 
philosophy aiming to move toward the ideal of a nuclear-free world, in spite of its 
incapability “to put the genie back in the bottle.” That is, the ambition of eliminating 
both nuclear weapons and the knowledge of how to build them cannot be achieved. 
Having nuclear weapons generates some advantages compensating the perils of not 
having them. Nuclear weapons as an instrument of deterrence “does not ensure 
peace, but short of nuclear war, places a limit on the level of violence,” as 
experienced among the great powers during the Cold War. Conventional weapons, as 
some claim, cannot carry out the strategic assignment of nuclear weapons. In 
addition, Russian nuclear capability continues to be a threat to the US. In the 
following years, Japan, a Western European state, or China might also create a 
strategic danger to the US extensive interests. China might be a nuclear threat to the 
US. In this context, the advantages of having nuclear weapons validate the case that 
the removal of US nuclear weapons would not be in favor the US. The advantages of 
having nuclear weapons would comprise “deterrence against attacks on our central 
security interests, a contribution to the general prevention of war, extended 
deterrence that protects our allies and discourages proliferation, security against 
technological surprise, maintenance of our superpower status, and the tangible 
benefits of nuclear diplomacy.” Against this background, he argues that before 
radically changing the US security policy, a severe debate aiming to evaluate “the 
dangers and benefits of nuclear weapons must be undertaken.”571  
                                                 
571 See Spulak, Jr., op. cit., pp. 106-18. Keith B. Payne, Robert G. Joseph, and John F. Reichart make 
some similar arguments against the abolition of nuclear weapons and deep reductions in their articles. 
See Payne, (Jan-Mar98), op. cit. and Robert G. Joseph and John F. Reichart, “The Case for Nuclear 
Deterrence Today,” Orbis, Winter 98, Vol. 42, Issue 1, p. 7, 13p. 
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Another advocate of traditional approach is Kathleen Bailey, a senior fellow 
at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. In 1995, in her article, she presented 
comprehensibly the arguments against nuclear disarmament. She argues that the aim 
of abolishing nuclear weapons is at this time “neither practical nor desirable.” Two 
measures must be done to realize total nuclear disarmament: first, all states must 
“agree to participate,” and there must be a “very effective verification” system. 
However, “the first is unlikely, and the second is currently impossible.” 572  In 
addition, she argues that nuclear deterrence creates a security and stability 
framework for the US against the traditional and new threats. Even if the US 
relations with Russia are not bad, the US has to keep in mind the Russia's military 
capabilities, rather than its intentions. Hence, going down to zero or radically 
reducing the number of US nuclear weapons “below present levels” would not be in 
favor of the US.573  
                                                 
572 In addition, realization of total nuclear disarmament might encourage a number of nations to obtain 
nuclear weapons. Japan and South Korea and some countries in Europe, in consequence of the 
reduction or elimination of the US security assurances, might have incentives to build or acquire 
nuclear weapons to  “develop their own deterrent.” Even if the verification problem was solved and all 
states agreed to eliminate all nuclear weapons, there would be “practical limitations,” such as the 
process of dismantling nuclear warheads: “how to store weapon components until they can be 
destroyed, how to destroy them faster, what to do with the plutonium and other materials, and how to 
pay for it all.” The future of Russia is still uncertain. Some forces, after taking control in the Russia, 
might revive the Cold War framework. China is modernizing its nuclear arsenals. Ongoing WMD 
proliferation activities might create new nuclear opponents in the future against the US. Against these 
threats, the US conventional weapons might fail to counter them. Moreover, The development, 
maintenance, and use of US conventional forces might be more expensive and more difficult. See 
Kathleen Bailey, "Why We Have to Keep the Bomb, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 51 
(January-February 1995), available on line at: www.thebulletin.org/issues/1995/jf95/jf95Bailey.html 
573 The destructive power of nuclear weapons as an instrument of nuclear deterrence is still vital for 
the US to deter nuclear, biological, and chemical threats posed by Russian, other nuclear states such as 
China and India and proliferating states, such as Iraq and North Korea. In addition, the undeclared 
stockpiles, including warheads, and fissile materials, the asymmetries in US and Russian production 
and use of fissile materials to build warheads and undeclared production facilities are the main 
problems to be solved for going a total disarmament. Hence, realizing total disarmament or making 
deep reductions is not in favor of US because “deterrence is still vital” and “ compliance with such 
reduction could not be verified.” See C. Paul Robinson and Kathleen C. Bailey, “To Zero or Not To 
Zero: A US Perspective on Nuclear Disarmament,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 28 (2), 1997, pp. 14 9-
156. “Great caution therefore should be exercised in any arms control efforts to lower the numbers of 
nuclear warheads beyond the levels of 2000-2500.” See Statement by Dr. Kathleen C. Bailey Before 
the US Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Strategic Forces March 31, 1998, 
available on line at: ww.senate.gov/~armed_services/statemnt/980331kb.htm 
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However, it seems that after START III was signed by the US and Russia, 
there appears to be some other proposals rejecting a reduction in the numbers of US 
nuclear weapons below the START III level. Since such proposals are still aiming to 
maintain a robust deterrence against the uncertainties in the international system, 
such proposals will also be gathered under the rubric of traditionalist approach in this 
study. For example, Air Force Chief of Staff general Larry Welch declared that a 
force structure around 2500 warheads is the “firebreak” for the US, since going down 
that level would necessitate to modify its deterrence policy.574 US State Department 
spokesman James P. Rubin declared in 2000 that the US could go down to “a level of 
2,000 to 2,500” without endangering its interests concerning nuclear deterrence 
while limiting the nuclear danger.575 In addition, a 1997 study made by the then-
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili stated, “the minimum 
levels of nuclear warheads needed to deter other nations from launching a nuclear 
attack is 2,000-2,500 warheads.”576 As noted earlier, the Clinton presidential decision 
directive, (PDD-60) envisaged a nuclear posture level at START III level. 
In 1998, Senator Robert Kerrey (D-Neb.) stated that the US could securely 
decrease the number of its nuclear warheads to proposed START III level, since the 
US had much more nuclear weapons than it needed. A nuclear force posture around 
2000-2500 warheads would be too sufficient to annihilate any nation threatening the 
US, “any where any time.” This reduction would also save a substantial amount of 
money. As estimated by Congressional Budget Office, even going down to START 
II level will save $12.7 billion within 10 years.577 
                                                 
574 Interview with General Larry Welch (USAF, ret.), June 13, 1997 cited in Hall, Capello, and 
Lambert, op. cit. 
575 See Steven Mufson, “Russia: Cut Arsenals To 1,500 Warheads U.S. Resists, Prefers 2,000 to 2,500 
Units,” The Washington Post, Friday, January 28, 2000; Page A17 
576 See Ibid. 
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In January 2001, two researchers from RAND Cooperation declared, in a 
briefing to the Pentagon, that to decrease the number of US nuclear weapons below 
START III levels will call for a deep re-examination of the role of nuclear weapons 
in US security policy, together with nuclear targeting policies.578 
A report prepared by a number of prominent American experts, including 
Keith B. Payne, R. James Woolsey, Fred C. Iklé, Robert Joseph, and Kathleen C. 
Bailey, seems to fit this position. However, it does not recommend any force level 
clearly. It argues that the logic behind the proposals for nuclear “abolition” and deep 
force reductions, “however attractive, is extremely fragile.” Since such proposals fail 
to examine the utility of nuclear weapons in serving US national objectives, “with 
full recognition of their special advantages and disadvantages.” While putting 
emphasis on the unpredictability of future security environment, it argues that the 
future of Russia and China is not certain and that the US may face “a variety of other 
regional aggressors armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD).” In this 
context, it is not likely to predict with assurance the requirements for nuclear 
deterrence in future. A new security environment may emerge in which the US 
security interests calls for a robust nuclear capability and deterrence. The US nuclear 
weapons may possibly be essential to deter the employment of biological, chemical, 
nuclear, or conventional weapons by regional actors against the US and its allies and 
to augment the US position in a crisis. Against this background, it argues that to 
decrease the number of the US and Russian nuclear weapons “below START II 
levels, or, in principle, below proposed START III” will be prudent and practical if 
such a force level provides the US with a capability to “adjust its future strategic 
                                                                                                                                          
 
577 See John Isaacs, “Kerrey Amendment on Nuclear Weapons Reduction,” Global Beat, May 11, 
1999, p.1-3, available on line at: www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/nuclear/Isaacs051199.html 
578 NDRI Pentagon Briefing Examines the Future of Nuclear Deterrence, op. cit. 
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force structure, offensive and defensive, in response to a highly dynamic strategic 
environment.” However, it is impossible to decide whether such a force posture will 
do so or not at the time.579 Finally, as envisaged in the most recent US nuclear 
posture review, the Bush administration favors to deploy no more than 2200 strategic 
offensive weapons. Such a nuclear force posture does not make much distinction 
from the START III level (2000-2500).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
579 The report argues “the basis on which recent proposals for nuclear disarmament or deep nuclear 
reductions reach their conclusions is to set aside traditional U.S. security requirements in favor of 
other priorities by simply assuming, intuitively, a future in which there is little or no requirement for 
nuclear weapons. Such an approach is wholly inadequate for addressing the question, how much is 
enough?” See, National Institute for Public Policy, Executive Report 2001, op. cit.  
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CONCLUSION:  
In their nature, the nuclear weapons inherently carry three-power qualities, 
namely the structural, deterrent, and compellent. As a source of structural power, 
they are “ the highest form of military and diplomatic power in the international 
system.” During the Cold War, by exercising the structural power the two 
superpowers secured their vital interests such as “acting as systemic leaders” or 
“preventing a sytemwide conflict.” As a source of deterrent power, it is believed that 
they decrease the possibility of initiating war among the permanent rivals by making 
the cost of attacking higher than any expected benefits by means of going to war. In 
the Cold War, the mutual destruction relationship between the two superpowers 
generated a deterrent effect based on the capability of inflicting unacceptable damage 
upon each other. In addition, as a source of compellent power, the threat of using 
them is utilized to force an opponent to fulfill something or to discontinue doing any 
action as in the case of Cuba missile crisis.580 
Nevertheless, in the 1990s the remarkable transformations in the international 
system give the impression that “the sources of power and influence” in the new 
world order will differentiate from the Cold War order. Moreover, the changing 
nature of conflicts from high systemic conflict to regional conflicts as in the case of 
Bosnian conflicts and the Gulf War implies that nuclear weapons will not be any 
more the source of power necessary to overcome such challenges.581 While the utility 
of them declining as sources of power, their vulnerability as a sources of new 
security dangers has increased. Partially motivated by these realities and also by new 
security opportunities to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in interstate relations, 
                                                 
 
580 See V. Paul, op. cit., pp. 19-23 
581 See Ibid, pp.38-9 
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the interests in nuclear disarmament has increased all over the world. Since the main 
rationale (the Soviet threat) that required a large nuclear arsenal disappeared. Hence, 
the US as the most experienced country on the nuclear issues began to experience 
actively such changes.  
In this context, a public debate about the future role of nuclear weapons in the 
US national security began between the proponents of nuclear abolition and their 
opponents and among the opponents of total elimination in the US. Since the 
arguments or counter-arguments of parties to this debate are mentioned in previous 
chapter, they will not be repeated here. However, some characteristics of this debate 
will be presented.  
First, it is too early to predict how this debate will be settled or which 
arguments will be validated or invalidated in the following years. In addition, there is 
not any rigid demarcation line among the advocates of different proposals. Hence, an 
advocate of one group, in accordance with the changing security environment and 
new developments, may shift his support from one group to another. For example, a 
report prepared by the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the 
US National Academy of Sciences, proposes to reduce US and Russian nuclear 
arsenals to 1,000 total warheads, and subsequently, contingent on security 
environment, to a few hundred warheads (roughly 300) in 1997582, although its 
another report in 1991 recommended to reduce the number of the US and Russian 
nuclear weapons to a level of 1000 to 2000 nuclear warheads.583 
                                                 
582 National Academy Report (1997), op. cit., pp. 77- 80 
583 The Future of the US-Soviet Nuclear Relationship, Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 
1991, p., 10 cited in Fisher (1998), op. cit., p. 39 
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 In addition, two strategists, while recommending to reduce the number of US 
and Russian nuclear weapon to a level of 2000 warheads in 1990,584 in the following 
years became the advocates of de-alerting and reducing the number of nuclear 
weapons to a level of 200 deactivated warheads.585 Moreover, they are by no means 
only examples of such changes.  
The conclusion that can be drawn from these examples is that the public 
debate has a dynamic nature in which the members of the groups may move from 
supporting some proposals to another. In addition, another conclusion can be that in 
the past decade the proposals supporting deeper reductions and minimum deterrence 
posture seem to come into favorable position among the circles outside the US 
government in the debate. As noted earlier, a number of nuclear abolitionists now 
propose to reduce the number of the US nuclear weapons to a level around 1000 
warheads. As some argue, the rationale behind this change might have been the 
reality of the extreme character of abolition proposals failing to challenge the US 
official polices. Since the US “could/would never drop to zero strategic nuclear 
weapons and therefore the proposal should not be taken seriously.” However, by 
encouraging cooperation around, say, 1000 warheads or less, this may be better 
position to go the ultimate goal.586  
Second, the future role of nuclear weapons seems to remain at the center of 
US security debates, because the impossibility of testing the arguments against 
empirical evidences prevent the realization of any settlement or consensus in the 
debate. Hence, any argument cannot prevail over some others.  
                                                 
584 See Harold A. Feiveson and Frank N. von Hippel, “Beyond START: How to Make Much Deeper 
Cuts,” International Security, Volume 15, Issue 1, (Summer 1990), p. 155 
585 See Feiveson, op. cit., p. 17 
586 See, Hall, Capello, and Lambert, op. cit. 
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Finally, with regard to the implications of this debate on the developments of 
US official nuclear policy, it will be correct to say that the debate has not had – and 
may not - substantial impacts on the future of US official nuclear strategy, or on the 
side of the future role of nuclear weapons. However, it challenges the traditional 
beliefs about utility of nuclear weapons. Since the end of the Cold War, the US 
nuclear strategy and force level has been shaped in accordance with the preferences 
of the Pentagon. The nuclear posture reviews as the blueprints of the US nuclear 
strategy rejected proposals either for the nuclear disarmament or for racially reducing 
the number of the US nuclear weapons. Only did it become possible for the US 
administrations to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons after the Pentagon 
reviewed the requirements for deterrence such as targeting policy and force 
vulnerability as clearly demonstrated in the 1994 and 2001 nuclear posture 
reviews.587  
The US shows a continued commitment to the ultimate elimination of nuclear 
weapons as a long-term goal, as envisaged under NPT Article VI. However, as noted 
earlier, Clinton administration's Nuclear Posture Review showed that the United 
States would continue to rely on nuclear weapons as the ultimate resort for its own 
security and to defend its important alliances. In addition, more than a decade since 
the end of the Cold War, the most recent NPR articulates neither the going down to 
zero level of nuclear weapons nor radically reducing the number of nuclear weapons, 
rather maintaining a robust deterrence and rejecting a possible Comprehensive Test 
                                                 
587 As some argue, “a bigger impediment to President Bush's dream of reducing the U.S. nuclear 
arsenal may be his own Pentagon.” See John Barry, Evan Thomas, and Sharon Squassoni, “Dropping 
the Bomb,” Newsweek, 06/25/2001, Vol. 137, Issue 26, available on line at: ehostvgw4.epnet.com 
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Ban Treaty. Nor does it mention new declaratory polices such as no first use, or de-
alerting.588   
Moreover, as some argue while it seems that the envisaged reduction under 
the Bush Administration’s NPR, to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 “operationally 
deployed” warheads would go further than the proposed START II and START III 
level, however in fact this reduction will not be so much deep. Because of the 
Administration’s counting rules -“not count the warheads on delivery vehicles that 
are in overhaul or otherwise unavailable for nuclear missions”- in reality the number 
of US nuclear warheads would be closer to a level of 3,000 warheads.589 Against this 
background, it is possible to say that the traditional approach to nuclear weapons has 
continued to exist in the US official nuclear policy since the end of the Cold War.  
                                                 
588 The Bush administration’s review argues that US will continue to “make every effort to maintain 
the stockpile without additional nuclear testing.” However, “this may not be possible for the indefinite 
future.” In addition, on the de-alerting issue, it states only that “the US forces are not on "hair trigger" 
alert and rigorous safeguards exist to ensure the highest levels of nuclear weapons safety, security, 
reliability, and command and control.” See Nuclear Review Excerpts, op. cit. 
589 See Amy F. Woolf, “The Nuclear Posture Review: Overview and Emerging Issues,” CRS Report 
for Congress, Order Code RS21133, January 31, 2002, available on line at: www.uspolicy.be/Issues/ 
Defense/crsnpr.pdf 
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APPENDIX A 
TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS1 
 
Signed at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 
Ratification advised by U.S. Senate March 13, 1969 
Ratified by U.S. President November 24, 1969  
U.S. ratification deposited at Washington, London, and Moscow March 5, 1970  
ProclaimedbyU.S.PresidentMarch5, 1970  
Entered into force March 5, 1970 
 
 
The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty,”  
Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to 
make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,  
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,  
In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an 
agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,  
Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on 
peaceful nuclear activities,  
Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the 
framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding 
effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at 
certain strategic points,  
Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any 
technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear 
explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties of the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon 
or non-nuclear weapon States,  
Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest 
possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the 
further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,  
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to 
undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,  
Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,  
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the 
atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test 
explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,  
Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to 
facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and 
the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty 
on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,  
Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or 
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and 
                                                 
1 See Arms Control Association: Treaties, the Text of Treaty On The Non-Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons, 
available on line at: www.armscontrol.org 
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maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the 
worlds human and economic resources,  
Have agreed as follows:  
Article I 
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or 
indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or 
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or 
explosive devices.  
Article II  
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor 
whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive 
devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices.  
Article III  
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an 
agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the 
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agencys safeguards system, for the exclusive 
purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing 
diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 
Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special 
fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside 
any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied to all source or special fissionable 
material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out 
under its control anywhere.  
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) 
equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable 
material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable 
material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.  
3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV 
of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international 
cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material 
and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with 
the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.  
4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in 
accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall 
commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their 
instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence 
not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after 
the date of initiation of negotiations.  
Article IV  
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to 
develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in 
conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.  
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible 
exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with 
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other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due 
consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.  
Article V  
Each party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, 
under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits 
from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party 
to the Treaty on a nondiscriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will 
be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to 
the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, 
through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. 
Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-
weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.  
Article VI  
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to 
cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and 
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.  
Article VII  
Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the 
total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.  
Article VIII  
1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall 
be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if 
requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a 
conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.  
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, 
including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the 
amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment 
upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of 
ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the 
amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the 
amendment.  
3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in 
Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of 
the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority 
of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, 
the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.  
Article IX  
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry 
into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.  
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of 
accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the 
Depositary Governments.  
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated 
Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of 
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ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded 
a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967.  
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of 
this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.  
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each 
signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of 
this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.  
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter of the 
United Nations.  
Article X  
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides 
that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of 
its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations 
Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it 
regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.  
2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether 
the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This 
decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.  
Article XI  
This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be 
deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted 
by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.  
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty. 
DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this first day of July one thousand nine 
hundred sixty-eight. 
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APPENDIX B 
START PROCESS2 
Treaty Basic elements Other issues (Counting Rules, Other Provisions) 
START   I 
• 1,600 deployed ballistic missiles including ICBMs and SLBMs 
and heavy bombers for each side 
• 6,000 "accountable" warheads on these systems, of which no 
more than 4,900 may be on ballistic missiles, 1,540 on heavy 
missiles (the Soviet SS-18), or 1,100 on mobile ICBMs.  
• Ballistic missile throw-weight (lifting power) is limited to 
3,600 metric tons on each side. 
 
• No more than 1,250 warheads may be removed and not 
counted ("downloaded") from existing multiple-warhead 
ballistic missiles 
• Heavy bombers equipped only with bombs or short-range 
attack missiles (SRAMs) are counted as carrying one 
warhead each 
• Soviet heavy bombers may carry no more than 16 ALCMs 
each. The first 180 of these bombers count as carrying only 
8 ALCMs each 
• Reductions are scheduled to be completed in December 
2001 (7 years after the treaty entered into force in 
December 1994) 
• Separate "politically binding" agreements limit sea-
launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) with ranges above 600 
kilometers to 880 for each side and the Soviet Backfire 
bomber to 500. 
 
START II 
• By December 31, 2007, the United States and Russia are to 
deploy no more than 3,000 to 3,500 strategic nuclear warheads 
each on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers 
• By December 31, 2003, the sides are to "deactivate" all 
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to be eliminated under the 
treaty by removing their nuclear reentry vehicles or taking other 
jointly agreed steps 
 
 
• All SS-18 "heavy" Russian missiles must be destroyed. 
• No more than 1,700 to 1,750 warheads may be deployed on 
SLBMs. 
• Reductions in strategic nuclear warheads, as well as the de-
MIRVing of ICBMs, may be achieved by "downloading" 
(removing) warheads from a missile. Once removed, 
warheads may not be restored to downloaded missiles. 
• The number of weapons counted for heavy bombers will be 
the number they are actually equipped to carry.  
• Provided they have never been equipped for long-range 
nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), up to 100 
heavy bombers may be "reoriented" (shifted without 
physical conversion) to conventional roles and will not 
count against the overall limits 
START 
III 
• By December 31, 2007, coterminous with START II, the 
United States and Russia will deploy no more than 2,000 to 
2,500 strategic nuclear warheads each on ICBMs, SLBMs and 
heavy bombers.  
• Measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear 
warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear 
warheads as well as other jointly agreed technical and 
organizational measures to promote the   irreversibility of deep 
reductions. 
• The United States and Russia will resolve issues related to the 
goal of making the current START treaties unlimited in 
duration 
 
 
• In the context of START III negotiations their experts will 
explore, as separate issues, possible measures relating to 
nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) 
and tactical nuclear systems, to include appropriate 
confidence-building and transparency measures. 
• The United States and Russia will also consider issues 
related to transparency in nuclear materials 
                                                 
2  The figure is based on data taken from Arms Control Association Fact Sheet, available on line at: 
www.armscontrol.org /FACTS/ 
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APPENDIX C 
            Current Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Former Soviet Union  
                                    (As the date of July 31, 2001)3  
Number of "START-Accountable"  
Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles 
 Russia  Ukraine  Kazakhstan  Belarus  
ICBMs 742 13 0  0  
SLBMs 376 0  0  0  
Bombers 80  0 0  0  
Total 1,198  13  0  0  
 
Number of "START-Accountable" Strategic Warheads1 
 Russia  Ukraine  Kazakhstan  Belarus  
ICBMs 3,364 130 0 0 
SLBMs 1,868 0  0  0  
Bombers 626  0 0  0  
Total 5,858  130  0  <0  
  
Current U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces (As date of December 5, 2001) 4 
Number of "START-Accountable" Strategic 
Nuclear Forces Delivery Vehicles Warheads 
ICBMs 551 1,701 
SLBMs 432 3,120 
Bombers 255 1,128 
Total 1,238  5,949  
 
 
Notes: Ukraine completed the transfer of nuclear warheads back to Russia in 1996 but continues to destroy delivery systems, including 
missile silos and heavy bombers that remain START accountable until their final destruction. Sources: START Memoranda of 
Understanding of September 1, 1990 and July 31, 2001 and the Arms Control Association 
                                                 
3 Figures are taken from Arms Control Association: Treaties, Current Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Former 
Soviet Union, October 2001, available on line at: www.armscontrol.org 
4 Figures are taken from Arms Control Association: Treaties, Current U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces, January 
2002, available on line at: www.armscontrol.org 
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APPENDIX D 
NUCLEAR-SMUGGLING INCIDENTS UNTIL 19965  
 
  
                SITES OF NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENTS: 
 5 OR MORE                 2 TO 4       1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 This figure is taken from Phil Williams And Paul N. Woessner, The Real Threat of Nuclear Smuggling, 
Scientific American, January 1996 Volume 274 Number 1 Pages 40-44 available on line at: 
www.sciam.com/0196issue/0196williams.html 
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APPENDIX E 
                                    NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW: 2001 6 
 
 New Environment: 
 
 
 
 Capabilities-Based Approach: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 This figures are taken from J.D. Crouch, DoD News Briefing, Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review, 
09 January 2002, available online at: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/g020109-D-6570C.html 
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The New Triad: 
 
 
 
 
 Planned Reduction: 
 
 
